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Abstract 
By reviewing the literature, we find a clear gap in studying the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms on asymmetric information in general and in the UK capital market in particular. 
Accordingly, the main objective of this research is to establish a practical guidance for 
corporate governance mechanisms (internal and external) that can be used to control, mitigate 
or reduce asymmetric information. 
The empirical work includes three studies. The first study examines the effect of some 
corporate governance variables (related to some. internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms) on asymmetric information. The second study examines the effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms using the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) indexes' values on 
asymmetric information. The third study examines if corporate governance variables could be 
used as predictors for the degree of asymmetric information and for the corporate governance 
indexes' values. 
Using a sample of 392 non-financial UK companies listed in the London Stock Exchange from 
2003 to 2006, the results of the first study indicated that board and committees' sizes, activities 
and independence; executive compensation; the number of investors inside the company and 
debt financing are significantly negatively related to asymmetric information. The ratios of 
insiders' ownership and block (institutional) ownership are significantly positively related to 
asymmetric information. 
The results of the second study indicated that the corporate governance sub-indexes which are 
related to board, audit, compensation and ownership are significantly negatively related to 
asymmetric information. Also, corporate governance's general and industry indexes are 
significantly negatively related to asymmetric information. The negative relations of corporate 
governance variables and indexes with asymmetric information which resulted from the first 
and second studies indicated that the higher the quality of corporate governance the lower the 
degree of asymmetric information. 
Based on the results of the first and second studies, the results of the third study indicated that 
corporate governance variables could be used in predicting asymmetric information degree 
(high or low) and the rates of corporate governance indexes with a higher degree of 
significance and accuracy. 
This research has several contributions to make to the financial literature and practices. First, 
the research examines comprehensively the effect of corporate governance mechanisms 
on asymmetric information. Second, the research unified the theoretical thinking for corporate 
governance and asymmetric information under the agency theory. Third, the research examines 
empirically if the financial ratios which include Volatility, Leverage and Volume are good 
proxy measures of asymmetric information. Fourth, the idea of measuring the effect of 
corporate governance as a group of indexes (rather than variables) on the degree of asymmetric 
information is a new idea and added a new technique in studying the effect of corporate 
governance on asymmetric information. Fifth, predicting corporate governance indexes' rates 
and the degree of asymmetric information has added new contributions in the literature of 
corporate governance and asymmetric information. Accordingly, all stockholders and 
stakeholders of a company can use these predictions in building their investment and financial 
strategies. Hence, this adds new dimensions to the studies in the corporate governance area, 
and also provides a starting point for future research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
RESEARCH 
CHAPTER ONE 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
1.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance is a process in motion, and the practice of corporate governance 
has developed radically in the last few years. All countries around the world are now 
aiming to issue new codes for corporate governance. These codes have generally been 
drawn up in reaction to events or crises and respond directly to the economic, social, 
political and public concerns, Mallin (2007). This leads to a variety of governance 
systems around the world that have a powerful national effect. 
The main goal of corporate governance mechanisms is to solve any existing or 
potential agency problems. The agency problems are related to the divergence of the 
economic interest of the agent (manager of the firm) from those of the principal 
(investor in the firm) in whose interest the agent is supposed to act; and this leads to 
the existence of asymmetric information between the agent and the principle. Klein et 
al. (2002, p. 318) stated that, "in corporate finance, asymmetric information refers to 
the notion that firm insiders, typically the managers, have better information than do 
market participants on the value of their firm's assets and investment opportunities". 
So, information asymmetry is a main cause of the agency problem and the solution for 
this problem requires a mechanism or some mechanisms of corporate governance 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2007; Rutherford and Buchholtz, 2007; Chen et al., 2007). 
This research focuses on the role of corporate governance mechanisms (internal and 
external) in controlling, reducing or mitigating asymmetric information between 
managers and shareholders in UK companies. Also, the research seeks to uncover if 
the UK companies' compliance with the combined code on corporate governance 
(2003) is solving the problem of asymmetric information. Moreover, this research 
examines the effect of corporate governance on asymmetric information using some 
corporate governance indexes (calculated by the Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS)). The main objective of using these indexes is to examine if these indexes 
2 
actually measure the quality of corporate governance, or not. Finally, the research 
seeks to predict the degree of asymmetric information and the rates of corporate 
governance indexes using corporate governance variables. 
In this chapter we will discuss the research's historical background, problem, 
significance and plan. 
1.2 Historical Background and Research Problem 
Although the theoretical exploration of the subject is relatively new, the practice of 
corporate governance is ancient (Tricker, 2005). "Adrian Cadbury cites Cicero in 
conveying the original meaning of this contested concept. Governance is a word with 
a pedigree that dates back to Chaucer' and in his day the word carried with it the 
connotation wise and responsible, which is appropriate. It means either the action of 
governing or the method of governing and it is in the latter sense it is used with 
reference to companies" (Clarke, 2007, p. 2). 
The practice of corporate governance started with the emergence of the corporation in 
16002. The early publication of "the wealth of nations" in 1776, which is written by 
Adam Smith, had supported the importance of the corporations and explicit that 
optimal market efficiency depends on the owners of capital being directly involved in 
its management (Dragomir, 2008). "Modern managerial structures began to appear in 
the 1850s and 1860s as industrialization increased the complexity of business 
operations. However, the public limited liability corporation, in which a shareholder's 
liability was limited to their investment, took hold only in the 1900s. Since their 
creation, corporations have initiated the rise of the professional manager ", (Green, 
2005, pp. 11-12). 
Corporate Governance has been developed over several decades, primarily in USA and 
UK. As a result of the various financial scandals and collapses in the beginning of last 
decade, each year has seen the introduction, or revision, of a corporate governance 
'Geoffrey Chaucer (born 1343 in London) was an English author, poet, philosopher, bureaucrat, courtier 
and diplomat. Sometimes called the father of English literature. 
2 Early examples of chartered corporation include the East India Company, formed in 1600, Virginia 
Company formed in 1606 and Bank of England formed in 1694, Dragomir (2008). 
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code in a number of countries (Mallin, 2007). In the UK, The growth in corporate 
governance codes started with Cadbury code (1992), then Greenbury Report (1995), 
Hampel Report (1998), Combined Code (1998), Turnbull (1999), Myners (2001), 
Higgs (2003), Smith (2003), Combined Code (2003), Revised Turnbull Guidance 
(2005), and finally Combined Code (2006)3. Around the world, the Cadbury code and 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) principles, in 
particular, have each played a major role in the development of corporate governance 
codes. 
The birth of the modern corporate governance theory returned back to Jensen and 
meckling (1976) and Freeman (1984) as developers of the Agency Theory and 
Stakeholder Theory. The Agency Theory had been developed by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). They defined an agency relationship as "a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service 
on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent", (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308). The Stakeholder Theory had been 
developed by Freeman in 1984. He outlined and developed the basic features of the 
concept in a book entitled "Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach". The 
Stakeholder Theory broadens the agency relationship and extends it to all parties who 
can affect, or be affected by, an organization (Sternberg, 1997; Jones 1995). The 
Stakeholder Theory placed the researchers in finance and economics into a debate over 
whether corporations should maximize value for stockholders or act in the interests of 
their stakeholders (Jensen, 2001). 
Regardless of the theory which the corporations hold, and the advantages and 
disadvantages related to each theory, every theory tries to find cost effective solutions 
or ways or mechanisms to solve conflicts which happen between managers and 
stockholders or stakeholders (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007; Rutherford and Buchholtz, 
2007; Chen et al., 2007). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 738) defined Corporate Governance Mechanisms as 
"economic and legal institutions that can be altered through the political process- 
3 For more detail, see Mallin (2007, p. 21). 
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sometimes for the better". Jensen (1993) provides a classification of governance 
mechanisms that can be used to protect the rights of shareholders or stakeholders. His 
classification divides the corporate governance environment in terms of external 
mechanisms and internal mechanisms. 
The internal corporate governance mechanisms include many variables related to board 
size and composition, executive compensation, and ownership structure. The external 
corporate governance mechanisms include many variables related to market for 
corporate control and the legal system (Le et al., 2005; Denis and McConnell, 2003)4. 
By reviewing the literature we find that there is a clear gap in studying the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and asymmetric information. 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) argued that studying the relationship between corporate 
governance and changes in information asymmetry in non-announcement periods is an 
interesting question for future research. All papers which examine the relation between 
corporate governance and asymmetric information deal with different aspects or 
mechanisms of corporate governance. Some papers find that board independence 
reduces asymmetric information (Becker-Blease and Irani, 2008; Rutherford and 
Buchholtz, 2007; Kanagaretnam et al., 2007; Cai et al., 2006; Hillier and McColgan 
2006; Guercio et al., 2003). Other papers reflect the importance of executive 
compensation in reducing the agency problem and mitigating asymmetric information 
(Kang et al., 2006; Tevlin, 1996; Wruck, 1993). 
Some papers reflect different results regarding the effect of ownership structure on 
asymmetric information. The first category of results states that large shareholders are 
able to reduce asymmetric information and improve long-term performance (Campbell 
and Frye, 2006; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; Florackis and Ozkan, 2008; Li and 
Jeong-Bon (2004); Perotti and Thadden, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The second 
category of results finds that higher institutional ownership, particularly a higher 
number of institutional investors, is associated with a lower degree of informed trading 
and not all types of institutions can cause decreases in adverse selection costs as a 
4 We discuss this classification in detail in chapter two. 
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measure of asymmetric information (Clarck, 2007; Fehle, 2004; O'Neill and Swisher, 
2003; Heflin and Shaw, 2000). 
Accordingly, we state the research problem in the following question: 
What is the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on asymmetric information 
in general and in the UK corporations in particular? 
1.3 Research Objectives 
According to the research problem, the main objective of this research is to establish a 
practical guidance for corporate governance mechanisms that can be used by the 
corporations in general, and in the UK in particular to control, minimize or mitigate the 
degree of asymmetric information. Based on this objective, the sub-objectives are: 
First, identifying the most effective corporate governance mechanisms applied in the 
UK capital market that can be used to control, reduce or mitigate asymmetric 
information. 
Second, examining empirically the role of corporate governance mechanisms in 
controlling, reducing or mitigating the problem of asymmetric information in the UK 
capital market. 
Third, examining empirically if the ISS' corporate governance indexes rates actually 
measure the quality of corporate governance, and if the quality of corporate 
governance affect the degree of asymmetric information. 
Fourth, examining if we can use corporate governance variables to predict the ISS' 
corporate governance indexes' rates. 
Fifth, examining empirically if we can use corporate governance variables to predict 
the degree of asymmetric information in the UK companies. 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
In spite of the extensive and in-depth research in the area of corporate governance and 
also in the area of asymmetric information, there is little evidence about the role of 
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corporate governance mechanisms in controlling, reducing or mitigating asymmetric 
information. In contrast to the existing literature, we provide a comprehensive review 
of the relationship between corporate governance and asymmetric information grouped 
around four main hypotheses concerning the relation between the characteristics of the 
board, committee activity, performance based compensation, ownership concentration 
and asymmetric information. 
Also, despite the fact that there is little evidence regarding the relation between 
corporate governance variables and asymmetric information, the research is trying to 
identify the best blend or the optimal mix of corporate governance mechanisms which 
could be used to mitigate the degree of asymmetric information. Up to our knowledge, 
there is no previous study has tried to identify the best mix of corporate governance 
mechanisms to solve agency problems or mitigate asymmetric information as a main 
reason of agency problems. Most of previous studies have tried to relate between only 
on mechanism of corporate governance and examine its effect on agency cost or 
asymmetric information. But we claim that it is difficult for the companies to work 
with only one mechanism for corporate governance. Internal mechanisms must 
combine with external mechanisms to solve agency problems and more specifically the 
information asymmetry problem between managers and shareholders. 
Moreover, the study concentrates on the idea of measuring the effect of corporate 
governance as a group of indexes (rather than variables) on the degree of asymmetric 
information. We use the ISS' indexes as new measures for the quality of corporate 
governance in the UK capital market to examine its effect on asymmetric information. 
Finally, up to our knowledge, there is no evidence regarding the prediction with 
corporate governance quality or asymmetric information degree. Predicting with 
asymmetric information and the ISS corporate governance indexes' rates is a main 
motivation for this study. Accordingly, all stakeholders of a company can use these 
predictions in building their investment and financial strategies. 
7 
1.5 Research Plan 
The research plan is organized as follows: 
Chapter two discusses the theoretical and conceptual background of corporate 
governance. Further, the chapter discusses the literature of the main corporate 
governance mechanisms (internal and external). Also, we mention the differences 
between corporate governance practices between countries. Finally, we conclude with 
the necessity of interaction between internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
Chapter three discusses the theoretical and conceptual background of asymmetric 
information. Next, we present the main measures of asymmetric information as a step 
to identify the main variables which are affected by asymmetric information. Also, the 
chapter discusses the boundaries of asymmetric information. Finally, the chapter 
reviews the literature regarding the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and asymmetric information. 
Chapter four discusses the methodological issues regarding the relationship between 
corporate governance variables and asymmetric information. It covers the research 
questions, objectives, variables, hypotheses and design. 
Chapter five discusses the descriptive analysis, Pearson correlation, multiple 
regression analysis, and the robustness analysis results of the effect of corporate 
governance variables on asymmetric information. 
Chapter six discusses the methodological issues of corporate governance indexes. 
Then, we present the results of the descriptive analysis, Pearson correlation, and simple 
and multiple regression analyses which are related to the effect of corporate 
governance indexes on asymmetric information. 
Chapter seven discusses the methodological issues and the empirical results of using 
the probit and the ordered probit regression in predicting the rates of corporate 
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governance indexes and the degree of asymmetric information using corporate 
governance variables. 
Chapter eight concludes the thesis by summarizing the main ideas and conclusions of 
each chapter. In addition, it describes the contributions to the existing literature, 
limitations of the study and the extensions for future research. 
9 
CHAPTER TWO 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
THEORIES, CONCEPTS, MECHANISMS AND PRACTICES 
10 
CHAPTER TWO 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
THEORIES, CONCEPTS, MECHANISMS AND PRACTICES 
2.1 Introduction 
The subject of corporate governance is vast and complicated. It is too difficult to find 
or arrive at a general theory, definition, mechanism or type of practice of corporate 
governance. There are many reasons for this complexity: 
First of all, the combined economic and social roles of the corporations make some 
writers concentrate mainly on the concept of agency theory. This holds that value 
maximization for shareholders is the general and economical objective of the 
corporation, and managers must focus their efforts to attain this objective. Others 
concentrate on the concept of stakeholder theory, which holds that there are multiple 
objectives that must be attained for all stakeholders who are affecting or affected by 
the activities of corporations. 
Second, the diversity of governance systems around the world means that forms or 
mechanisms (internal and external) of corporate governance are shaped according to 
economic, political and legal backgrounds, sources of finance and the history and 
culture of each country. Firms in the USA and the UK (and other Anglo-Saxon 
countries) largely depend on legal protection of investors. In much of Continental 
Europe as well as in Japan, there is more reliance on banks and large investors. In the 
rest of the world, ownership is greatly focused in families, with a small number 
involving large outside banks and investors (Denis and McConnel, 2003). 
Finally, there has been a movement and dramatic development in corporate 
governance in the last two decades. All countries all over the world are now trying to 
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issue new codes (like the combined code on corporate governance (2003) issued in 
UK) for corporate governance. These codes have been drawn up in reaction to events 
or crises, and respond immediately to the public, economic, social and political 
concerns. 
In this chapter we review theories, definitions, mechanisms and practices of corporate 
governance and concentrate mainly on the literature review regarding the mechanisms 
of corporate governance. 
2.2 Theoretical Background of Corporate Governance 
There are different theories related to the concept of corporate governance. Each 
theory represents a stage in the development of the concept of corporate governance. 
Theories of corporate governance are interrelated; each new theory puts a new idea, 
new thinking or new block into the development of the corporate governance concept. 
Each of the separate theories throws light on some aspects of corporate governance and 
cannot capture the theoretical basis as a whole. In general, writers who are interested in 
theories of corporate governance agree with two theories of corporate governance, 
which are the theory of agency, and the theory of stakeholder 
5 (Charreaux, 2004; 
Clarke, 2004; Turnbull, 2000). So, we concentrate in this chapter on two theories 
which are: 
2.2.1 The Theory of Agency. 
2.2.2 The Theory of Stakeholder. 
2.2.1 The Theory of Agency 
"The agency relationship is one of the commonest and oldest codified modes of 
social interaction. An agency relationship has arisen between two (or more) parties 
5 There are other theories for corporate governance which are the Stewardship Theory, Transaction Cost 
Economics Theory and The Resource Dependence Theory, (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Clarke, 2007; 
Mallin, 2007). In contrast to Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory posits that managers are essentially 
trustworthy individuals and so are good stewards of the resources entrusted to them. The Transaction 
Cost Economics Theory is related to the Agency Theory, but it sees the firm as a governance structure 
rather than a nexus of contracts as viewed by the Agency Theory (Williamson, 1988). The Resource 
Dependence Theory maintains that the board is an essential link between the firm and the essential 
resources that it needs to maximise performance. 
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when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the 
other, designated the principal, in particular domain of decision problems" Ross 
(1973, p. 134). Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 318) defined an agency relationship as 
"a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent". 
Therefore, the delegation of decision making from the principal to agent is a problem. 
Because the interests of the principal and agent will diverge, the principal cannot 
perfectly and costlessly control the actions of the agent and monitor and attain the 
information available to, or owned by the agent. These form the agency problem 
which means the possibility of opportunistic behaviour on the part of the agent that 
works against the welfare of the principal. "The agency problems arise because of the 
impossibility of perfectly contracting for every possible action of an agent whose 
decisions affect both his own welfare and the welfare of the principal. Arising from 
this problem is how to encourage the agent to act in the best interests of the 
principal" (McColgan, 2001, p. 4). Also, Hauswald and Marquez (2006, p. 1) argue 
that "agency problems between the board and shareholders may lead to inefficient 
levels of both monitoring and disclosure': 
Hence, we conclude that the theory of agency deals with the agency problem which 
can be summarized as the type of problem that arises from: first, the divergence of the 
economic interest of the agent (manager of the firm) from those of the principal 
(investor in the firm) in whose interest the agent is supposed to act; and second, the 
existence of information asymmetry between the agent and the principle as to what 
activities the former has undertaken (Al-Baluchi, 2006). 
Also, it is important to highlight the generality of the agency problem. The problem of 
making a "manager" to manage as if he were maximizing the "stakeholder's" welfare 
is general (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It exists in all organizations and in all 
cooperative efforts - at every level of management in firms, in mutual companies, in 
cooperatives, in universities, and bureaus, in unions and in governmental authorities. 
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The agency problem incurs the agency costs to protect the principal's interests and to 
minimize the opportunity that agents will behave badly. So, agency costs can be seen 
as the value of loss to stockholders, arising from differences of interests between 
stockholders and corporate managers (McColgan, 2001). Jensen and Meckling (1976, 
p. 308) defined the agency costs as "the sum of. 
A. The monitoring expenditures by the principal, 
B. The bonding expenditures by the agent, 
C. The residual loss". 
A. Monitoring costs "are expenditures paid by the principal to measure, observe and 
control an agent's behaviour" (McColgan, 2001, p. 5). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argued that the principal can minimize the differences from his interest by establishing 
suitable compensation for the agent, and by creating monitoring costs designed to 
minimize the abnormal activities of the agent. They may contain the expenditure of 
audits, writing executive compensation contracts, and ultimately, the cost of firing 
managers. Originally these expenditures are paid by the principal, but Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argue that they will finally be borne by an agent, as their reward will be used to 
face these costs. 
B. Bonding Costs "are costs borne by the agent, they are likely to set up structures 
that will see them act in shareholder's best interests, or compensate them 
accordingly if they don't" (McColgan, 2001, p. 5). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued 
that in some situations the agent will use resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he 
will not take specific actions which would harm the principal, or to ensure that the 
principal will be rewarded if he does take such actions. Bonding costs are not always 
financial. They may contain the expenditure of additional information disclosures to 
the principal, but management will clearly have the advantage of preparing these 
themselves. Agents will impede incurring bonding costs when the marginal decrease in 
monitoring equals the agent increase in bonding costs. However, it is normally 
unattainable for the principal or the manager (at zero cost) to guarantee that the agent 
will make the best possible decisions from the principal's perspective. In most agency 
interactions, the principal and the manager will incur positive monitoring and bonding 
costs (non-financial as well as financial) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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C. Residual Loss "is the reduction in the value of the firm that obtains when the 
entrepreneur dilutes his ownership" (Williamson, 1988, p. 572). Also, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, p. 308) defined the residual loss as: "The dollar equivalent of the 
reduction in welfare experienced by the principal as a result of the divergence". 
They happen because the expenditure of enforcing shareholder-manager contracts 
would far outweigh the advantages derived from doing so. While managerial actions 
are unobviously ex-ante, to completely contract for every state of nature is unrealistic. 
The result of this is a best level or residual loss, which may characterize a swap 
between excessively restricting management, and enforcing contractual tools designed 
to decrease agency problems (McColgan, 2001). 
All of the agency costs or losses arise from divergences of interest between two parties 
to a contract. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) argue that the separation of ownership and 
management, and the presence of asymmetric information, introduce the possibility of 
principle-agent conflicts, as the manager's self interest may lead to misuse of company 
assets. Cloninger (1995) argues that if agency contracts are well-specified and 
enforced, it would not pay agents to favour other interests at the expense of the 
shareholder. Both theoretical and empirical research argued four key problematic 
areas in the agency theory: 
A. Moral hazard, 
B. Earnings retention, 
C. Risk aversion, and 
D. Time-horizon. 
A. Moral-Hazard Agency Conflicts 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) first suggested a moral-hazard clarification of agency 
divergences. Proposing a condition where a particular manager owns the company, 
they develop a model whereby his motivation to consume private benefits, rather than 
investing in positive net present value investments, enlarges as his ownership stake in 
the company decreases. McColgan (2001) argued that managers could select projects 
suited to their private personal expertise. Such projects increase the value to the 
company of the manager, and increase the expenditure of replacing him, permitting 
managers to take out higher levels of compensation from the company. Moral-hazard 
problems are also associated with a lack of managerial effort. As managers possess 
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smaller equity stakes in their companies, their motivation to work may reduce. It is 
difficult to directly measure such an avoidance of responsibilities by managers. 
Moral-hazard problems are possibly more dominant in bigger companies (Jensen, 
1993). While bigger companies attract more external monitoring, increasing company 
size enlarges the complexity of the firm's contracting nexus exponentially. This will 
have the outcome of increasing the difficulty of controlling, and consequently, increase 
these costs. 
B. Earnings Retention Agency Conflicts 
Managers like to maintain earnings, but shareholders like higher levels of cash 
dividends, particularly where the company has little internal positive net present value 
investment chances. Managers gain from retained earnings, as size increase awards a 
stronger power base, better status, and a capability of leading the board and prizing 
themselves with higher levels of compensation (Jensen and Smith 1995, Jensen 1993). 
This decreases the amount of a firm's particular risk within the company, and as a 
result, supports executive job protection. However, finance theory states that investors 
will already hold diversified portfolios. Therefore, additional corporate diversification 
may be different from their concerns. 
McColgan (2001) stated that gains to stockholders in undiversified companies are 
better than for those who had tried to decrease their exposure to risk through this 
diversification. Also, they found that the value of these companies is decreased as they 
diversified further. Such earnings retentions decrease the need for external financing 
when managers need finances for investment plans. 
C. Time Horizon Agency Conflicts 
McColgan (2001) explained that divergences of interest may also happen between 
stockholders and managers concerning the timing of cash flows. Stockholders will be 
concentrating on all future cash flows of the company. Conversely, management may 
only be concentrating on company cash flows for their term of employment, leading to 
unfairness in support of short-term high accounting returns projects, without regard for 
long-term positive net present value investments. The scope of this problem is 
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increased as top managers move towards their retirement, or have made plans to leave 
the company. 
D. Managerial Risk Aversion Agency Conflicts 
Divergences concerning managerial risk aversion happen because of portfolio 
diversification restrictions with regard to managerial earnings. Should private investors 
wish to diversify their holdings they can do so at small cost. McColgan (2001) 
comments that the majority of a company director's human resources are tied to the 
firm they work for, and consequently, their income is mainly reliant upon the 
performance of their company. They may try to reduce the risk of their company's 
shares. Hence, they may try to keep away from investment decisions which raise the 
risk of their company, and follow varying investments which will decrease risk 
(Jensen, 1986). Myers and Majluf (1984) find that managers invest in every project 
they know to have positive net present value (NPV). 
Dey (2008) argues that the existence and role of various governance mechanisms in a 
firm are a function of the level of agency conflicts in the firm. He find that firms with 
greater agency conflicts have better governance mechanisms in place, particularly 
those related to the board, audit committee, and auditor. Accordingly, we conclude that 
the agency conflicts are the main sources of agency costs and each of them (agency 
conflicts and agency costs) are main aspects in the theory of agency. At the same time, 
the goal of the theory of agency is to find the most cost-effective governance 
mechanisms to solve any existing or potential agency problems. 
2.2.2 The Theory of Stakeholder 
The theory of stakeholders has its pedigree in sociology, organizational behaviour, the 
politics of special interests, and managerial self-interest. The theory is now accepted, 
and has obtained the formal support of many professional associations, special interest 
groups, and governments, including the current British government (Jensen, 2001). 
Adam Smith's recognition of outside interests to the company could be seen as an old 
identification of stakeholders. In the last thirty years, the term "stakeholder" has come 
to have a specialized meaning in discussions of corporate governance. Freeman (1984) 
developed the basic characteristics of the concept in a book named "Strategic 
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Management: A Stakeholder Approach". The word was meant to oversimplify the idea 
of the stockholder as the single group to whom management need to be reactive. 
The concept of stakeholder was initially defined as "those groups without whose 
support the organization would cease to exist " (Sternberg, 1997, p. 3). This definition 
of stakeholder includes all those who affect the organization. Freeman (1984, p. 46) 
defined a stakeholder broadly as "any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the firm's objectives". Indeed, he saw such widely 
disparate groups as local community organizations, environmentalists, consumer 
advocates, governments, special interest groups, and even competitors and the media 
as legitimate stakeholders (Clement, 2005). According to the last definition, the 
meaning of stakeholders shifted from those who affect the organization, to those who 
are affected by it. As a result of this change, the number of groups identified as 
stakeholders has increased dramatically. 
Sternberg (1997, p. 3) modified Freeman's definition of stakeholder as "stakeholders 
are those who can affect, or more affected by, an organization": Jensen (2001, p. 236) 
argued that "Stakeholder theory says that managers should make decisions that take 
account of the interests of all the stakeholders in a firm. Stakeholders include all 
individuals or groups who can substantially affect, or be affected by, the welfare of 
the firm -a category that includes not only the financial claimholders, but also 
employees, customers, communities, and government officials. " 
The last definitions show up the major features of the stakeholder theory. Donaldson 
and Perston (1995) identified three main features of stakeholder theory. These features 
are Descriptive/Empirical, Instrumental and Normative. Firstly, the theory is used to 
describe or to clarify particular corporate characteristics and behaviour (the descriptive 
aspect). Secondly, the theory is used to discover the relationships, or lack of 
relationships between management and stakeholder, and the attainment of established 
objectives by the company (the instrumental aspect). Finally, the theory is used to 
understand the corporation's purpose, including the classification of ethical or 
theoretical rules for the corporations' management and operation (the normative 
aspect). 
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In spite of the advantages of the stakeholder theory, it placed the researchers in finance 
and economics in a discussion over whether companies have to maximize value or 
work for stakeholders' interests. This discussion is generally understood in terms of the 
second issue, and is regularly falsely outlined as stockholders versus stakeholders. 
Jensen (2001, p. 237) explained that "the real conflict here is whether the firm should 
have a single-valued objective function or scorecard". The failure to outline the 
problem in this way has added greatly to extensive misinterpretation and debate. 
Accordingly, Sternberg (1997,2004) identified four criticisms for the theory of 
stakeholder which are: 
A. Stakeholder Theory is Incompatible with Business 
Because business is understood as the activity of maximizing long-term ownership 
value, the first thing to be said against stakeholder theory is that it is not a model of, or 
even compatible with business. The theory was originally proposed as a way of 
improving strategic planning in business, and more recently as a way of making 
business conduct itself more ethically (Sternberg, 1997,2004). To explain the 
difficulties arising from the numerous objectives that accompany stakeholder theory, 
Jensen (2001) explained the suitable relation between value maximization and 
stakeholder theory by proposing a new corporate objective function called enlightened 
value maximization, and it matches with what he named enlightened stakeholder 
theory. Enlightened value maximization employs much of the construction of 
stakeholder theory, but recognizes maximization of the long-term value of the 
company as the measure for making the essential tradeoffs among its stakeholders. 
Enlightened stakeholder theory, places the centre of attention on meeting the orders of 
all important corporate areas, and identifies long-term value maximization as the 
objective of the firm, yet, it is difficult to know how to make the tradeoffs among these 
orders. 
Despite of this criticism we see that the theory could be compatible with business. The 
new corporate objective function which called enlightened value maximization by 
Jensen means that the attainment of the other stakeholders' objectives will help in 
attaining the value maximization objective. For example, the satisfaction of customers' 
needs by producing high quality products will help in gaining more earnings and as a 
result will help in maximizing the shareholders wealth. 
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B. Stakeholder Theory is Incompatible with Corporate Governance 
Sternberg (1997, p. 5) stated that "stakeholder theory is incompatible with good 
corporate governance as it is with business. Because the key concept in corporate 
governance is accountability: the accountability of directors to shareholders, and the 
accountability of corporate employees and other corporate agents to the corporation 
via the directors". Jensen (2001) supported this criticism, and argued that stakeholder 
theory successfully leaves directors and managers without accountability for their 
stewardship of the companies' resources. Without a measure for performance, we can 
not evaluate managers. It permits directors and managers to allocate the company's 
resources to their own preferred reasons, without being accountable for the result of 
such expenses on the value of the firm. 
C. The Stakeholder Theory of Accountability is Unjustified 
Sternberg (1997, p. 5) stated that "stakeholder theory cannot serve as a useful model 
of corporate governance in any traditional sense; it destroys, rather than supports, 
conventional corporate accountability. Can stakeholder theory justify its alternative 
doctrine, that corporations, and more generally organisations, should be 
accountable to all their stakeholders? The first thing to note is that although this 
precept is both essential to stakeholder theory and highly contentious, attempts are 
seldom made to justify it". Starting from the fact that an organisation is affected by 
and affects certain factors, most stakeholder theorists simply assume that it must be 
accountable. Key (1999) supports the same idea, and explained that the theory does not 
sufficiently address the dynamics which link the firm to the stakeholders that are 
6 identified. 
D. Stakeholder Theory Weakens Private Property, Agency and Wealth 
6 For example, Sternberg (1997, p. 6) argue that" One (typically implicit) argument for accountability to 
all stakeholders, is that which points to performance. It is sometimes suggested that the best way to 
achieve business success is not to concentrate narrowly on financial outcomes, but to strive instead to 
delight customers, to empower employees, to form lasting partnerships with suppliers, etc. And to the 
extent that such strategies enhance motivation, or improve quality, they may well be justified as effective 
means for achieving the business end. But the practical success of stakeholder-oriented strategies does 
not and cannot justify accountability to stakeholders. Establishing accountability to all stakeholders 
requires showing that they have legitimate authority over the business, not that they are functionally 
useful to it. As the property of its owners, a business is properly accountable only to them ". 
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Sternberg (1997,2004) stated that stakeholder theory weakens private property, 
because it denies owners the right to decide how their possessions will be used. On this 
point, as possessions are held or utilised by organisations, stakeholder theory confirms 
that those possessions have to be employed for the assistance of all stakeholders. 
The last criticisms of the theory of stakeholder do not imply the weakness of it, but 
there are some difficulties in identifying how to make the tradeoffs between the 
multiple objectives of the stakeholders. In other words, how can enlightened value 
maximization be attained? This means meeting the orders of all main corporate areas, 
and identifies long-term value maximization as the objective of the firm. 
After this short analysis of the two main theories in corporate governance, we conclude 
that regardless of the theory which the corporations hold, every theory must try to find 
cost effective solutions, or ways or mechanisms to solve conflicts which occur between 
management and stockholders or stakeholders. 
2.3 Corporate Governance Definitions 
There are no agreed definitions or boundaries for defining or investigating corporate 
governance (Solomon, 2007; Turnbull, 2000). Melis (1998) argued that "most of the 
literature on the subject comes from an Anglo-American perspective. Although 
corporate governance is not a new issue among scholars (e. g. Smith, 1776; Berle 
and Means, 1932), there is little doubt that it is only during the 1990s that 
governance has become a key issue for all people with a stake in the business 
world". "The most direct and useful definition of corporate governance is that 
employed in the UK report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance. Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled" (Clarke, 2007, p. 2). Since there are many definitions of corporate 
governance, we will divide them according to the theory (the agency or stakeholder 
theory) which the definitions serve. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737) defined corporate governance as "the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment". According to this definition, the suppliers of finance need to be sure that 
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managers will give some of the profits to them, that managers will not steal the 
investment, and that they will not invest it in bad investments; they also need to feel 
that they will be able to control the managers. Denis and McConnell (2003, p. 2) 
defined corporate governance as "the set of mechanisms - both institutional and 
market-based - that induce the self-interested controllers of a company (those that 
make decisions regarding how the company will be operated) to make decisions that 
maximize the value of the company to its owners (the suppliers of capital)": Boubakri 
et al. (2005, p. 370) defined corporate governance as "a response to the agency 
problems that arise from the separation of ownership and control in a corporation". 
Also, Larcker (2005, p. 1) defined corporate governance as "the set of mechanisms 
that influence the decisions made by managers when there is a separation of 
ownership and control"The last definitions are concentrated mainly on the concept 
of agency theory, and define corporate governance as the mechanisms that are in place 
to deal with the agency problem which can occur between managers and shareholders. 
Other definitions concentrate mainly on the concept of stakeholder theory. Sanda et al. 
(2005, p. 1) defined corporate governance as " ways in which all parties interested in 
the well-being of the firm (the stakeholders) attempt to ensure that managers and 
other insiders take measures or adopt mechanisms that safeguard the interests of the 
stakeholders". Also, Turnbull (2000, p. 4) supports the last definition, and defines 
corporate governance as "all the influences affecting the processes for appointing 
those who decide how operational control is exercised to produce goods and services 
and all external influences affecting operations or the controllers": Baums and Scott 
(2003, p. 2) argued that "corporate governance can be, and sometimes is, defined so 
broadly as to encompass every force that bears on corporate decision-making. That 
would include not only the control rights of stockholders, but also the contractual 
covenants and insolvency powers of debt holders, the commitments entered into with 
employees and customers and suppliers, the regulations issued by governmental 
agencies, and the statutes enacted by parliamentary bodies. And in a still more 
comprehensive sense, a company's decisions are powerfully affected by competitive 
conditions in the various markets in which it transacts, and indeed by the social and 
cultural norms of the society in which it operates". 
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From the last two groups of definitions for corporate governance, it is clear that the 
writers defined the concept from their point of view, or to serve the theory which they 
support. But, all writers agreed that there are ways, influences, or mechanisms that 
must be used to handle the conflicts which occur between managers and shareholders 
or stakeholders. In the following section we will discuss the mechanisms of corporate 
governance, showing the most important results from the empirical studies. 
2.4 Corporate Governance Mechanisms: Literature Review 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 738) defined corporate governance mechanisms as 
"economic and legal institutions that can be altered through the political process - 
sometimes for the better": Jensen (1993) provides a typology of governance 
mechanisms that can be used to protect the rights of shareholders given the separation 
of ownership from control. His typology classifies the corporate governance 
environment in terms of external mechanisms and internal mechanisms. Denis and 
McConnell (2003) stated that the internal mechanisms of main interest are the board of 
directors and the equity ownership concentration of the firm. The main external 
mechanisms are the external market for corporate control (the takeover market) and the 
legal/regulatory system. There are other classifications for corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as market-based mechanisms (external) and corporate structure- 
based mechanisms (internal) (Le et al., 2005). As most of the literature classifies 
corporate governance mechanisms into internal and external mechanisms, we will 
follow the same classification. 
2.4.1 Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
We will classify the literature related to internal corporate governance mechanisms 
according to the classification of Jensen (1993) and Denis and McConnell (2003), into: 
2.4.1.1 The board of directors' literature, and 
2.4.2.2 The ownership concentration's literature. 
2.4.1.1 The Board of Directors 
Corporate governance research recognizes the essential role performed by the board of 
directors in monitoring management (Kent and Stewart, 2008; Florackis and Ozkan, 
2008; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Fama and Jensen, 1983). "Boards of directors are 
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economic institutions that help solve the agency problems inherent in managing any 
organization" (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003, p. 1). Most empirical work on boards 
has been aimed at answering questions related to board size and composition and 
executive compensation. So, we classify the literature review related to the board of 
directors into: 
2.4.1.1.1 Literature related to board size and composition 
2.4.1.1.2 Literature related to executive compensation 
2.4.1.1.1 Board Size and Composition 
The board of directors is the official first line of defence against managers who would 
act contrary to shareholders' interests (Denis and McConnell, 2003). Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) stated that most empirical work aimed at studying one of three 
subjects. First, studying board characteristics such as composition or size and how it 
affects profitability. Second, studying board characteristics and if it affects the 
observable actions of the board. Third, studying the factors which affect the makeup of 
boards and how they develop over time. 
The composition of the board is different from one country to another and these 
differences cause many differences in the results of the empirical studies. Denis and 
McConnel (2003) stated that boards of directors in Europe are mainly unitary, as in the 
USA and the UK. In some European countries, however, boards are two-tiered? (Hopt 
and Leyens, 2004). Also, the codes of best practice have been issued in a number of 
European countries, starting with the UK in 1992. The code recommends that boards 
of UK corporations comprise at least three outside directors and a splitting of the 
positions of chairperson and CEO. The code is voluntary, but an explanation is 
required if a company is not in compliance (comply or display). These differences 
between countries regarding the composition of the board and its size cause differences 
in the literature results. 
Regarding the board size and composition and its effect on firm value and 
performance, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) survey the economic literature on boards 
A two-tiered structure is mandatory in some countries, e. g. Germany and Austria, and optional in 
others, e. g. France and Finland. Two-tier boards generally consist of a managing board, composed of 
executives of the firm, and a supervisory board. In Germany, representation of employees on the 
supervisory board is mandatory. 
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of directors in the USA. The key results from the empirical literature on boards are: 
First, board composition is not related to corporate performance. Second, board size is 
negatively related to corporate performance. Third, both board composition and size 
are correlated with the quality of the board's decisions like acquisitions, CEO 
replacement, executive compensation, and poison pills. Fourth, boards appear to 
change over time according to the bargaining power of the CEO compared with the 
current directors. Finally, firm performance, CEO turnover, and changes in ownership 
structure appear to be key factors affecting changes to boards. 
Also, there is much evidence consistent with theories that small boards and board 
independence have strong influence on firm value and performance. Guercio et al. 
(2003) examined whether board composition and director independence in closed-end 
investment US companies is related to shareholder interests. Using data for 467 closed- 
end funds in existence in December 1994, they find that funds with low expense ratios 
have smaller boards, a higher proportion of board members who are legally considered 
independent and low director compensation. Bohren et al. (2004) confirmed the same 
results using data from the Oslo Stock Exchange. They find that performance 
decreases with increasing board size. Also, Yermack (1996) finds an inverse 
relationship between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large US industrial 
corporations between 1984 and 1991. Companies with small boards reveal more 
positive values for financial ratios, and present stronger CEO performance incentives 
from compensation and the risk of firing. 
Using a sample of 1,005 industrial US bond issues from 1991 to 1996, Bhojraj et al. 
(2002) provide evidence linking board composition to higher bond ratings and lower 
bond yields. They find firms that have stronger outside control of the board, enjoy 
lower bond yields and higher ratings on their new bond issues. 
To examine the relationships between institutional influences and stakeholder 
representation on boards of directors, Luoma and Goodstein (1999) use data from 224 
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) over the period of 1984 to 
1994. They indicated that differences in legal environments, industry regulations, and 
firm size are associated with stakeholder representation on boards, but do not affect 
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stakeholder representation on key board committees. Legal environments and firm size 
are associated with the adoption of stakeholder-oriented board committees. 
Also, Baysinger and Butler (1985) studied performance differences across corporations 
as a function of differences in board independences and changes in independences 
occurring using 266 US firms as a sample during the period from 1970 to 1980. They 
find that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors have superior 
performance records. 
In non-US countries the literature has Kedialar results regarding board size and 
independence. In the UK, Hillier and McColgan (2006) examined the development of 
company board structure during a period of corporate governance reform. They 
followed the board structure of a sample of non-financial companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) over the period of 1992 to 1997 following the 
publication of the Cadbury Report (1992). They find indications of an increase in the 
independence of UK boards. Moreover, they find that boards change more in response 
to changes in managerial control, equity issuance and corporate performance than due 
to changes in the companies' operating environment. 
For a large sample of UK companies, Florackis (2005) investigated the relationship 
between internal corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance. The 
results support the existence of a non-linear impact of both managerial ownership and 
managerial compensation on company performance. Also, there is strong evidence that 
managerial ownership and managerial compensation work as alternative mechanisms 
in mitigating agency problems. 
O'Sullivan and Diacon (2003) examined the use and the value of non-executives in the 
insurance industry. They examined board features for a sample of 53 UK life insurance 
companies over the period from 1984 to 1991. The results suggested that mutual 
insurers utilize a larger ratio of non-executive directors and are less likely to have 
CEO/chairman duality than their proprietary counterparts. Proprietary companies, 
which are subject to stronger shareholder and capital market control, put less 
confidence on non-executive monitoring. 
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Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) examined interlinks between executive and non- 
executive characteristics, share ownership, and short-term performance measured in 
terms of share offer `under-pricing'. Using a sample of 251 IPOs in the UK, they find 
that executives' power and previous experience directly affect ex-ante choice of non- 
executive directors and their ownership interests in the firm. These endogenously 
developed governance factors may be strategically used by IPO teams to reduce the 
extent of under-pricing. However, there is a selective response by investors to different 
board characteristics and share ownership structures. 
Erickson et al. (2005) examined the relationship between board composition and firm 
value using publicly traded Canadian firms over the 1993 to 1997 period. They showed 
that board independence does not have a positive effect on firm value, and that weakly 
performing firms raise the percentage of outside directors in the following periods. 
However, directors from financial institutions can provide monitoring benefits. 
Moreover, the negative effect of dual-class common stock on firm value is reduced by 
board independence, the participation of officers from financial institutions, and audit 
committee independence. 
Kiel and Nicholson (2003) studied the relationship between board demographics and 
corporate performance in 348 of Australia's largest publicly listed companies in 1996. 
They find that board size is positively related to firm value. Moreover, there is a 
positive relationship between the percentage of inside directors and company 
performance. 
In the emerging markets there was little evidence about corporate governance 
mechanisms in general, and about board composition in particular. Black et al. (2005) 
constructed a corporate governance index for 515 Korean companies based on a 2001 
Korea Stock Exchange survey. The results reflected a relationship between an overall 
governance index and higher share prices. They find that Korean firms with 50% 
outside directors have a 0.13 higher Tobin's q value (roughly, a 40% higher share 
price). 
Firth et al. (2006) use data on top management turnover in China's listed firms. The 
results reflected a very high turnover of company chairmen. Moreover, chairman 
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turnover is associated with a firm's profitability, but not to its stock returns. Turnover- 
performance sensitivity is higher if legal entities are major shareholders. They did not 
find evidence that profitability improves after a change in chairman. 
Snada et al. (2005) used data for the period 1996 through 1999 for a sample of 93 firms 
listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange to examine the relationship between internal 
governance mechanisms and firm financial performance. They indicated that 
separating the positions of CEO and Chair works in favour of the company. The results 
indicated the need to retain a board size of ten persons. Unlike the results in developed 
countries, they explain no significant evidence to support the idea that outside 
directors' help increase firm performance. One more feature of the results is that firms 
run by expatriate CEOs tend to perform better than those run by indigenous ones. 
Yeh and Woidtke (2005) examined the determinants of board composition and firm 
valuation as a function of board composition using 251 non-financial firms in Taiwan. 
The results suggested that there is weak governance when the board is directed by 
members who are affiliated with the controlling family, but good governance when the 
board is directed by members who are not affiliated with the controlling family. In 
particular, board affiliation is higher when there are negative entrenchment effects, and 
lower when positive incentive effects are strong. Moreover, relative firm value is 
negatively related to board affiliation in family-controlled firms. 
Some literature concluded different results regarding board size and composition. Chin 
et al. (2004) investigated the relationship between firm performance and board 
composition, size and equity ownership structure for a sample of 426 annual 
observations of New Zealand firms across a five-year period. No statistically 
significant relationships have been found. They concluded that this may be due to 
endogenous factors, or due to the small size of the New Zealand pool of corporate 
directors. 
Alshimmiri (2004) examined the relationship between board compensation, executive 
remuneration and corporate performance. Using a sample which included 167 firms 
listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange, the results indicated that there is a negative 
relationship between managerial compensation and firm performance. Moreover, the 
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results reflected a nonlinear relationship between board size and firm performance. The 
relationship is negative when board size is small, and it turns positive when board size 
grows. 
Other papers concentrate mainly on board and CEO turnover. Eldenburg et at. (2004), 
in a sample of California hospitals, find that the composition of the board of directors 
varies systematically across ownership types. For all ownership types, except 
government-owned, they find that poor financial performance is related to board and 
CEO turnover. 
Gibson (2003) examined whether corporate governance is ineffective in emerging 
markets. He estimated the link between CEO turnover and firm performance for over 
1,200 firms in eight emerging markets. The results indicated that CEOs of emerging 
market firms are more likely to lose their jobs when their firm's performance is weak, 
suggesting that corporate governance is not ineffective in emerging markets. 
Moreover, there is no link between CEO turnover and firm performance for the firms 
with a large domestic shareholder. He concluded that corporate governance appears to 
be ineffective in emerging market firms. 
Anderson et al. (1998) follow a sample of 199 US firms from 1985 to 1994. They 
examine the association between firm diversification and firm ownership structure, 
including holdings of the CEO, officers and directors, and outside block-holdings. 
They find that CEOs in diversified firms have lower stock ownership. However, 
diversified companies have more outsiders on the board, no economic difference in 
independent block-holdings, and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance is 
Kedialar to that in single-segment firms. Moreover, they find no evidence that failures 
of internal governance mechanisms are associated with the decision to diversify, or 
that governance characteristics explain the value loss associated with diversification. 
The rest of the literature concentrates on different aspects related to the composition of 
the board and their monitoring and informational role in decision making. Boone et al. 
(2006) examined the idea that boards are adapted to features of the companies they are 
planned to manage. Using Compustat data from 1019 US companies that went public 
from 1988 to 1992, they found that: first, board size and independence increase as 
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firms grow in size and expand over time. Second, board size reveals a trade-off 
between the firm-specific benefits of monitoring and the costs of such monitoring. 
Third, board independence is negatively related to the manager's influence and 
positively related to limitations on such influence. 
Using panel data from New Zealand firms for the financial years 1991 to 1997, Ahmed 
et al. (2006) examined whether the information usefulness of annual accounting 
earnings varies with the fraction of outside directors serving on the board, and board 
size. They find that earnings' informativeness is negatively related to board size, but is 
not related to the fraction of outside directors serving on the board. 
Yoshikawa and Phan (2005) investigated the relationships between ownership and 
board structure with the diversification strategy of large Japanese firms. Using a 
sample consisting of 228 publicly traded Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange for the period between 1996 and 1998, the results showed that corporate 
nominee directors are associated with lower levels of product diversification of their 
firms. This suggested that nominee directors in large Japanese corporations see 
themselves as representing specific interests, and therefore investors should pay 
attention to board composition in order to assess the level of protection they can expect 
to receive. Even without any apparent agency problem with management, there 
remains a potential "principal-principal" problem. 
O'Regan et al. (2005) studied the governance cultures in Irish information and 
communications technology (ICT) companies. The results indicated that ICT 
companies adopt structures and cultures like those in more companies in other sectors. 
Though there is proof that Irish ICT companies have responded positively to calls for 
the functions and responsibilities of non-executive directors to be applied. 
Jonnergard et al. (2004) studied how boards of directors respond to changes in the 
Swedish pattern of corporate governance, by studying the behaviour of boards of 
Swedish publicly listed companies in 1994 and 1999. The results revealed significant 
changes in the decision criteria applied by the boards and their activities. 
Simultaneously, the results indicated no significant changes concerning directors' 
attitudes toward the role of the stock market or other governance mechanisms between 
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1994 and 1999. They interpret that as there being a direction for performers to change 
their behaviour in accordance with their expectations about change, while changes in 
value systems are more static. 
Weir and Laing (2003) examined the relationship between the board composition and 
ownership structure. Using 332 UK companies, 166 acquired during 1997 and 1998 
and 166 non-acquired companies, they find significant governance variations between 
acquired companies and the control sample. Companies with the following features 
were more likely to be acquired: they had the same person acting as CEO and chair, a 
higher proportion of non-executive directors, larger institutional shareholdings and 
higher director shareholdings. An analysis of small firms also found evidence of higher 
CEO shareholdings. They also find that treating all takeovers as a single group leads to 
a model mis-specification which does not identify the incentive effects of board and 
CEO shareholdings present in non-hostile acquisitions. 
O'Sullivan and Wong (1999) support the last idea, and investigated whether there are 
significant differences in board composition, executive ownership and external 
shareholder control in a sample of hostile takeover targets and a control group of non- 
target firms in the UK for the period of 1989 to 1993. The results indicated that hostile 
targets are more likely to have different persons in the roles of chairman and CEO. 
Fiegener et al. (2000) investigated whether CEO ownership in small private firms is 
related to board composition. They surveyed 2,365 small private firms. The results 
indicated that CEOs with greater ownership and family stakes have less independent 
board composition. 
Coles and Hesterly (2000) examined the role of leadership structure and board 
composition using a sample consisting of 247 firms. The results indicated that there is a 
significant effect between board composition and the independence of the board 
chairman. Also, there is a critical monitoring role for outside directors, and inside 
directors provide a major informational role in board decision-making processes. 
All in all, after analysing the literature related to board size and composition, which is 
summarized in table 2.1, we conclude the main following results: 
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First, board size is negatively related to corporate performance and positively related 
to firm value. In some cases, in some developing countries, board size has no relation 
to firm value and performance. 
Second, board composition, like the number of non-executive directors and 
chairman/CEO split, is positively related to firm value and performance, but some 
literature concludes that board composition is not related to corporate performance. 
Third, board and CEO turnover is negatively related to firm performance. 
Fourth, board independence is positively related to firm performance and value. In 
some cases, board independence has no relation to performance. But, greater 
independence of the board leads to lower value and performance of the firm. This may 
result from firms acting to appease unhappy investors by adding outside directors. 
Fifth, CEO ownership and family ownership are negatively related to board 
independence. 
Sixth, splitting the roles of chairman and CEO, and the existence of non-executive 
directors, decreases the chance of acquiring the firm by hostile takeover. But, a larger 
institutional shareholding and higher directors' shareholdings increase the chance of 
acquiring the firm by hostile takeover. 
2.4.1.1.2 Executive Compensation 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explained that incentive contracts are indeed common in 
practice. A vast amount of empirical literature on incentive contracts in general, and 
management ownership in particular, documents a positive relationship between pay 
and performance, and thus rejects the extreme hypothesis of complete separation of 
ownership and control. The compensation issue that is important from the viewpoint of 
corporate governance is the amount to which executive compensation unifies or aligns 
the interests of top executives with those of shareholders (Denis and McConnell, 
2003). McConvill (2006) argued that for determining executive pay, the pay-for- 
performance methodology is derived from a specific assumption about the actions and 
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incentives of executives in corporations. The assumption argues that the interests of the 
principal and the agent are not actually aligned. To solve the problem of this 
nonalignment assumption, Florackis and Ozkan (2008) stated that managerial 
compensation plays an important role in mitigating the agency cost. 
The empirical and theoretical research on executive compensation presented a 
complete and new explanation of pay exercises for chief executive officers (CEOs) in 
the US, and was summarized by Murphy (1998, p. 35) as follows: "First, levels of pay 
are higher, and pay performance sensitivities are lower, in larger firms. Second, 
levels of pay and pay performance sensitivities are lower in regulated utilities than in 
industrial firms. Third, levels of pay and pay performance sensitivities are higher in 
the US than in other countries. The analysis has also documented that pay- 
performance sensitivities are driven primarily by stock options and stock ownership 
and not through other forms of compensation. Fourth, levels of pay and pay- 
performance sensitivities in the US have increased substantially over the last decade, 
driven primarily by an explosion in stock-option compensation" 
There are also some empirical studies in the USA related to compensation as a 
corporate governance mechanism. Harvey and Shrieves (2001) find that the degree of 
incentive compensation is related to other characteristics of corporate governance, as 
well as to aspects affecting managerial risk aversion. Using a sample comprising 290 
firms randomly selected from the Compustat database, the results supported the 
following conclusions. First, the existence of non-executive directors and block- 
holders helps in applying incentive compensation. Second, incentive compensation is 
inversely related to the use of leverage. Third, there is a decrease in the incentive pay 
component for CEOs near, or at retirement age. Accordingly, there is a reduction in the 
percentage of firm stock already owned by the CEO. 
Regarding equity-based compensation, Kang et al. (2006) evaluated the interaction 
between corporate investment spending and executive incentive structure (measured by 
the weight placed on equity-based compensation), where both investments and 
incentive structure were endogenously determined. Joint estimation of the investment 
and the compensation models indicates that long-term business investment is 
significantly related to incentives delivered to top management through equity-based 
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compensation. Using the S&P ExecuComp database, which contains the 1992 to 2000 
compensation data for US executives, they find a significant positive correlation 
between compensation structure and investment, which is consistent with the 
prediction that equity-based compensation plays an important role in providing 
investment incentives to managers. 
Whether the composition of director compensation has an effect on CEO turnover, 
Perry (1999) finds a significant increase in applying incentive-based compensation for 
directors. Incentive compensation for directors affects the level of monitoring by the 
board. Also, the likelihood of CEO turnover following poor performance increases 
when directors of independent boards receive incentive compensation. Moreover, the 
probability of a company adopting a stock-based incentive plan for directors is 
positively associated with the percentage of independent directors on the board and the 
ownership of institutional investors in the company. 
Whether CEO compensation is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights, 
Jiraporn et al. (2005) find that first, CEOs of firms where shareholder rights are weak 
obtain more encouraging compensation. Second, higher CEO pay is related to a higher 
degree of managerial entrenchment. Third, CEOs of firms with governance provisions 
that offer them protection from takeovers have higher pay. Fourth, the CEO is able to 
obtain higher incremental compensation when shareholder rights are weak. Fifth, when 
shareholders' wealth decreases, there is no equivalent reduction in CEO compensation 
when shareholder rights are weak. 
Regarding the negotiation process between the CEO and the Board of Directors (BOD) 
in designing CEO compensation, Cyert et al. (2002) find that equity ownership of the 
major external shareholder is negatively correlated with the size of CEO equity 
compensation. Moreover, the equity ownership of the BOD is more significant in 
managerial compensation control than other BOD related variables are, such as board 
size, or the proportion of non-executive directors. 
The non-US evidence on executive compensation has been relatively limited. Ozkan 
(2007) examined the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the level of 
CEO compensation for a sample of 414 large UK companies for the fiscal year of 2003 
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to 2004. The results indicated that board and ownership structure explained the 
variation in the total CEO compensation. Companies with larger board size and a 
higher proportion of non-executive directors pay their CEOs higher compensation. 
Also, institutional ownership and block-holder ownership have a significant and 
negative impact on CEO compensation. Finally, CEO compensation is lower when the 
directors' ownership is higher. 
Conyon (1997) examined the impact of corporate governance innovations on top 
director compensation in a sample of 213 large UK companies between 1988 and 
1993. She found that directors' compensation and current shareholder returns are 
positively correlated. There is also some evidence that governance variables play an 
important role in shaping top director pay. Companies that adopt remuneration 
committees are seen to have lower growth rates in top directors' compensation. 
Separating the roles of CEO and chairman appears to play no part in shaping directors' 
pay. 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between board remuneration and performance 
of a sample of large Spanish listed companies during the period of 1990 to 1995 were 
presented by Cladera and Gispert (2003). The results confirmed the positive 
relationship between board remuneration and company performance, which is stronger 
for book values than for stock market measures. 
The results are somewhat Kedialar in the developing countries regarding compensation 
and performance. Firth et al. (2007) examined whether a CEO's pay depends on the 
firm's performance. The findings showed a positive pay-performance relationship in 
China, when performance is measured as a return on assets. Thus, firms reward their 
CEOs when their firms have good operating profits. Also, Kato and Long (2005) 
provide evidence on how executive compensation relates to firm performance in listed 
firms in China. Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's listed 
firms from 1998 to 2002, they find statistically important sensitivities, and of annual 
cash (salary and bonus) compensation for top executives. In addition, sales growth is 
significantly linked to executive compensation. Moreover, ownership structure of 
China's listed firms has important effects on the pay-performance link in these firms. 
Particularly, state ownership of China's listed firms brings about a declining pay- 
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performance link for top managers, and thus probably makes China's listed firms less 
effective in solving the agency problem. 
To investigate how top management pay is determined in a family firm environment 
where even listed firms are effectively controlled by a single individual or a single 
family, Cheng and Firth (2006) use data from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange for the 
period of 1994 to 2002. The results showed that executive directors' pay is reduced if 
the directors have substantial stockholdings. Moreover, pay is related to profits but not 
to stock returns. The results were consistent with external block-holders and 
independent non-executive directors persuading firms to base top management 
compensation on a firm's profitability. 
All in all, after analysing the literature related to the executive compensation - which is 
summarised in table 2.2 - we conclude the main following results: 
First, levels of pay are higher, and pay-performance sensitivities are lower, in larger 
firms; also, levels of pay and pay-performance sensitivities are higher in the USA than 
in other countries. 
Second, the presence of outside directors and block-holders increases the use of stock- 
based incentives. 
Third, incentive compensation for independent directors on the board is positively 
related to CEO turnover following poor performance. 
Fourth, equity-based compensation increases investment incentives and is positively 
related to firm performance and value. 
2.4.1.2 Ownership Structure 
Ownership and control are rarely split within any company. The directors and 
managers commonly have some level of ownership of the firms they control. Some 
owners effectively have some control over the firms they possess. Thus, ownership 
structure is an important element of corporate governance (Denis and McConnell, 
2003). Investors can get more effective control rights by being large. Shleifer and 
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Vishny (1997, p. 753) explained that "when control rights are concentrated in the 
hands of a small number of investors with a collectively large cash flow stake, 
concerted action by investors is much easier than when control rights, such as votes, 
are split among many of them". So, Lemmon and Lins (2003, p. 1445) argue that 
"Ownership structure is a primary determinant of the extent of agency problems 
between controlling insiders and outside investors": Also, Florackis and Ozkan 
(2008) find that managerial ownership and ownership concentration seem to play an 
important role in mitigating agency costs. 
Denis and McConnell (2003, p. 11) stated that "of the various corporate governance 
mechanisms that have been studied in the US, ownership structure is the mechanism 
that has been studied most extensively in the rest of the world". The results of 
empirical studies are different with the differences in ownership structure in general, 
and the types of shareholders (other corporations, institutions, families and 
government) in particular, and also when examining the differences between countries' 
corporate governance systems (market-centered systems, i. e., the USA and UK, and 
bank-centered systems, i. e., Germany and Japan). 
Miguel (2005) examined the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. The results indicated that ownership concentration and insider ownership 
levels are determined by numerous organizational characteristics such as investor 
protection, development of capital markets, effectiveness of boards, and activity of the 
market for corporate control. Also, the relationship between ownership concentration 
and performance is not directly affected by these organizational characteristics. 
Moreover, there is a direct effect of corporate governance characteristics on the 
relationship between insider ownership and performance. 
Most of the literature regarding the ownership structure as a mechanism for corporate 
governance concentrates mainly on the type of ownership and its relation to corporate 
value and performance. Shen et al. (2006) examined the relationship between 
ownership structures, firm values, and the factors that formed the firm values. They 
find that book value per stock revealed a significantly positive relationship with the 
ownership ratio of the board of directors and supervisors. Also, the institutional 
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ownership ratio, and ownership ratio of the board of directors and supervisors, all have 
positive relationships. 
Also, Ben-Amar and Andre (2006) investigated the relationship between ownership 
structure and acquiring firm performance. They find that the average acquiring firm 
announcement period for abnormal returns for the sample of 327 Canadian transactions 
is positive over the 1998 to 2002 period. Cash deals, acquisitions of unlisted targets 
and cross-border deals have a positive impact on value creation. Governance 
mechanisms (outside block-holders, unrelated directors and small board size) also have 
a positive influence on the acquiring firm's performance. Additionally, the positive 
abnormal returns are greater for family firms. Also, ownership of a majority of the cash 
flow rights has a negative impact on announcement returns. 
To investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in post- 
privatization corporate governance, Boubakri et al. (2005) use a sample of 209 
privatized firms from 39 countries over the period of 1980 to 2001. The results 
indicated that firm size, industry affiliation and growth, privatization method, as well 
as the level of institutional development and investor protection, explain the cross-firm 
differences in ownership concentration. The positive effect of ownership concentration 
on firm performance matters more in countries with weak investor protection. 
Regarding the effect of concentrated ownership on monitoring, Heinrich (2000) 
showed that the large stakes of ownership make the owner less risk-tolerant. 
Accordingly, their incentives to monitor management are weakened, because 
monitoring shifts some of the firm's risk from management to owners. Moreover, the 
paper showed how the opportunity cost of concentrated ownership, which is the loss of 
risk-sharing benefits, makes the span to utilize leverage as an additional 
complementary governance tool. 
Also, to reflect the importance of ownership concentration as a mechanism of 
corporate governance, Gordon and Pound (1993) examined how information and 
ownership structure affect voting outcomes on shareholder-sponsored proposals to 
change corporate governance structure. Using a sample of shareholder-sponsored 
proposals, including 266 proposals from the 1990 proxy season, they find that the 
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outcome of the votes varies with the governance and performance records of target 
firms, the identity of proposal sponsors, and the type of proposal. Proposals receive 
more votes when they are sponsored by large institutional investors, active dissidents, 
and members of the United Shareholders Association. 
The empirical findings in different countries support those results. Edwards and Nibler 
(2000) stated that the German system of corporate governance involves a high 
concentration of the ownership of large firms, and the usual emphasis on the role of 
banks in supervision and monitoring. They analysed the relative significance of these 
two characteristics. The results indicate that high ownership concentration is more 
important than banks, which may influence corporate governance via their control of 
positions on supervisory boards, proxy votes, and provision of loan finance. They 
concluded that German large shareholders are playing a distinct role in governance of 
large companies than in any other country. 
In the Ukraine, Akimova and Schwodiauer (2004) examined the effect of ownership 
structure on corporate governance and performance using data taken from a survey 
conducted in 2001, on 202 medium and large firms in the Ukraine for the period of 
1998 to 2000. The results indicated that first, insider ownership has a significant non- 
linear effect on performance (positive within a lower range, but negative from a 
threshold close to majority ownership onwards). Second, outside ownership does not 
have a significant effect on performance. Third, customers' ownership affects sale 
prices and performance negatively. Finally, foreign ownership on performance is 
significantly non-linear (positive only up to a level that falls short of majority 
ownership). 
Also, Zheka (2005) examined the effects of different ownership structures for a set of 
Ukrainian joint-stock companies on corporate efficiency. The results indicated that 
first, domestic ownership of the company is found to improve efficiency the most. 
Second, managerial ownership has a weak effect on efficiency. Third, concentrated 
ownership rights (including state ownership) improve efficiency, possibly reflecting 
country-specific factors. Fourth, foreign owned companies are relatively inefficient; 
but foreign ownership is found to have a positive and significant effect on corporate 
governance quality. 
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Regarding managerial stock ownership and firm value, using a sample of US 
companies, Faccio and Lasfer (1999) find a strong negative relationship between the 
level of managerial ownership and the probability that the roles of chairman and CEO 
are split. However, the relationship between managerial ownership, firm value and 
board structure is generally weak. 
In Korea, Joh (2003) examined the relationship between ownership structure and 
performance during the financial crisis. Using 5,829 Korean companies during the 
1993 to 1997 period, the results indicated that companies with low ownership 
concentration show low firm profitability. Also, controlling shareholders expropriated 
company resources even when their ownership concentration was small. Companies 
with a high degree of difference between ownership rights and control rights, 
explained low profitability. Moreover, the negative effects of control-ownership 
difference and internal capital market inefficiency were stronger in publicly traded 
firms than in privately held ones. 
During the same period of the Korean financial crisis, Baek et al. (2004) argued that 
companies with higher ownership concentration by unaffiliated foreign investors 
experienced a smaller reduction in their share value. Companies that had higher 
disclosure quality and alternative sources of external financing also suffered less. On 
the contrary, Chaebol companies with concentrated ownership by controlling family 
shareholders experienced a larger fall in the value of their equity. Moreover, 
companies in which the controlling shareholders' voting rights went beyond cash flow 
rights, and those who borrowed more from the main banks, also had lower returns. 
In India, Deb and Chaturvedula (2003) investigated the relationship between 
ownership structure and value by testing for the "Monitoring and Expropriation" 
hypothesis as well as the "Convergence of Interest" and "Entrenchment hypothesis"8. 
The study provided evidence in support of the monitoring hypothesis. But they could 
8 The monitoring hypothesis means that dispersion of ownership creates a free-riding, problem-making 
manager's monitoring more difficult. The expropriation hypothesis means that the cost of expropriation 
by insiders exceeds the benefits of monitoring, leading to a decline in performance. The convergence of 
interest hypothesis says that the value of the firm increases as the management ownership rises. The 
entrenchment hypothesis means that insiders' ownership is too high, thus resulting in poor corporate 
performance. 
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not find any evidence in support of the expropriation hypothesis. Also, the paper 
reports evidence in support of both "convergence of interest" and the "entrenchment 
hypothesis". They find that there is no evidence of "Expropriation" by significant 
shareholders in Indian firms, but at a certain range of insider ownership, Indian 
managers get entrenched and firm value gets affected negatively. Also, Selarka (2006) 
used a much more disaggregated and uniform database from the Indian corporate 
sector for the year 2001, and examined the interaction between ownership structure 
and firm value. The results showed that minority block-holders have no effect on firm 
value at lower and higher levels of ownership, but they have a strong negative effect at 
moderate levels of ownership. Further, they showed that there are coordination 
problems between the largest two outsiders in a firm. 
In Spain, Miguel et al. (2003) examined the relationship between ownership structure 
and value in Spanish firms. The results reflected a non-linear relationship between 
value and ownership concentration. This result supports the monitoring and the 
expropriation effect for the very highest concentration values in Spanish firms. They 
concluded that the fact that Spanish majority shareholders manage to expropriate the 
wealth of minority shareholders, verifies the idea that variations in corporate 
governance systems lead to different value-ownership relations. 
In China, within the framework of corporate governance, Xu and Wang (1999) 
investigated whether ownership structure significantly affects the performance of 
publicly listed companies. The results showed that there is a positive and significant 
correlation between ownership concentration and profitability. The company's 
profitability is positively correlated with the ratio of legal person shares. Third, labour 
productivity tends to decrease as the stake of state shares increases. They concluded 
that a large institutional shareholding is an important mechanism in corporate 
governance. 
In Egypt, Abdel-Shahid (2003) examined the effect of ownership type on accounting 
and market performance indicators. Using the data of 90 Egyptian listed companies in 
the Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange, the results indicated that there is a high 
degree of ownership concentration. Also, the dispersed ownership percentage 
influences certain dimensions of accounting performance indicators (i. e. ROA and 
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ROE) but not stock market performance indicators (i. e. P/E and P/BV ratios). She 
concluded that there might be other factors (economic, political, and contextual) 
affecting companies' performance other than ownership structure. 
All in all, after analysing the literature related to ownership structure - which is 
summarized in table 2.3 - we conclude the main following results: 
First, in general, ownership structure has an important influence on both firm 
performance and value. 
Second, ownership concentration by any type of block-holders is positively related to 
firm performance and value. Hence, ownership concentration is a very effective way 
for corporate governance and for solving the problems of agency. 
Third, state-owned enterprises have - in most cases -a negative relationship with firm 
performance, productivity and value. 
Fourth, managerial ownership bears no relation to firm value and in some cases 
produces non-linear relationships with firm performance. But, it is a useful way to 
mitigate or minimize the agency costs and problems. 
Fifth, foreign ownership has - in most cases -a positive relationship with firm value 
and performance. 
Last, family ownership has different relations with firm value and performance 
regarding the differences between countries. 
2.4.2 External Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
The literature review for the external (market-based) corporate governance 
mechanisms can be divided into: 
2.4.2.1 The takeovers' literature review 
2.4.2.2 The large creditors' literature review 
2.4.2.3 The legal system's literature review 
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In the following we will discuss the empirical studies for each of them. 
2.4.2.1 Takeovers 
"When internal control mechanisms fail to a large enough degree - i. e. when the 
gap between the actual value of a firm and its potential value is sufficiently negative 
- there is incentive for outside parties to seek control of the firm" (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003, p. 4). In the UK and USA, two of the countries where large 
shareholders are less common, a particular mechanism for consolidating ownership has 
emerged, namely the hostile takeover. "In a typical hostile takeover, a bidder makes a 
tender offer to the dispersed shareholders of the target firm, and if they accept this 
offer, acquires control of the target firm and so can replace, or at least control, the 
management. Takeovers can thus be viewed as rapid-fire mechanisms for ownership 
concentration. " (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 756). 
Maher and Andersson (2000) stated that takeover threats can act as a successful 
mechanism and reduce the incentive for managerial opportunism. The USA, UK and 
Germany have active markets for corporate control. The y have active markets in 
mergers and acquisitions, and also, a significant number of hostile takeovers. The 
value of US mergers totaled about one trillion dollars in the mid-1980s, which equals 
about forty percent of the annual market capitalization. Over the last decade, there has 
been an average of over 200 mergers and acquisitions per year in the UK, against 50 in 
Germany. The takeover mechanism as a corporate governance mechanism is very 
disruptive and costly. Even in the USA and the UK it is rarely used. In most other 
countries it is almost absent. Up till now, hostile takeovers have received a great deal 
of attention from academic researchers (Becht et al., 2005; Jensen and Chew, 1995). 
The takeover market has its dark side for shareholders (Denis and McConnell, 2003). It 
can be a manifestation of the manager-shareholder agency problem. Managers 
concerned with increasing the size of their empires can expropriate corporate 
possessions by overpaying for takeovers rather than maximizing shareholders' wealth. 
So, the literature review in this area is divided into two categories. The first category 
examines the idea of takeovers, and the other category examines the idea of anti- 
takeover provisions. 
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As a broad assessment of the disciplinary role of the corporate takeover market, Kini et 
al. (2004) used a sample of US target firms over the period 1979 to 1998. The overall 
result was consistent with the view of the corporate takeover market as a "court of last 
resort, " that is, it is an external mechanism of control and monitoring that mediates 
when internal corporate governance mechanisms are relatively weak or ineffective. 
Mikkelson and Partch (1997) compared top management turnover in un-acquired US 
industrial companies during an active takeover market (1984-1988) and a less active 
takeover market (1989-1993). For firms in the lowest quartile of performance 
(measured by operating income scaled by assets), 33% experience complete turnover 
of the president, CEO, and board chair during the active takeover period, and only 17% 
experience complete turnover during the less active period. Controlling for various 
determinants of management turnover, they provided evidence that turnover and 
performance are related only in the active takeover period, and conclude that takeover 
activity affects the intensity of managerial discipline. 
Goldstein (2000) used a comprehensive sample of large US hostile takeovers from the 
years 1978 to 1989. He examined the most significant clarification of takeovers, the 
free cash flow theory of debt-financed restructuring. The results show little support for 
the free cash flow hypothesis that high-retention of corporate income, compared with 
investment opportunities, would differentiate targets from other companies. Firms with 
less debt are more expected to be a target for takeovers. On the other hand, Safieddine 
and Titman (1999) find that, normally, targets that stop takeover offers notably 
increase their leverage ratios. They suggested that leverage-increasing targets act in the 
interests of shareholders when they terminate takeover offers. Higher leverage assists 
companies stay self-governing not because it entrenches managers, but because it 
commits managers to create the developments that would be made by prospective 
raiders. 
Over the period of 1972 to 1987, Serveas (1991) examined the relationship between 
takeover gains and the q ratios of targets and bidders for a sample of 704 mergers and 
tender offers. The results indicated that target, bidder, and total returns are larger when 
targets have low q ratios and bidders have high q ratios. Also, the abnormal returns in 
tender offers are related to Tobin's q ratios of the targets and the bidders. Bidders with 
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high q ratios have significant positive abnormal returns when they engage in a 
takeover, while bidders with low q ratios have significant negative abnormal returns. 
Franks and Mayer (1996) examined the disciplining function of hostile takeovers in the 
UK in 1985 and 1986. They reported evidence of high board turnover and significant 
levels of post-takeover restructuring. Large gains are anticipated in hostile bids, as 
reflected in high bid premiums. However, there was little evidence of poor 
performance prior to bids, suggesting that the high board turnover does not derive from 
past managerial failure. Hostile takeovers do not, therefore, perform a disciplining 
function. Instead, rejection of bids appears to derive from opposition to post-takeover 
redeployment of assets and renegotiation over the terms of bids. 
Sinha (2004) examined the likelihood that underperforming firms with ineffective 
internal governance structures are the targets of hostile takeover bids using panel data 
for a matched sample of firms in the UK. The study did not find under-performance in 
firms as a significant factor in the likelihood of a hostile takeover bid. The study also 
compared the relationship between governance structure and performance for firms 
subject to a hostile takeover bid with firms that did not receive a tender offer. The 
empirical findings do not show that firms with relatively ineffective internal 
governance structures are the likely targets for hostile takeover bids. 
Sinha (2006) examined the effects of regulation and a contested market for corporate 
control on the internal mechanisms of corporate governance. The study focus was on 
two sectors, manufacturing and banking, due to their differences in the governance 
environment. In the UK, for the sample period used in this study, manufacturing was 
characterized by a contested market for corporate control with little or no regulatory 
interference. In banking, on the other hand, takeovers, hostile or otherwise, were 
absent, and ownership changes and board appointments were supervised by the 
regulator - the Bank of England. The results indicated that, unlike in the manufacturing 
sector, disciplinary top management turnover in banks was not related to share price 
performance. Outside directors were significantly less effective in disciplining top 
management in banks than in manufacturing firms. 
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Henry (2004) examined the influence of the corporate governance and ownership 
attributes of target companies on the outcome of takeovers in Australia between 1991 
and 2000. The findings suggested that board composition and chairperson identity - if 
he was the CEO or not - of target companies and director, institutional investor and 
external share ownership in targets, have minimal effects on the likelihood of takeover 
success. The nature of the recommendations of target directors is found to be the most 
significant determinant of takeover success or failure, and bid premium levels and 
offer price revisions are also shown to be important in discriminating between 
successful and failed takeovers. 
Whether the interests of shareholders, banks, and workers are compatible with the 
practice of hostile takeovers have been examined by Schneper and Guillen (2004). 
Using data from 37 countries between 1988 and 1998, the results indicated that hostile 
takeovers decrease with the level to which workers' and banks' rights are protected, 
and increase in occurrence with the level to which shareholder rights are protected. 
On the other hand, there are a number of studies that were interested in the importance 
of anti-takeover provisions. Using data for the period of 1990 to 2000, Klock et al. 
(2005) examined the relationship between the cost of debt and anti-takeover 
provisions. The results reflected that anti-takeover provisions minimize the cost of 
debt. Splitting the data into companies with the strongest and weakest anti-takeover 
provisions, they find that strong anti-takeover provisions are associated with a lower 
cost of debt than the weakest anti-takeover provisions. 
Bosworth (2005) discussed the relationship between anti-takeover defences (ATDs) 
and firm value. While ATDs may entrench managers, leading to inappropriate levels of 
compensation, perquisites, and shirking, they may also increase the bargaining position 
in the event of merger proposals and, in the case of some ATDs, provide incentives to 
managers to make long-term commitments to the firm. They find that nine out of the 
21 ATDs are associated with lower firm value, six are associated with higher firm 
value, and the significance of the remaining six must be rejected. 
Hoi et al. (2000) examined the effects of anti-takeover laws (ATLs) on corporations in 
Ohio and Pennsylvania. Assessment of board composition changes following the 
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passage of ATLs. They find losses of shareholders and the reduction of the probability 
of takeovers following ATLs. The results showed a significant increase in the 
representation of outside directors on corporate boards following ATLs in response to 
weaker discipline from the market for corporate control. 
Lansing and Wellinghoff (2003) focused on the ethics of the US anti-takeover laws. 
They conclude that these laws harm those in foreign nations that could benefit from US 
investment. These laws negate the wishes of two willing parties, and they do not allow 
someone to sell property he or she legally purchased. On top of this, as mentioned in 
the shareholder viewpoint section, these laws contribute to inefficiency, allocate 
resources chaotically, and maintain directors and managers' places on a company's 
board of directors. 
All in all, after analysing the literature related to takeovers - which is summarized in 
table 2.4 -we conclude the main following results: 
First, the corporate takeover market is an external source of discipline that intercedes 
when internal control mechanisms are relatively weak or ineffective. 
Second, takeover has a positive relationship to management turnover, firm 
restructuring, shareholders' wealth, and shareholders' rights. 
Third, there is little evidence about the relationship between ownership structure and 
takeover markets. 
Fourth, anti-takeover provisions have negative relations with firm value, efficiency, 
performance and the cost of debt. 
Fifth, anti-takeover laws contribute to inefficiency, allocate resources chaotically, and 
maintain directors and managers' places on a company's board of directors. 
2.4.2.2 Large Creditors 
Significant creditors are also large and potentially active investors. Like the large 
shareholders, they have large investments in the firm, and want to see the returns on 
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their investments materialize. Their power comes in part because of a variety of control 
rights they receive when firms default or violate debt covenants. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that the effectiveness of large creditors, like the 
effectiveness of large shareholders, depends on the legal rights they have. In Germany 
and Japan, the powers of the banks in comparison with companies are highly 
significant, because banks take part in any election since they have blocks of shares, 
take a seat on boards of directors, play a major role in lending, and work in a legal 
environment constructive to creditors. In other countries, particularly where procedures 
of controlling the banks are weak, bank governance is likely to be less effective. 
Kang and Shivdasani (1995) examined the role of corporate governance mechanisms 
during top executive turnover in Japanese corporations. The results indicated that the 
sensitivity of non-routine turnover is higher for companies which have relationships 
with a main bank than for companies without such relationships. Outside development 
in Japan is more likely for firms with large shareholders and a main bank relationship. 
The results documented performance developments following to non-routine turnover 
and outside development. 
Dinc (2006) examined the effects of bank shareholding structure on the real estate 
lending of Japanese banks. Using a sample covering the fiscal years (April to March 
for all the banks) from 1984 through 1989, it includes all of the 84 banks that were 
listed continuously in the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and that did not 
take part in an acquisition or merger during this period. The results showed that large 
shareholders restrained managers, on average, and that the real estate lending of banks 
decreased as the total shares held by the top five shareholders increased. However, this 
effect was absent when the shareholders belonged to a keiretsu led by the bank itself. 
The additional business ties between the banks and these shareholders, such as cross- 
shareholding and bank borrowing, weakened the ability of the shareholders to 
discipline bank managers. The results indicated that corporate governance problems in 
banks are also likely to have an important role in financial crises. With 45% of all real 
estate lending and more than 40% of total lending by the sample banks, the sheer size 
of keiretsu banks suggests that their corporate governance problems may have 
increased the magnitude of the financial crisis in Japan. 
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Also, Morck and Nakamura (1999) find that Japanese banks act primarily in the short- 
term interests of creditors when dealing with firms outside bank groups. When dealing 
with companies in bank groups, banks may act in the wider interests (for all 
stakeholders). Also, banks are supporting troubled bank group companies. 
Cooke (1996) suggested that companies within a keiretsu with a main-bank or main- 
company monitor (and which are therefore less subject to capital market discipline) do 
not disclose less information than other companies in their annual reports. It appears 
that whatever type of corporate governance mechanism is adopted in Japan, there 
exists a monitor that places approximately equal demands on information disclosure in 
corporate annual reports. 
Kang et al. (1997) find that the rate of asset downsizing and layoffs in Japanese firms 
increases with the ownership by the firm's main bank. Moreover, the existence of the 
main bank as block-holder increases the likelihood of management turnover, non- 
executive director removals, and non-executive director additions, but decreases the 
possibility of acquisitions. 
In Germany, Franks and Mayer (1996) examined the three cases of hostile takeovers in 
the post-Second World War period. It described the important role played by banks in 
affecting the outcome of the bids: bank representatives were chairmen of the 
supervisory board in all three cases, and banks voted in a large number of proxies 
regarding important decisions affecting the bids. They reported that low returns were 
earned by shareholders of two of the target firms, and offered an explanation in terms 
of bank control and the regulatory regime operating in Germany. 
In developing countries, Arun and Turner (2004) present a theoretical discussion of the 
corporate governance of banks. They suggest that banking restructurings can only be 
completely applied once a practical regulatory system is in place. An essential part of 
banking restructurings in developing countries is the privatization of banks. They 
suggested that corporate governance restructurings may be a necessity for the 
successful divestiture of government ownership. Additionally, they suggested that the 
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increased competition resulting from the opening of foreign banks may develop the 
corporate governance of banks in the developing countries. 
Other studies discuss the effect of cross-shareholdings between the main bank and 
client firms, and its effect on firm value. Hiraki et al. (2003) found that the main bank 
borrowing was negatively related to firm value until the early 1990s. They show that 
the cross-shareholdings between the main bank and client firms are negatively related 
to firm value during the sample period. Third, the results on the inter-corporate 
shareholdings show that one-way shareholdings tend to be positively related to firm 
value, but cross-shareholdings tend to be negatively related to firm value. 
All in all, after analysing the literature related to large creditors, we conclude the main 
following results: 
First, the higher the stake of ownership of large creditors in the firm, the higher the 
degree of power they have in monitoring management. 
Second, some evidence indicated that there is a positive firm performance in firms 
which have a relationship with a main bank. Also, the sensitivity of non-routine 
turnover to earnings performance is higher for firms with ties to a main bank than for 
firms without such ties. 
Third, in spite of the dominant role played by main banks like in Japan and Germany, 
there is evidence that corporate governance problems in banks are also likely to have 
an important role in financial crises. The sheer size of "keiretsu" banks suggests that 
their corporate governance problems may have increased the magnitude of the 
financial crisis in Japan. Also, the frequency of asset downsizing and layoffs in 
Japanese firms increases with the ownership by the firm's main bank and other block- 
holders. 
Fourth, the increased competition resulting from the entrance of foreign banks may 
improve the corporate governance of developing-economy banks. 
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2.4.2.3 The Legal System 
Denis and McConnell (2003), in their survey on international corporate governance 
generation, divided corporate governance into two generations. The first generation 
was concerned with all mechanisms (internal and external) of corporate governance 
like board structure, equity ownership, executive compensation, and/or external control 
mechanisms. The second generation pays attention to additional external corporate 
governance mechanisms, which is the legal/regulatory system. La Porta et al. (2000, 
p. 4) argued that "the legal approach to corporate governance holds that the key 
mechanism is the protection of outside investors (whether shareholders or creditors) 
through the legal system, meaning both laws and their enforcement". Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) explained that a lot of the variations in corporate governance systems 
around the world come from the variations in the nature of legal responsibilities that 
managers have to the stockholders, in addition to the variations in interpretations and 
enforcement of these responsibilities by courts. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 750) 
argue that "The most important legal right shareholders have is the right to vote on 
important corporate matters, such as mergers and liquidations, as well as in 
elections of boards of directors, which in turn have certain rights vis a vis the 
management" 
Kim et al. (2005) strengthen the importance of legal systems in determining the quality 
of corporate governance systems and financial market results. The results suggested 
that stock market liberalization may reduce shortages and disadvantages in the current 
institutional settings that are not helpful for effective corporate governance structures. 
Using a sample of more than 19,000 companies from 61 countries across the world, 
Gugler et al. (2004) find that the source of a country's legal system is the most 
essential factor for investment performance. Companies which have legal systems with 
an English origin earn returns on investments that are at least as large as their costs of 
capital. But, companies which have civil-law systems earn, on average, returns on 
investments below their costs of capital. Additionally, variations in investment 
performance that are related to a country's legal system dominate variations that are 
related to ownership structure. 
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In nine Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, over the period 
of June 1994 to June 2001, Pajuste (2002) finds evidence to show that the enforcement 
of law is more important than the quality of law. Moreover, that enforcement of 
financial rules and regulations has the highest illustrative influence on stock market 
returns. Finally, the protection of minority shareholders has an important impact on 
market activity. 
From those results it is clear that the legal and regulatory systems of corporate 
governance in any country play an important role in increasing firms' performance and 
value. Also, the enforcement of law is more important than the quality of law. The 
enforcement of financial rules and regulations has the highest illustrative influence on 
stock market returns. 
2.5 The Interaction between Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms 
After the analysis of the literature review of corporate governance mechanisms we can 
conclude that it is difficult for the companies to work with only one mechanism for 
corporate governance. Internal mechanisms must join or merge with external 
mechanisms, regardless of the industry type or the country of study. 
John and Kedia (2003, p. 2) argued that "differences in the corporate governance 
systems observed around the world raise many important questions. How are 
individual governance mechanisms combined to form a governance structure? Are 
some governance mechanisms more effective when used in conjunction? What blend 
of different mechanisms of corporate governance constitutes an optimal governance 
structure? Is the optimality of the governance structure related to the embedding 
financial and legal system? " Shleifer and Vishny (1997), in their survey of corporate 
governance, suggested that for a good corporate governance system we need to 
combine both the legal protection of investors and some form of concentrated 
ownership. 
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There is empirical evidence supporting the idea of interaction between corporate 
governance mechanisms. Using data from over 400 publically listed Canadian 
companies and various internal and external corporate governance related factors, Sapp 
(2008) finds that differences in internal governance related to the characteristics of the 
CEO, compensation committee, and board of directors do influence both the level and 
composition of executive compensation, especially for the CEO. Also, Dong and 
Ozkan (2008) examined the effect of an institutional investor on directors' pay for a 
sample of listed non-financial companies in the UK. They find that an institutional 
investor, as a whole, makes no difference in the determination of directors' pay levels 
and pay-performance levels. However, they find that long-horizon institutions are more 
involved in corporate governance, and they restrained the level of directors' pay and 
strengthened the pay-performance link. 
Webb (2006) stated that corporate governance should be viewed as a set rather than as 
individual components. He finds that a strong board is inversely related to strong 
shareholder protection in the form of takeover defences. 
Sinha (2006) examined the possible influences of the regulatory framework and the 
Market for Corporate Control (MCC) on the internal corporate governance 
mechanisms in the UK capital market. The study focus is on two sectors, 
manufacturing and banking, due to their differences in the governance environment. 
The study showed that there is interdependence between external and internal 
governance mechanisms in the monitoring ' of top management, and there are 
differential effects of the external governance mechanisms on the effectiveness of the 
internal corporate governance mechanisms. In the absence of an effective MCC in 
banks, the accountability of top management towards its shareholders is found to be 
significantly less in comparison to manufacturing firms -a sector where the MCC is 
very active. On the one hand, top management accountability as proxied by 
disciplinary turnover of executive directors and the CEO, is found to be significantly 
related to relative stock market returns amongst manufacturing firms. On the other 
hand, disciplinary management turnover is not related to relative stock market 
performance in banks where only regulation is used as an external corporate 
governance mechanism. However, they find that disciplinary CEO turnover is related 
to accounting-based performance changes. Other constituents of the internal control 
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mechanisms (like outside directors) are significantly more effective in the 
manufacturing sector, where there is an active MCC, than in banks where the MCC is 
inactive and external control is exercised through regulation by the Bank of England. 
Cremers and Nair (2005) investigated how external governance and internal 
governance interact through the interaction between the market for corporate control 
and shareholder activism. They find that block-holder ownership is important in the 
existence of takeover vulnerability. Also, the takeover market is important in the 
presence of an active shareholder. Moreover, they find that a portfolio that buys firms 
with high takeover vulnerability and high block-holder ownership gained abnormal 
return of 10 - 15%. 
Using three of the main mechanisms of corporate governance (managerial ownership, 
monitoring by banks, and disciplining by the takeover market), John and Kedia (2003) 
examined how different economies would design an optimal corporate governance 
system structured through interactions among these three mechanisms. The results 
indicated that: first, when controlled debt appears in an optimal system it is 
accompanied by concentrated ownership; second, when takeovers appear in an optimal 
system they are accompanied by dispersed ownership. They concluded that the optimal 
system for a given economy is described as a function of the degrees of development 
of its financial institutions and markets. 
Dhnadirek and Tang (2003) studied the role of different corporate governance 
mechanisms for the period from 1994 to 1996 for 41 firms in Thailand. The study 
concluded that there are at least two additional corporate governance mechanisms 
which should be included in the analysis of the Thai corporate governance system, in 
addition to ownership concentration. First, the mechanism of debt pressure should be 
included to determine its impact on firm performance - namely, whether debt is a 
device for reducing the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, or a 
tool for protecting management from other forms of discipline. Second, the mechanism 
of bank ownership is important, because banks usually have intimate relationships with 
firms in Thailand, especially in the finance industry. 
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The results supported the idea of the need for interaction between internal and external 
corporate governance mechanisms. Also, there is interaction between external and 
internal governance mechanisms in the monitoring and controlling of directors and 
management. Moreover, there are differential effects of the external governance 
mechanisms on the success of the internal corporate governance mechanisms. 
2.6 Corporate Governance Practices 
The subject of the differences between corporate governance practices (or what is 
sometimes called international corporate governance) is vast, and there is much 
research comparing between systems of corporate governance in different countries 
(Denis and McConnel, 2003). Corporate governance mechanisms vary a great deal 
around the world. Firms in the United States and the United Kingdom substantially 
rely on legal protection of investors. Large investors are less common, except that 
ownership is concentrated sporadically in the takeover process. In much of Continental 
Europe as well as in Japan, there is less reliance on elaborate legal protection, and 
more reliance on large investors and banks. Finally, in the rest of the world and in most 
small firms everywhere else, ownership is typically heavily concentrated in families, 
with a few large outside investors and banks. This diversity of systems raises the 
obvious question: what arrangement is the best from the viewpoint of attracting 
external funds to firms? (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Doidge et al. (2004) developed and tested a model of how country characteristics, such 
as legal protection for shareholders, and the development of financial and economic 
systems, improve their own governance. The results indicated that: first, nearly all of 
the difference in governance systems across firms in developing countries is 
attributable to country characteristics rather than company characteristics; second, 
company characteristics explain more of the difference in governance systems in more 
developed countries; and third, entrance to global capital markets increases firm 
encouragement for better governance, but reduces the value of home country legal 
protection of shareholders. They concluded that, the motivations to implement better 
governance mechanisms at the firm level increase with the development of financial 
and economic systems. 
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The results in empirical research on corporate governance mechanisms showed 
differences in the results due to differences in corporate governance practices in each 
country. In the US, some changes have occurred in the last few years in the legal 
system of corporate governance as a result of some problems like Enron. Holmstrom 
and Kaplan (2003) stated that, as a result of failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and 
other prominent American companies, US corporate governance practices have come 
under attack. These much publicized failures, and the resulting popular outcry, have 
served as catalysts for legislative and regulatory changes that include the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act of 2002, and new governance guidelines from the NYSE and NASDAQ. 
They conclude that, the net effect of the recent legislative and regulatory changes has 
been to make a good governance system an even better one. But, perhaps the greatest 
risk now facing the U. S. financial market system (of which corporate governance is a 
critical part), is that of overregulation. 
In East Asia, Nam and Nam (2004) identified four factors that account for the poor 
corporate governance in East Asia. First, legal infrastructure to regulate corporate 
governance was incomplete and inadequate, leaving firms in danger of expropriation 
by managers and large investors. Furthermore, laws and regulations were not enforced. 
Second, market forces were largely absent. Banks and financial institutions operated 
under altered governance structures. Financial supervision was also weak and allowed 
banks' weak governance and inefficient loan decisions to continue. Third, families 
controlled most large firms and many of these families had controlling interests in 
multiple firms. Fourth, expropriation by large shareholders was also the most critical 
cause of governance problems in companies. Johnson et al. (2000) supported the same 
results that in East Asian countries with weak corporate governance, worse economic 
prospects result in more expropriation by managers, and thus a larger fall in asset 
prices. They highlighted the importance of the legal protection afforded to creditors 
and minority shareholders. 
Baek et al. (2004) explained that during the 1997 Korean financial crisis, companies 
with superior ownership concentration by unaffiliated foreign investors faced a smaller 
reduction in their share value. Companies that had higher disclosure quality and 
different sources of external financing also suffered less. On the contrary, Chaebol 
companies with ownership concentration by controlling family shareholders suffered a 
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substantial drop in the value of their equity. Companies in which the controlling 
shareholders' voting rights exceeded cash flow rights, and those who borrowed more 
from the main banks, also had lower returns. They suggested that during a crisis, 
change in company value is a function of firm-level variations in corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
In a sample of 398 firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand, Mitton (2002) found that company-level variations in mechanisms related to 
corporate governance had a powerful effect on firm performance during the East Asian 
financial crisis of 1997 to 1998. The results indicated that better stock price 
performance is related to companies that had indicators of higher disclosure quality, 
higher outside ownership concentration, and with focused, rather than diversified 
companies. 
Whether corporate governance is ineffective in emerging markets was examined by 
Gibson (2003), who tested the link between CEO turnover and firm performance for 
over 1,200 firms in eight emerging markets. The results indicated that in emerging 
market firms, CEOs are more expected to lose their jobs when their company's 
performance is weak. Also, for the companies with a big domestic shareholder, there 
was no link between CEO turnover and firm performance. He concluded that for this 
subset of emerging market companies, corporate governance appears to be ineffective. 
Black (2001) examined the relationship between corporate governance behaviour and 
market value for a sample of 21 Russian firms. The results explained that corporate 
governance behaviour has a powerful effect on market value in a country where legal 
and cultural constraints on corporate behaviour are weak. 
Turnbull (2000) concluded that failure by many economists to recognize that there are 
modes of governing transactions outside markets and hierarchy, has resulted in there 
being no conventional theoretical structure for comparing schemes of corporate 
governance in or between cultures. 
From the last two sections, we conclude that there are differences between 
corporations in the same country in applying corporate governance mechanisms. The 
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different methods of interaction which occur between the governance mechanisms, 
means each firm has its own corporate governance mechanisms. Also, the differences 
between countries in legal, political, cultural and social systems mean each country has 
different systems of corporate governance. 
2.7 Summary 
From the main results of this chapter we conclude the following points: 
First, there is a debate between researchers over the main objective of 
corporations, and whether corporations should maximize value (the corporation has 
one objective) or act in the interest of their stakeholders (the corporation has 
multiple objectives). That means there is still confusion about general theory of 
corporate governance. 
Second, there are no agreed definitions or boundaries for defining or investigating 
corporate governance. Every writer defines the concept from his point of view, and 
supports the theory or the main idea which he is interested in, or concerned about. 
Third, there are different corporate governance mechanisms (internal and 
external). Each mechanism has its effect on the firm performance and value. 
Fourth, it is difficult for corporations to work with only one mechanism of 
corporate governance. Internal mechanisms must combine with external 
mechanisms regardless of the type of industry or the country of analysis. 
Fifth, there is no agreed system for corporate governance, and no accepted 
theoretical framework for comparing systems of corporate governance within or 
between cultures. Each company has its own corporate governance system, and 
each country has its own corporate governance system. 
Sixth, the differences between countries in legal, political, cultural and social 
systems make each country have a different system of corporate governance. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
3.1 Introduction 
G. Akerlof, A. Spence, and J. Stiglitz were awarded the 2001 Bank of Sweden prize in 
economic science for their work on the economic implications of asymmetric 
information during the 1970s. It was a signal of the importance of the economics of 
information. Also, it reflected the main function of asymmetric information in the 
economics of information (Rosser, 2003). Ho and Wang (2007) stated that the 
occurrence and existence of asymmetric information in financial markets and its 
impact on economic growth have also received a great deal of attention in recent 
years. 
The subject of asymmetric information is used in different levels (macro and micro), 
markets (agriculture, manufacturing, and services), and also in different subjects in 
finance. Rosser (2003) stated that there are many extensions and applications for the 
concept of asymmetric information in industrial organization and microeconomic 
dynamics; new theories of unemployment; new theories of credit market rationing; 
and models of economic development and global financial stability. 
In this chapter we will discuss firstly, the conceptual and theoretical background of 
asymmetric information, and explore the relationship between the agency theory and 
the concept of asymmetric information; second, the main measurements of 
asymmetric information according to the literature will be examined; third, the 
boundaries of asymmetric information will be looked at; finally, the literature which 
relates corporate governance mechanisms to asymmetric information will be 
considered. 
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3.2 Conceptual and Theoretical Background of Asymmetric 
Information 
The concept of asymmetric information was first introduced in a paper by George A. 
Akerlof in 1970, called "The Market for `Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism". In this paper, Akerlof tried to relate between quality and 
uncertainty, and developed asymmetric information with the example case of the 
automobile market. He explained that in many markets the buyer uses some market 
statistic to measure the value of a class of goods. The asymmetric information that 
exists is between the seller of the used car and the buyer of the used car. Thus the 
buyer sees the average of the whole market, while the seller has more knowledge of a 
specific item (Auronen, 2003). Rosser (2003, p. 10) showed that "awareness of their 
relative ignorance would lead potential buyers to assume that any used car would 
have a high probability of being low quality, a `lemon "'. On the other hand, Akerlof 
argues that this information asymmetry provides the seller a reason to sell goods of 
less than the average market quality. Then, the average quality of goods in the market 
will decrease and so will the market size. That means there is a problem as a result of 
this information asymmetry. Akerlof observed that in many markets these problems 
are not easily resolved, including in insurance, labour, and credit. His result of lemons 
driving out good cars from the market is known as adverse selection (Rosser, 2003). 
The main idea of Akerlof s paper explained that asymmetric information is 
information available to some people but not to others. In other words, there is 
unequal information that each party to a transaction has about the other party. In 
economics, information asymmetry happens when one party to a transaction has more 
or better information than the other party. It is also called asymmetric information. 
Normally it is the seller that knows more about the product than the buyer, however, it 
is possible for the reverse to be true: for the buyer to know more than the seller 
(Miller, 2002). Klein et al. (2002, p. 318) stated that, "in corporate finance, 
asymmetric information refers to the notion that firm insiders, typically the 
managers, have better information than do market participants on the value of their 
firm's assets and investment opportunities". 
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Many writers, in different areas, continue the ideas of George A. Akerlof on 
asymmetric information. So, the concept has different definitions according to the 
area of application. Michael Spence, in his 1973 paper "Job Market signalling", 
continues the idea of taking decisions under uncertainty through a new concept called 
signalling. In his example, the asymmetry is between an employer and a potential 
employee. Spence models hiring employees as an investment decision made under 
uncertainty. The employer is not sure of the characteristics of a person before hiring. 
Even after hiring the characteristics are not obviously clear, as some job learning and 
training has to be done. Because the employer is unable to distinguish clearly the 
skills of the potential employee, he relies upon signals (Rosser, 2003). Miller (2002, 
p. 44) argues that "markets with asymmetric information are incomplete because 
they lack markets for specific levels of product quality. Such markets either lump all 
qualities together (lemons) or using external indications of quality to separate them 
(signalling)". Auronen (2003, P. 11) explained that "Signalling equilibrium is a 
stable state where the sellers (potential employees) in the market differentiate 
themselves from each other by signalling and thus reduce the information 
asymmetry between themselves and the buyer (employer) ". 
The (1975) paper of Joseph Stiglitz "The Theory of Screening, Education, and the 
Distribution of Income" explains whether screening can be used by an employer to 
screen the candidates into levels that replicate their efficiency or some other ability. 
Stiglitz applies this to insurance markets which are characterized with asymmetric 
information problems, leading to both moral hazard and adverse selection. He defines 
screening as classifying the qualities of goods. The screening mechanism is designed 
to offer a diversity of deals that encourage agents to disclose accurate information 
about their riskiness through a process of self-selection. Further, mechanisms or 
devices that perform screening activities are called screening devices (Rosser, 2003; 
Auronen, 2003). Auronen (2003) concluded that Spence's concept of signalling can 
be seen as a screening tool. Alternatively, screening aims at levelling information 
asymmetries between parties in the market, so screening could also be labelled as an 
example of signalling. 
Shin (1994, P. 58) argues that "The literature on asymmetric information has been 
concerned mainly with the problem of the informed party lying to the uninformed 
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parties. However, in many cases, the informed party will stop short of lying but will 
seek to gain from private information by managing the disclosure of news': The 
literature has many models and theories related to the concept of asymmetric 
information. Kennedy et al. (2006) review asymmetric information models in a multi- 
period setting to explain underpricing in IPOs. These models are; signalling, 
information production, market feedback, entrepreneurial losses, changing objective 
function, and the information momentum models .9 Deshmukl (2005) classified the 
theories of asymmetric information which related to the dividend policy into two 
theories; Pecking Order Theory and Signalling Theory. 1° Also, there are two theories 
that are the closest to the theory of asymmetric information, and they are the theory of 
agency and the theory of incomplete contracts (Auronen, 2003). 
9Kennedy et al. (2006, Pages 51-52) stated that "Although these models are based on information 
asymmetry, they have some distinct differences. The signalling model and the information production 
model assume that the firm has the informational advantage compared to the investor while the market 
feedback model assumes the opposite. The signalling model assumes that there is an exogenous release 
of information subsequent to the IPO, which attenuates the information asymmetry (i. e. reveals the firm 
type) and reduces mispricing. In contrast, the information production model and the market feedback 
model assume that IPO underpricing is used to induce the subsequent revelation of information from 
investors, which moves share prices to a more appropriate level. Specifically, the information 
production model assumes that the underpricing is not effective as a signal in revealing the firm type 
and shows that firms use underpricing as a device to encourage information production by investors. 
The entrepreneurial losses model assumes that some investors are better informed than others. 
Consequently, owners incur the costs of promoting the issue to reduce the information asymmetry and 
decrease the adverse selection problem so that their underpricing-related wealth losses are minimized 
The previous models assumed asymmetric information regarding the value of the firm whereas the 
changing objective function model assumes that investors cannot observe the actions of the managers, 
suggesting a principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers. The information 
momentum model differs from the other models as it does not explicitly incorporate an informational 
advantage for one group. Instead, the assumption is made that managers can use underpricing to 
reveal information through increased research coverage, creating information momentum, which shifts 
the demand curve for the firm's shares. " 
'ODeshmukl (2005, pp 107-110) stated that "The pecking order theory predicts that the higher the level 
of asymmetric information, the lower the dividends. The signalling argument predicts that the higher 
the level of asymmetric information, the higher the dividends. Note that the pecking order theory and 
the signalling theory provide opposite predictions regarding the effect of the level of asymmetric 
information on dividend policy. " The rationale behind the signalling theory is that "the signalling 
literature suggests that dividends convey information about current and future earnings". The 
alternative explanation of dividend policy based on the pecking order theory and implies that "in the 
presence of asymmetric information, the firm may under-invest in certain states of nature. The 
underinvestment arises when the firm has inadequate funds for investment purposes and does not want 
to bear the lemons premium associated with new capital issues. a firm can reduce underinvestment by 
financing investments with slack that can be accumulated through retention (or by decreasing 
dividends) ". 
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The concept of asymmetric information is closely related to the concept of the agency 
theory. In chapter two we define an agency relationship according to the definition of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) as "a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent': This means that there is a divergence of the economic interest of the agent 
(manager of the firm) from those of the principal (investor in the firm) in whose 
interest the agent is supposed to act; and this leads to the existence of information 
asymmetry between the agent and the principle. So, information asymmetry is a main 
cause of the agency problem, and this requires a mechanism, or some mechanisms of 
l corporate governance to solve the problem of asymmetric information. " 
We conclude that an agency relationship means that there is a degree of asymmetric 
information occurring when one party (shareholders or stakeholders) has insufficient 
or inaccurate information necessary to make, or take an optimal decision. In other 
words, the contractual relationship between the principle (shareholders or 
stakeholders) and the agent (managers) is incomplete. Hence, the agent will use his or 
her own, or private information to attain benefits (opportunistic behaviour) at the 
expense of the principle. Also, because the benefit of companies' stockholders or 
stakeholders and that of their agents' are not constantly Kedialar, the same fact of 
agency theory could also be explained in the terms of the asymmetric information 
theory. All in all, the agency theory is a theory for corporate governance and 
asymmetric information. 
Asymmetric information leads to two main problems, which are: adverse selection 
and moral hazard. In adverse selection models the ignorant party lacks information 
while negotiating a contract. An example of adverse selection is when persons who 
are high risk are more likely to buy insurance, because the insurance company cannot 
effectively discriminate against them, usually due to lack of information about the 
particular individual's risk, but also sometimes by the power of law or other 
constraints. So, an adverse selection problem occurs before the transaction. Wet 
(2004) stated that in the debt market, if the lender cannot discriminate between good 
11 We will discuss this point in detail in the literature review of this chapter 
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borrowers (low risk) and bad borrowers (high risk), the adverse selection problem 
may increase dramatically, in turn leading to a sharp decline in investment and 
aggregate activity. Sharp (1990, P. 1069) argues that "in the process of lending, a 
bank learns more than others about its own customers. This information asymmetry 
allows lenders to capture some of the rents generated by their older customers"". 
In moral hazard models, the ignorant party lacks information about the performance 
of the transaction. All principal-agent connections have the possible problem of moral 
hazard, in which the potential exists that one party (manager) will act in their own 
interests, to the harm of the interests of the principal (stockholder). An example of 
moral hazard is when people are more likely to behave badly if insured, either because 
the insurer cannot monitor this behavior or cannot face it. So, a moral hazard problem 
occurs after the transaction. Wet (2004) stated that in the debt market asymmetric 
information between borrowers and lenders also results in the problem of moral 
hazard. Borrowers have the incentive to engage in activities that may be personally 
beneficial, but the probability of default increases and thus harm the lender. 
Bebczuk (2003) stated that the main types of informational asymmetries that may 
affect the borrower-lender-relationship are, first, ex-ante asymmetries (adverse 
selection) under which the lender is unable to distinguish between the qualities of 
finance projects in the population of lenders. He will therefore offer credit at a single 
rate of interest, and hence borrowers with less risky projects suffer, while those with 
riskier projects benefit from the lender's inability to screen projects. Second, interim 
asymmetries (moral hazards), under which the lender is unable to observe into which 
of two projects the borrower invests the funds provided by the lender. Third, ex post 
asymmetries (costly state verification). 
In the context of the agency theory, we conclude that, since the agent's interests are 
not completely aligned with the principal's interest, risks of adverse selection and 
moral hazard happen. Usually, adverse selection happens before a contract (ex-ante 
problem), and moral hazard happens after the contract (ex post problem). Regardless 
of the time of information asymmetry, the real problem is how to reduce or mitigate 
the degree of information asymmetry. In the following section we present the main 
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measures of asymmetric information as a step to identify the main variables which are 
affected by asymmetric information. 
3.3 Asymmetric Information Measurements 
There are no identified or specified measures for asymmetric information. Most of the 
measures of asymmetric information which are used in the literature are proxy 
measures. So, there are many classifications of the main measures of asymmetric 
information. Clarke and Shastri (2001) classified the measures of information 
asymmetry into four broad categories: measures based on analysts' forecasts, 
investment opportunity set measures, stock return measures and market 
microstructure measures. Ness et al. (2001) compare the adverse selection 
components to various corporate finance variables that are related directly or 
indirectly to asymmetric information. These variables are: first, corporate finance 
variables like volatility and volume. Second, informed trader variables like number of 
analysts and percentage of stock held by institutions. Third, other control variables 
like company size and industry. Kanagaretnam et al. (2005) studied the relationships 
between three variables which act as proxies for the ex-ante level of information 
asymmetry - forecast dispersion, forecast revision volatility, and the level of analyst 
coverage, and equity bid-ask spread and depth changes around quarterly earnings 
releases. 
In the following section we will concentrate on asymmetric information proxy 
measures which measuring the information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders. 
3.3.1 Financial Ratio Measures 
There are a number of studies that used proxies for a firm's financial ratios as 
measures for information asymmetry. Clarke and Shastri (2001), and Ness et al. 
(2001), classified these measures as follows: 
3.3.1.1 The Residual Volatility in Daily Stock Returns 
Ness et al. (2001), and Clarke and Shastri (2001), use the residual volatility in daily 
stock returns as another proxy for information asymmetry. Clarke and Shastri (2001) 
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argue that residual volatility may be overstating the level of asymmetric information 
about a firm. This means there are other factors affecting the degree of volatility, and 
it may be related to the degree of firms' uncertainty. Kanagaretnam et al. (2005) 
examined whether volatility is a good measure for asymmetric information. They find 
that the relative spreads of the bid-ask spread has a significant positive relationship to 
both forecast dispersion and revision volatility, and a significant negative relationship 
to analyst coverage. 
Eleswarapu et al. (2004) argue that if information disclosure becomes more general, 
the amount of asymmetric information in the securities market will decline following 
the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) by the USA. They find that return 
volatility was lower around mandatory announcements. In the same issue, Lee et al. 
(2004) suggested that Regulation FD has brought about a new awareness of the 
importance of disseminating information to the public. Results indicated that 
Regulation FD did not increase volatility. Indeed, it is more likely to have contributed 
to lower volatility. Also, Wang (1993) proved that information asymmetry among 
investors can increase price volatility and negative autocorrelation in returns. 
3.3.1.2 Volume 
Ness et al. (2001) hypothesized that the average daily trading volume might be related 
to adverse selection, because less commonly traded stocks may have more 
information problems. There is some evidence exploring the relation between trading 
volume and asymmetric information. Acker et al. (2002) find that closing daily inside 
spreads are affected by order processing costs, inventory control costs and 
asymmetric information (proxied by unusually high trading volumes). Grishchenko et 
al. (2003) find good indication of return continuation following high volume days, 
suggesting the existence of private information trading for many emerging market 
stocks. They find that private information trading is particularly strong around main 
corporate event dates. 
Tung and Marsden (2000) indicated that markets with inside and privately informed 
traders led to greater trading volumes than markets with traders having access to 
private information only. Gajewski (1999) finds that trading volume is larger on 
announcement days, and spreads are wider after announcements, while the results 
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relating to the spread and the permanent effect of trades are compatible with the view 
that earnings announcements correspond to an increase in information asymmetries. 
Lang et al. (1992) indicated that the spreading of private information across traders 
has an impact on trading volume, but not on price. Morse (1980) stated that unequal 
costs of obtaining and processing information may lead to trading of securities and 
wealth redistributions among investors. Those investors with easy access to 
information about a firm may be able to profit from prior knowledge of the 
information before public release. Public policy-making bodies have attempted to 
alleviate this phenomenon by promoting public disclosure of information through 
litigation and regulation of the trading activities of insiders. The paper provided a 
tentative testable theory on trading in markets with asymmetrically distributed 
information, as well as an empirical investigation of this theory. 
3.3.1.3 Leverage 
Ness et al. (2001, p. 11) argue that "due to the presence of fixed charges, more 
highly levered firms can have greater volatility in their earnings. The value of these 
firms can be more volatile, thus exposing investors to potentially greater 
information asymmetries" 
There is some evidence about the relation between asymmetric information and 
leverage. Klein et al. (2002) reviewed the impact of asymmetric information on the 
choice of capital structure. They argue that information asymmetry cerates the 
possibility that the market will not price the firm's claims correctly, thus providing a 
positive role for corporate financing decisions in leverage adjustments and market 
timing. Verschueren and Deloof (2006) argue that the lower costs of asymmetric 
information will make firms have higher leverage. 
3.3.2 Micro-structure Measures: 
Microstructure measures of information asymmetry are taken from an extensive 
literature indicating that the bid-ask spread consists of three primary components: an 
order processing component, an inventory component, and an adverse selection 
component. There are a number of models for micro-structure measures. Each model 
is estimated using trade and quote data from the Stock Exchange (Glosten and Harris, 
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1988; George et al., 1991; Lin, Sanger, and Booth, 1995; Madhavan et al., 1997; 
Huang and Stoll, 1997). The adverse selection component of the spread compensates 
the market maker for transacting with better-informed traders and increases with the 
degree of information asymmetry. 
There are huge numbers of studies that concentrate on the bid-ask spread components 
and use the adverse selection component as a measure for asymmetric information. 
Stoll (1989) introduces an intuitive procedure to estimate the basic components of the 
bid-ask spread (order-processing cost, inventory cost, and adverse-selection cost). 
Brooks and Masson (1996) stated that empirical applications of Stoll's model create 
broadly different estimations of the bid-ask spread components. Huang and Stoll 
(1997, p. 995) argued that "the spread components differ significantly according to 
trade size and are also sensitive to assumptions about the relation between orders 
and trades". Gibson et al. (2003) found that inventory and adverse-selection costs are 
economically significant in the traded spreads. Brooks (1994) showed a different 
conclusion. He concluded that, around earnings' announcements, the bid-ask spreads 
and spread components have significant changes, indicating that the anticipated 
announcement is informative. 
3.3.3 Other Control Measures 
3.3.3.1 Size and Industry 
Ness et al. (2001) argue that the market value of equity is a key variable of the speed 
with which a stock price adjusts to new information, probably because of the better 
knowledge of investors of larger firms. Furthermore, if investors face some fixed cost 
in information production, then they have a tendency to follow larger stocks in which 
they can obtain better positions. Moreover, they find that larger firms have smaller 
adverse selection components. Pettit and Singer (1985) stated that asymmetric 
information and agency theory are well-suited to an analysis of how the financial 
behaviour of smaller firms may differ from that of larger enterprises. 
3.3.3.2 Percentage of Stock Held by Institutions 
Ness et al. (2001) stated that because various institutions compete with each other and 
the market maker to profit from their private information, a greater number of 
74 
institutional owners could indicate less private information. On the other hand, a 
superior proportion of institutional ownership might reflect more private 
information. 12 
3.4 Asymmetric Information Boundaries 
There is a huge amount of research on different levels (macro and micro), markets 
(agriculture, manufacturing, and services), and subjects in the same field discussing 
the problems of asymmetric information (Ho et al., 2007; Jaleta and Gardebroek, 
2007; Lau et al., 2007; Cohen, 2005; Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; and Rosser, 2003). 
In the field of finance, there are huge numbers of topics related to the concept of 
asymmetric information. Some papers concentrate on the relationship between 
asymmetric information and dividend policy (Deshmukh, 2005). Other papers 
concentrate on the relationship between asymmetric information and IPOs (Su, 2004; 
Jog and McConomy, 2003). Zhao (2004) discussed the effect of information on 
corporate risk management decisions when the information is asymmetric between the 
insider and the market. Also, there are a number of papers exploring how the degree 
of information asymmetry between managers and outsiders may differ for diversified 
versus focused firms (Clarke et al., 2004; Thomas, 2002; Fee, 1999). Berger et al. 
(2005,2006) examine the overall importance of informational asymmetries in debt 
maturity choices. Many researchers are interested in the effect of asymmetric 
information on the capital structure decisions (Gomes and Phillips, 2005; Wu and 
Wang, 2002; Blazenko, 1987; Brennan and Kraus, 1987). 
3.5 Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Asymmetric 
Information 
In spite of the large numbers of papers on asymmetric information in different areas, 
there is little evidence in the literature about the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and asymmetric information. How do corporate governance 
mechanisms mitigate or reduce the degree of asymmetric information? In the 
12 We present more evidence about the role of institutions and large shareholders in eliminating or 
reducing asymmetric information in section 3.5. 
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following sections we will discuss the literature which relates between the governance 
mechanisms and asymmetric information to explain the gap in this relationship. 
3.5.1 Board Size and Composition and Asymmetric Information 
There is some evidence about the effect of board size and composition on the degree 
of asymmetric information. Cai et al. (2006) investigated the effect of corporate 
governance characteristics on the market reaction to company specific news in the 
UK. Their results support that the larger the proportion of the board from the founding 
family, the greater the information asymmetry in the market, and the more diverse the 
board in terms of the presence of female directors, the less the information asymmetry 
in the market. Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) find clear evidence that voluntary 
disclosure increases with the number of non-executive directors on the board. The 
results regarding non-executive directors are interpreted as independent boards 
facilitating a reduction in information asymmetry between owners and managers. 
Also, Rutherford and Buchholtz (2007) find that an increase in the proportion of 
outside directors on a board is associated with an increase in boards' information 
quality and proactive information-seeking. In addition, an increase in outside director 
tenure is associated with boards exchanging information more frequently. Around 
quarterly earnings' announcements, Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) find that changes in 
bid-ask spreads at the time of earnings' announcements are significantly negatively 
related to board independence, board activity, and the percentage stock holdings of 
directors and officers. They also find that depth changes in bid-ask spreads are 
significantly positively related to board structure, board activity, and directors' and 
officers' percentage stock holdings. 
The above studies indicated that there are no clear and direct results about the effect 
of board size on the degree of asymmetric information. There is little evidence about 
the effect of board composition on the degree of asymmetric information. Some 
corporate governance variables related to board characteristics and composition need 
more investigation. Moreover, there is no comprehensive study examining the effect 
of board size and composition as a corporate governance mechanism in eliminating or 
reducing the degree of asymmetric information in the non-announcement periods. 
Also, there is no work answering how to use the degree of asymmetric information as 
an indicator for the quality of board size and composition? 
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3.5.2 Executive Compensation and Asymmetric Information 
There is little and indirect evidence about the effect of CEO and managerial 
compensation as a corporate governance mechanism on the degree of asymmetric 
information. Regarding the relationship between CEO compensation and asymmetric 
information, Tevlin (1996, P. 3 9) stated that, "in theory, having CEO pay depend on 
the performance of the firm is the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem 
that exists because shareholders do not observe the actions of the CEO. Because the 
shareholders have less information than the CEO about the actions of the CEO and 
how they affect the health of the firm, the CEO takes actions in his or her own best 
interests, which do not necessarily coincide with the best interests of shareholders": 
Also, Douglas (2006) stated that the higher degree of information asymmetry between 
shareholders and managers makes the manager avoid opportunistic investments 
(which have volatile outcomes) and the shareholders offer value-maximizing 
compensation contracts. 
Regarding the relationship between the announcement of a Seasoned Equity Offering 
(SEO) and CEO equity-based compensation, Brazel and Webb (2006) find that the 
result of the announcement will be stronger when large asymmetric information exists 
between management and investors. Consequently, managers should think about the 
results of executive compensation structure when considering whether to make an 
SEO. Also, Bryan and Hwang (1997) argued that a firm's investment opportunity set 
affects the level of information asymmetry and thereby the structure of CEO 
compensation. Wruck (1993) showed that companies with higher information 
asymmetries have CEO compensation emphasizing equity ownership relative to salary 
and bonus incentives. They show that CEO compensation in firms with higher 
information as ymmetries is more weakly associated with stock performance than 
compensation in lower asymmetry firms. 
Whether there are benefits of compensation systems in overcoming the effects of 
information asymmetry, Shumsky and Pinker (2003) find that bonuses based solely on 
referral rates do no constantly certify first-best system performance, and that a 
suitable bonus based on customer volume may be necessary too. Furthermore, the 
outcomes also propose that by planning the internal information system to reduce 
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information asymmetry among subordinates, the firm can raise subordinates' 
incentives to offer more accurate financial plans. Cheung et al. (2005) suggested that, 
in the presence of information asymmetry between entrenched managers and outside 
investors, the former may use their ownership rights to extract higher salaries for 
themselves. There is also weaker evidence that top executives with larger 
shareholdings may be using dividends as a way of supplementing their cash salaries. 
Some evidence has been highlighted regarding the relation between compensation 
schems and asymmetric information. Bernardo et al. (2001) indicated that, contrary to 
standard agency models based on moral hazard, greater performance-based pay does 
not necessarily cause successive firm performance to develop; rather, managers 
receive greater performance-based pay because they manage higher quality projects. 
Also, Björkman and Furu (2000) stated that because there are information 
asymmetries between headquarters and foreign subsidiaries, headquarters may use 
variable pay for subsidiary top managers to reduce the agency problems. 
The above results indicate that there are some effects of compensation plans on the 
degree of asymmetric information, but these effects may differ according to the type 
of compensation plans. But all studies deal with asymmetric information as an 
assumption, not as a variable. This means that there is no study relating asymmetric 
information variables and compensation plans directly. Moreover, there is no study 
examining the effect of different compensation plans on the degree of asymmetric 
information. On the other hand, there is no study trying to use asymmetric information 
measures as indicators of the quality of compensation plans. 
3.5.3 Ownership Structure and Asymmetric Information 
The evidence about the effect of the different ownership structures on the degree of 
asymmetric information is little, indirect and contradict each other. Pawlina and 
Renneboog (2005) find that outside block-holders, such as financial institutions, the 
government, and industrial companies appear to play a role in mitigating asymmetric 
information between companies and capital markets. Campbell and Frye (2006) 
investigated the relationship between the degree of involvement by Venture 
Capitalists (VCs) and the long-run performance of IPOs. They find that VC-backed 
firms are able to reduce asymmetric information through attracting analysts and large 
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shareholders. Li and Jeong-Bon (2004) find that foreign (institutional) investors are 
likely to be efficient processors of public information and are attracted to Japanese 
firms with low information asymmetry. Perotti and Thadden (2003) concluded that 
dominant investors, which may be large lenders (banks) or large inside equity holders 
(usually family-controlled holding companies), can increase the publicly available 
information about firms by decreasing the cost of information collection. Li and 
Jeong-Bon (2000) find that as the level of cross-corporate ownership increases, there 
will be less asymmetric information between the company and market participants. 
Kini and Main (1995) indicated a negative relationship between bid-ask spread and 
insider and institutional ownership. Conversely, they find a positive relationship 
between spread and block-holdings. 
From the other side, Fehle (2004) implies that not all types of institutions may cause 
decreases in adverse selection costs. O'Neill and Swisher (2003) compared the 
asymmetric information costs of firms with low levels of institutional ownership to 
those with high levels. The results showed that higher institutional ownership, 
particularly a higher number of institutional investors, is associated with a lower 
degree of informed trading. 
Some other evidence relates between managerial ownership and asymmetric 
information. Boyer and Molina (2008), find that managerial ownership plays a role in 
resolving asymmetric information problems between top managers and the board of 
directors in the context of CEO succession. Filbeck and Webb (2001) examined the 
relationship between asymmetric information, managerial ownership, and the impact 
of layoff announcements on shareholder wealth. They find that firm size significantly 
clarifies the cross-sectional distribution of share price responses to layoff 
announcements. But, they find no evidence, or a relationship between insider 
ownership and share price reaction to layoff announcements. Diaz and Olalla (2004) 
find a higher possibility of buying, only by insiders, when there is more asymmetric 
information, and consequently the acquirers can gain from their position of better 
informed investors. 
The above results indicated that there are contradictions about the effect of different 
ownership structures on the degree and costs of asymmetric information. Some results 
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indicate that outside block-holders appear to play a role in mitigating informational 
asymmetries between firms and capital markets, but other results conclude that the 
higher the degree of institutional ownership, the higher the degree of asymmetric 
information. Also, there are no studies comparing ownership structures in 
corporations and their roles in mitigating or reducing asymmetric information. On the 
other hand, there is no study using the degree of asymmetric information as an 
indicator for the quality of ownership structure as a corporate governance mechanism, 
or as an indicator of different qualities among the different ownership structures. 
3.5.4 Takeovers and Asymmetric Information 
There is little evidence in the literature about the relationship between asymmetric 
information and takeovers. Most studies related to takeovers assumed the existence of 
asymmetric information. Yook et al. (1999) find that information asymmetry exists in 
the takeover market, and that it influences the payment method decision. Eckbo et al. 
(1990) model takeovers under asymmetric information. They assume that both sides 
have an information advantage, so that no two bidder types will present the same offer 
since they will be able to convey information efficiency to the target through the cash- 
stock mix selected. Also, Scharfstein (1988) presented a theory of the disciplinary role 
of takeovers based on an explicit model of managerial incentive problems stemming 
from asymmetric information. It is argued that an informed raider can reduce 
incentive problems by making managerial compensation more sensitive to 
information unavailable to shareholders. 
Under conditions of asymmetric information, Schnitzer (1996) examined the choice of 
a raider between a hostile and a friendly takeover, if the target company's manager has 
private information about the scope for efficiency gains. The raider has to decide 
whether to deal directly with shareholders by making a hostile tender offer without 
consulting the incumbent management, or to bargain with the manager. They 
concluded that an important cost of friendly takeovers is that the manager has to be 
paid an information rent in order to give his consent. Lagerlof and Heidhues (2005) 
constructed a model in which two companies that have planned to merge are privately 
informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the companies to affect the 
merger control process by intentionally revealing their information to an antitrust 
authority. While the information develops upon the quality of the authority's decision, 
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the influence activities may be detrimental to welfare if information processing or 
gathering is extremely costly. Holl et al. (1997) reported results of an empirical 
investigation based on a sample of 105 failed takeover bids that occurred in the UK in 
the 1980s. They find that target firms report large, significant, positive gains after the 
bid, while bidder firms report large and significant losses. They conclude that these 
results are related to asymmetric information during merger activity. Chang (1998) 
examined bidder returns at the announcement of a takeover proposal when the target 
firm is privately held. They find that, in stock offers, bidders experience a positive 
abnormal return, which contrasts with the negative abnormal return for bidders 
acquiring a publicly traded target. The analysis suggests that the positive wealth effect 
is related to monitoring activities by target shareholders and, to an extent, reduced 
information asymmetries. 
The above results indicated that most studies related to takeovers assumed the 
existence of asymmetric information. Accordingly, in some cases, bidders experience 
a positive abnormal return, which contrasts with the negative abnormal return for 
bidders acquiring a publicly traded target. In other cases, target firms report large, 
significant, positive gains after the bid, while bidder firms report large and significant 
losses. Also, the existence of asymmetric information affects the choice of a raider 
between a hostile and a friendly takeover. Also, there is no study examining the role 
of takeovers as a corporate governance mechanism in reducing or eliminating 
asymmetric information. Moreover, there is no study examining the effect of anti- 
takeover provisions on the degree of asymmetric information. 
3.5.5 Large Creditors 
There is some evidence about the role of large creditors in reducing the degree of 
asymmetric information. Degryse and Jong (2006, P. 125) stated that "leverage, and 
particularly bank debt, is a key disciplinary mechanism which reduces the 
managerial discretion problem and asymmetric information problem". Bebchuk 
(2003) confirmed the last result and stated that company debt can act as a disciplinary 
device to limit managerial discretion and asymmetric information, and works towards 
aligning manager and shareholder interests. Also, Dewenter and Warther (1998) 
explained that keiretsu-member companies in Japan face less information asymmetry 
and fewer agency conflicts than US firms. Takeo et al. (1990) hypothesized that free- 
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rider problems and asymmetric information make it difficult for companies to 
renegotiate with their creditors. They find proof that Japanese companies with 
financial structures in which these problems are likely to be small, perform better than 
other firms after the onset of distress. Particularly, they show that companies in 
industrial groups - those with close financial relationships to their banks, suppliers, 
and customers - invest more and sell more after the onset of distress than non-group 
firms. 
Also, there is evidence about the role of collateral in reducing the problem of 
asymmetric information. Berger et al. (2006) stated that the theoretical literature 
motivates collateral as a mechanism that reduces equilibrium credit rationing, and 
other problems arising from asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. 
However, no clear empirical evidence exists regarding the theory's central 
implication: that reducing asymmetric information reduces the use of collateral. They 
provide such evidence by exploiting exogenous variation in lender information sets 
related to their adoption of a new information technology, and by comparing collateral 
outcomes before and after adoption. 
In spit of the evidence about the role of banks as large creditors in reducing the degree 
of asymmetric information, there is no evidence regarding the role of other institutions 
(pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies) as large investors in reducing 
or eliminating asymmetric information. Also, there is no study discussing the role of 
large creditors as a corporate governance mechanism in reducing the degree of 
asymmetric information. In other words, there is no study using the degree of 
asymmetric information as an indicator for the quality of large creditors as a corporate 
governance mechanism. 
3.5.6 The Legal System 
Most studies which discuss the role of the legal system in reducing the degree of 
asymmetric information are related to the regulations of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure and accounting rules which provide investors with the information they 
need to exercise their rights (La Porta, 2000). Kelton and Yang (2008) find that firms 
with weak shareholder rights, a lower percentage of block-holder ownership, a higher 
percentage of independent directors, a more diligent audit committee, and a higher 
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percentage of audit committee members that are considered financial experts, are 
more likely to engage in Internet Financial Reporting (IFR). The findings suggest that 
corporate governance mechanisms influence a firm's Internet disclosure behaviour, 
presumably in response to the information asymmetry between management and 
investors and the resulting agency costs. 
Regarding the effect of disclosure on asymmetric information and their relation with 
corporate governance, Chen et al. (2007) stated that financial transparency and 
information disclosure are really key basics of good corporate governance. Good 
transparency and disclosure actions can help stockholders to attain a better 
understanding of companies' management practices, thus helping to mitigate the 
asymmetric information faced by investors. Brown and Hillegeist (2007) find a 
negative relationship between disclosure quality and information asymmetry. While 
information asymmetry is negatively associated with the quality of the annual report 
and investor relations' activities, it is positively associated with quarterly report 
disclosure quality. Additionally, they find that the negative association between 
disclosure quality and information asymmetry is stronger in settings characterized by 
higher levels of firm-investor asymmetry. Levine and Smith (2003) examined if 
voluntary disclosure by insiders can solve the problem of asymmetric information. 
When insiders take disclosure decisions after they become informed, other market 
participants renew their previous thinking on the source of both the information 
disclosed and the information not disclosed. Moreover, asymmetric information 
between corporate insiders and other market participants can lead to large bid-ask 
spreads, or even a failure of trade in financial markets. Aksu and Kosedag (2006) 
stated that transparency and disclosure practices followed by companies are a 
significant part, and a leading sign of corporate governance quality. They find that 
transparent and full disclosure of information is especially vital for Turkey, where 
external capital is essential to maintain the high growth rate, and the biggest agency 
problem centres on asymmetric information and expropriation by majority 
shareholders. Chipalkatti (2005) explained that as part of the financial sector 
deregulation, India's central bank mandated specific annual report disclosures 
effective March 31,2000. The mandatory disclosures were indeed transparent to 
investors, and bid-ask spreads and asymmetric information costs reduced in the post- 
disclosure period. 
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Other studies concentrate on the legal and regulatory system. Klapper and Love 
(2004) investigated the determinants of firm level governance, and find that 
governance is correlated with the extent of the asymmetric information and 
contracting defects that firms face. They provided evidence that company-level 
corporate governance provisions matter more in countries with weak legal systems. 
Hagerman and Healy (1992) suggested that when accounting regulation reduces 
asymmetric information, such regulation should reduce the bid-ask spread. His logic 
is that when security dealers are faced with asymmetric information they will have 
large bid-ask spreads to protect themselves from losses due to this information. Thus, 
if accounting regulation reduces asymmetric information, and/or prohibits insider 
trading, then spread should fall (when these regulations become effective). Lee et al. 
(2004) examined the components of the bid-ask spread surrounding news releases and 
trading activity by retail versus institutional investors, before and after the institution 
of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD). Evidence suggested that Regulation FD has 
brought about a new awareness of the importance of disseminating information to the 
public. Utrero-Gonzalez (2007) they find evidence that the efficiency of the legal 
environment significantly affects industry growth. In particular, prudent banking 
regulation has a depressing effect on industry growth. Excessive disclosure 
requirements hinder the results of leveraged industrial sectors. 
The above results indicate that there are vital roles played by the regulations of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures in reducing or eliminating the degree of 
asymmetric information. But, there is little evidence about the legal and regulatory 
system that is related to corporate governance and its role in reducing and eliminating 
asymmetric information. Also, there is little evidence concerning how the degree of 
asymmetric information is used as an indicator for the quality of the legal system of 
corporate governance. 
In brief, table 3.1 summarizes some important results regarding the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and asymmetric information. 
In brief, table 3.1 summarizes some important results regarding the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and asymmetric information. 
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3.6 Summary 
From the main results of this chapter we conclude the following points: 
First, the pervasiveness of asymmetric information in financial markets and its impact 
on economic growth have received a great deal of attention in recent years. 
Second, there are many theories related to the concept of asymmetric information, but 
if we are talking about the asymmetric information between shareholders or 
stakeholders and managers, then the agency theory will be the theory for corporate 
governance and asymmetric information. 
Third, there are no boundaries for the subject of asymmetric information. It is used in 
different levels (macro and micro), markets (agriculture, manufacturing, and services), 
and also in different subjects in finance, and has many extensions and applications in 
industrial organization and microeconomic dynamics; New Keynesian theories of 
unemployment; new theories of credit market rationing; and models of economic 
development and global financial stability. 
Fourth, by reviewing the literature, we find that there is indirect evidence regarding 
the effect of corporate governance mechanisms in reducing or controlling asymmetric 
information. All studies deal with asymmetric information as an assumption, not as a 
variable. 
Fifth, the last conclusion leads to the following research questions: 
A. How do different corporate governance mechanisms (internal and external) 
reduce the degree of asymmetric information? 
B. How does the degree of asymmetric information reflect the quality of 
different corporate governance mechanisms? 
C. Are there corporate governance mechanisms that are better than the others in 
reducing the degree of asymmetric information? 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES AND 
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapters two and three we reviewed the literature regarding corporate governance 
mechanisms and asymmetric information. The results showed that there is a clear gap in 
the literature in studying the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the degree of 
asymmetric information, especially in the UK capital market. How does the quality of the 
different corporate governance mechanisms - which is applied in the UK companies - 
control, reduce or mitigate asymmetric information? Is the compliance with the combined 
code on corporate governance solving the problem of asymmetric information which is a 
part of the agency problem? 
13 Also, can the degree of asymmetric information be an 
indicator for the quality of corporate governance mechanisms? 
In this chapter we discuss the research problem, objectives, variables, hypotheses, and 
design which are related to corporate governance variables (the independent variables) 
and asymmetric information (the dependent variables). 
13 The combined code on corporate governance (2003, p. 1) stated that "The existing Listing Rules require 
listed companies to make a disclosure statement in two parts in relation to the Code. In the first part of the 
statement, the company has to report on how it applies the principles in the Code. In future this will need to 
cover both main and supporting principles. The form and content of this part of the statement are not 
prescribed, the intention being that companies should have a free hand to explain their governance policies 
in the light of the principles, including any special circumstances applying to them which have led to a 
particular approach. In the second part of the statement the company has either to confirm that it complies 
with the Code's provisions or - where it does not - to provide an explanation. This 'comply or explain' 
approach has been in operation for over ten years and the flexibility it offers has been widely welcomed 
both by company boards and by investors. It is for shareholders and others to evaluate the company's 
statement". 
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4.2 Research Problem 
By reviewing the literature we find that there is a clear gap in studying the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and asymmetric information. Kanagaretnam 
et al. (2007) argued that studying the relationship between corporate governance and 
changes in information asymmetry in non-announcement periods is an interesting 
question for future research. All papers which examine the relationship between 
corporate governance and asymmetric information deal with different aspects or 
mechanisms of corporate governance. Some papers find that board independence reduces 
asymmetric information (Becker-Blease and Irani, 2008; Buchholtz, 2007; Kanagaretnam 
et al., 2007; Cai et al., 2006; Hillier and McColgan, 2006; Guercio et al., 2003). Other 
papers reflected on the importance of executive compensation in reducing the agency 
problem and mitigating asymmetric information (Kang et al., 2006; Tevlin, 1996; Wruck, 
1993). 
Some papers reflected different results regarding the effect of ownership structure on 
asymmetric information. The first category of results states that large shareholders are 
able to reduce asymmetric information and improve long-run performance (Campbell and 
Frye, 2006; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; Florackis and Ozkan, 2008; Li and Jeong- 
Bon 2004; Perotti and Thadden, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The second category 
of results finds that higher institutional ownership, particularly a higher number of 
institutional investors, is associated with a lower degree of informed trading, and that not 
all types of institutions can cause decreases in adverse selection costs as a measure of 
asymmetric information (Clarck, 2007; Fehle, 2004; O'Neill and Swisher, 2003; Heflin 
and Shaw, 2000). 
From the above results we conclude that there is no complete study that examines the 
effect of corporate governance mechanisms on asymmetric information. Also, there is 
little evidence about the effect of each corporate governance mechanism on the degree of 
asymmetric information in general, and in the UK corporations in particular. 
4.3 Research Objectives 
According to the research problems we state the main objective of this research is to 
establish a practical guide for corporate governance mechanisms that can be used by the 
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companies in the UK to control, minimize or mitigate asymmetric information. Based on 
this objective, the sub-objectives are: 
First, identifying the most effective corporate governance mechanisms applied in the UK 
capital market that can be used to control, reduce or mitigate asymmetric information. 
Second, examining empirically the role of corporate governance mechanisms in 
controlling, reducing or mitigating the problem of asymmetric information in the UK 
capital market. 
Third, examining empirically if we can use corporate governance variables to predict 
asymmetric information in the UK companies. 
Fourth, identifying the main measures of asymmetric information, and how to use them 
in measuring the quality of corporate governance mechanisms. 
4.4 Research Variables and Hypothesis 
4.4.1 The Dependent Variables 
To carry out the analysis in this study, we use many alternative proxies to measure the 
degree of asymmetric information as dependent variables. These measures are classified 
into two categories. The first category of these measures includes financial ratios like the 
price-to-book ratio of assets, the earnings-to-price ratio, volatility, volume and leverage. 
The second category includes the micro-structure measure of asymmetric information, 
which is the bid-ask spread. 
4.4.1.1 The Financial Ratio's Measures of Asymmetric Information 
4.4.1.1.1 Volatility (VOLATILITY) 
Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the day-over-day difference in the daily 
price change 14. Ness et al. (2001); and Clarke and Shastri (2001) use the residual 
volatility in daily stock returns as another proxy for information asymmetry. Clarke and 
Shastri (2001) argue that residual volatility may be overstating the level of asymmetric 
information about a firm. This means there are other factors affecting the degree of 
14 We select the average value of volatility for the last ten months in the year of analysis. 
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volatility and it may be related to the degree of firms' uncertainty. Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2005) find that the relative spreads of the bid-ask spread has a significant positive 
relation with both forecast dispersion and revision volatility and a significant negative 
relation with analyst coverage. Eleswarapu et al. (2004) argue that if information 
disclosure becomes more general, the amount of asymmetric information in the securities 
market will decline following the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure by the US. They 
find that return volatility was lower around mandatory announcements. In the same issue, 
Lee et al. (2004) indicated that Regulation FD did not increase volatility. Indeed, it is 
more likely to have contributed to lower volatility. Also, Wang (1993) proved that 
information asymmetry among investors can increase price volatility. Accordingly, we 
expect that the higher the degree of volatility in daily stock returns, the higher the degree 
of asymmetric information. 
4.4.1.1.2 Volume (VOLUME) 
The volume is the number of shares traded on the corresponding date. 15 Most of the 
literature results indicated that the average daily trading volume is negatively related to 
asymmetric information. Draper and Paudyal (2008) suggest that the average daily 
trading volume is negatively related to asymmetric information. Ness et al. (2001) 
hypothesized that the average daily trading volume might be related to adverse selection, 
because less frequently traded stocks can have more information problems. Acker et al. 
(2002) and Brooks et al. (1999) find that closing daily inside spreads are affected by high 
trading volumes. Grishchenko et al. (2003) find strong evidence of return continuation 
following high volume days, suggesting the presence of private information trading for 
many emerging market stocks. Tung and Marsden (2000) indicated that markets with 
inside and privately informed traders led to greater trading volumes than markets with 
traders having access to private information only. Gaj ewski (1999) finds that trading 
volume is larger on announcement days, and spreads are wider after announcements. 
Lang et al. (1992) indicated that the dispersion of private information across traders has 
an impact on trading volume. Accordingly, we expect that the higher the degree of 
trading volume, the lower the degree of asymmetric information. 
15 We use the average volume of shares traded in the year of analysis. 
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4.4.1.1.3 Leverage (LEVERAGE) 
In this research the leverage ratio is measured using the ratio of total debt to total assets16. 
Most of the literature indicates that leverage is negatively related to asymmetric 
information. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stated that debt financing is a mechanism for 
solving agency problems because of the ability of creditors to exercise control. The 
agency problems within a firm are usually related to free cash-flow and asymmetric 
information problems. So bank debt incorporates significant signalling characteristics that 
can mitigate informational asymmetry conflicts between managers and outside investors. 
Also, firms with large potential information asymmetries are likely to issue short-term 
debt because of the larger information costs associated with long-term debt (Florackis 
and Ozkan, 2008). John and Kedia (2003) stated that the bank acquires private 
information about the borrowing firm that enables the bank to monitor the firm and 
implement the correct investment choices. Periodic enforcement of debt covenants also 
performs a monitoring role. Verschueren and Deloof (2006) argue that the lower costs of 
asymmetric information will cause firms to have higher leverage. So, we expect that a 
higher leverage ratio is related to a lower degree of asymmetric information. 
4.4.1.2 The Micro-structure Measure of Asymmetric Information 
Empirical papers in finance have employed a wide variety of proxy variables to measure 
the degree of asymmetric information between insiders and outside investors. The 
majority of these studies use the bid-ask spread as a micro-structure measure for 
asymmetric information. These studies develop models by decomposing the bid-ask 
spread into various components (Glosten and Harris, 1988; George et al., 1991; Lin et al., 
1995; Madhavan et al., 1997; Huang and Stoll, 1997; Silva and Chavez, 2002). In these 
models, the spread generally has three components: order processing, inventory holding, 
and adverse selection. There are a number of studies that use these models to measure the 
adverse selection component as a measure of the degree of asymmetric information (Ness 
et al., 2001; Clarke and Shastri, 2001). These models are classified into two main classes 
of statistical models. The first one relies on the serial covariance properties of the 
observed transaction prices (Lin et al., 1995; George et al., 1991; Huang and Stoll, 1997). 
The second class of models is based on the trade initiation indicator variable (Glosten 
and Harris, 1988; Madhavan et al., 1997). The empirical findings indicated that the serial 
covariance properties of the observed transaction prices model and the trade initiation 
16 We follow Ness et at. (2001) in measuring the leverage ratio. 
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indicator variable model lead to identical results. 17 Also, the adverse selection component 
is highly correlated with total spread value. The finding suggests that the adverse 
selection component performs in a Kedialar manner to the spread alone (Ness et al., 
2001). 
Therefore, we follow Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) to calculate the mean value of the daily 
percentage spread (SPREADRATIO) 
18 as a proxy measure for the degree of asymmetric 
information. We collect daily closing bid and closing ask prices from 01/01/2003 to 
31/12/2006 from the Bloomberg database. The value of the spread ratio is measured as 
follows: 
SPREAD = (ASK - BID)/ ((ASK + BID)/ 2) * 100 
Accordingly, we expect that the higher the SPREAD ratio, the higher the degree of 
asymmetric information. 
4.4.2 The Independent Variables 
The empirical model of this study includes a set of corporate governance variables related 
to companies' board size and composition, executive compensation, ownership structure, 
large creditors and takeovers. Analytical definitions of these variables are given in table 
4.1. 
4.4.2.1 Board Size, Composition and Activities Variables 
By reviewing the literature we find some evidence about the effect of board size and 
composition on the degree of asymmetric information. Rutherford and Buchholtz (2007) 
find that an increase in the proportion of outside directors on a board is associated with 
an increase in the boards' information quality and proactive information-seeking. In 
" Ness et al. (2001) stated that there is a strong correlation among all the components and the spread 
between all these models. This strong correlation indicates that at the very least, the adverse selection 
components of the models studied are measuring something similar. 
" The mean value of the daily percentage spread is calculated for each company for one year to unify the 
year of analysis between the dependent and independent variables. For example, if the data is of corporate 
governance mechanisms (the independent variables), which are collected from companies' annual reports, 
for the year 2006, we calculate the mean value of the daily percentage spread (the dependent variable) for 
the same year of 2006, for the same company. 
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addition, an increase in outside director tenure is associated with boards exchanging 
information more frequently. 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) indicated that changes in bid-ask spreads at the time of 
earnings' announcements are significantly negatively related to board independence, 
board activity, and the percentage stock holdings of directors and officers. They also find 
that depth changes in bid-ask spreads are significantly positively related to board 
structure (measured by board committee's size, and the retirement age of board 
members), board activity (measured by the number of board meetings and the number of 
audit committee meetings), and directors' and officers' percentage stock holdings. 
Cai et al. (2006) provide some strong support that the larger the proportion of the board 
from the founding family, the greater the information asymmetry in the market, and the 
more diverse the board is in terms of the presence of female directors, the less the 
information asymmetry in the market. Hsiang-tsai (2005) stated that, according to 
signalling theory, under information asymmetry, companies with superior information 
transparency signal better corporate governance, and companies that have better 
corporate governance signal better performance. 
Nowak and McCabe (2003) focus on information costs and information asymmetry. The 
central finding was that directors perceive that the CEO and Executives have the 
controlling power over information. The provision of appropriate information for board 
decisions is perceived to hinge on the "integrity" of the CEO and Executives. This 
emphasis on integrity and "good companies" does seem consistent with the Stewardship 
Theory of governance. 
4.4.2.1.1 Board Size19 
19 The main principle of the combined code on corporate governance (2003, Secion 1, A 1) stated that "every 
company should be headed by an effective unitary board, which is collectively responsible for the success 
of the company. Also, the board should not be so large as to be unwieldy. The board should be of sufficient 
size that the balance of skills and experience is appropriate for the requirements of the business, and that 
changes to the board's composition can be managed without undue disruption ". 
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Board size (BSIZE) is defined as the number of directors serving on the board. Cai et al. 
(2006) stated that board size should be taken into account, since the number of directors 
can influence board activity and, potentially, disclosure activities. Boards impose a 
burden on corporate resources in two ways - the direct costs of keeping large boards of 
directors (financial rewards and perquisites) and the indirect costs of greater bureaucracy. 
In chapter three we concluded that there are no clear and direct results about the effect of 
board size on the degree of asymmetric information. But the results of Rutherford and 
Buchholtz (2007) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) indicated that board independence is 
negatively related to asymmetric information. Because we expect that there is a positive 
relationship between board size and board independence in the UK companies, so we 
expect that board size will be negatively related to asymmetric information as well. 
4.4.2.1.2 Board Composition and Independence 
H4.2: There is a negative relationship between board independence and the degree of 
asymmetric information. 
In the current research we use a number of variables related to board composition and 
independence which are the number of non-executive directors, CEO/Chairman split and 
committees' size. 
Regarding board independence, we use six variables which are the number of non- 
executive directors (NONEXESIZE)20, non-executive chairman (NONEXECHAIR)21 (a 
dummy variable equal to one if the chairman is a non-executive director and equal to zero 
if the chairman is an executive director), the number of directors serving on the 
remuneration committee (RCSIZE)22, the number of directors serving on the nomination 
20 The combined code on corporate governance (2003, Secion 1, A3) stated that "the board should include a 
balance of executive and non-executive directors (and in particular independent non-executive directors) 
such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the board's decision taking". 
21 The combined code on corporate governance (2003, Secion1, A 2.2) stated that "the chairman should, on 
appointment, meet the independence criteria". 
22The 
combined code on corporate governance (2003, Secion I, B 2.1) stated that "the board should 
establish a remuneration committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller companies, two members, 
who should all be independent non-executive directors ". 
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committee (NCSIZE)23, the number of directors serving on the audit committee 
(ACSIZE)24 and the split responsibility of the CEO and Chairman (SPLIT)25 (a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the positions of the CEO and Chairman are split, and 
0 otherwise)26. 
Cai et al. (2006) stated that the contribution of non-executive (independent) directors to 
the board is based on two theories, agency theory and resource dependence theory; the 
latter of which deals with the link between firms and their external environment due to 
outside non-executive directors' experience and expertise27. 
23The 
combined code on corporate governance (2003, Secionl, A. 4.1) stated that "there should be a 
nomination committee which should lead the process for board appointments and make recommendations 
to the board. A majority of members of the nomination committee should be independent non-executive 
directors. The chairman or an independent non-executive director should chair the committee, but the 
chairman should not chair the nomination committee when it is dealing with the appointment of a 
successor to the chairmanship". 
24The 
combined code on corporate governance (2003, Secionl, C. 3.1) stated that "the board should 
establish an audit committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller companies, two members, who 
should all be independent non-executive directors. The board should satisfy itself that at least one member 
of the audit committee has recent and relevant financial experience ". 
25 The combined code on corporate governance (2003, Section 1, A. 2) stated that "there should be a clear 
division of responsibilities at the head of the company between the running of the board and the executive 
responsibilityfor the running of the company's business. No one individual should have unfettered powers 
of decision. If, exceptionally, a board decides that a chief executive should become chairman, the board 
should consult major shareholders in advance and should set out its reasons to shareholders at the time of 
the appointment and in the next annual report". 
26 Note that in some cases NONEXECHAIR and SPLIT are similar. Fro example if the company split 
between the positions of the chairman and CEO, in this case the chairman - in most of the UK - will be 
non-executive (independent). So, in this case there is no difference between the NONEXECHAIR and 
SPLIT as proxies for corporate governance. But in some cases there is a difference between these two 
variables. For example, the company may split between the two positions, but the chairman is executive. In 
this case it is important to differentiate between these two variables to examine the effect of the executive 
chairman as a corporate governance variable on asymmetric information. Because there are some cases 
fitting the last example we differentiate between these two variables. 
Z7 "The resource dependence theory of the firm has often been applied to explain the role of the board of 
directors, which is seen as a particularly effective means of obtaining essential resources for the company. 
Indeed, the most recent and extensive reviews of the literature on boards of directors have classified the 
resource dependence role among the most important served by board directors. According to this theory 
the firm does not control all the resources it needs. The majority of such resources are only found outside 
the firm. Acquisition of resources by organizations, the critical activity for their survival - is carried out 
through the interaction with the subjects who control those resources. Hence, trying to eliminate or reduce 
resource dependence becomes a vital activity for any firm ", (Salvato, 1999, P. 7). 
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In reviewing the literature, we find that director independence is related to shareholder 
interests in ways that are consistent with boards being effective monitors. Becker-Blease 
and Irani (2008) find that board independence reduces asymmetric information during 
seasoned equity offerings. Also, there are trends that show that less board independence 
offers fewer disclosures (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Webb et al., 2008). Moreover, 
firms with a higher proportion of independent directors have superior performance 
records and greater board independence, causally predicting higher share prices in 
emerging markets (Hillier and McColgan, 2006; Guercio et al., 2003; Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985). 
Because the remuneration committee, nomination committee and audit committee are 
constructed from non-executive directors in the UK capital market so, the larger the size 
of these committees, the higher the committees' independence. While there is little 
evidence regarding the effect of committees' size on asymmetric information, Becker- 
Blease and Irani (2008) find that the size of the audit committee mitigates asymmetric 
information during the seasoned equity offerings. Accordingly, we expect that the larger 
the size of committees, the lower the degree of asymmetric information. 
The split responsibility of the CEO and Chairman is a further aspect of the independence 
of the board. We use the CEO/Chairman split as a dummy variable equal to one if the two 
positions are split, and zero if the two positions are not split. Cai et al. (2006) stated that 
if the roles of CEO and Chairman are separated, it will provide essential checks on 
management performance, and prevent powers from being concentrated on one 
potentially dominant person on the board. So, we expect that splitting the two positions 
leads to reducing the degree of asymmetric information. 
All in all, we expect that the higher the number of non-executive directors, 
CEO/Chairman split, the chairman is non- executive director and committees' size the 
higher the board independence and accordingly the lower the degree of asymmetric 
information. 
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4.4.2.1.3 Females on the Board 
Regarding females on the board as a board composition variable, there is some evidence 
suggesting that the number of females on the board affects the degree of asymmetric 
information. For example, Cai et al. (2006) stated that the more diverse the board in terms 
of the presence of female directors, the less the information asymmetry in the market. 
Also, in Spain, Campbell and Minguez-vera (2008) find that gender diversity (as 
measured by the percentage of women on the board) has a positive effect on firm value, 
and the greater gender diversity may generate economic gains. Beside the results of the 
literature, we test the idea that board gender variety may affect the actions of the board, 
including disclosure activities. So, we expect that the larger the ratio of females to board 
size (FEMALETOBOARD), the lower the degree of asymmetric information. 
4.4.2.1.4 Board and Committees' Activities 
and the degree of asymmetric information. 
We use the number of board and committees' meetings28 as measures of board and 
committees' activities29. In this research there are four variables related to board and 
committees' activities which are board meetings (BOARDMEETS), the remuneration 
committee meetings (RCMEETS), audit committee meetings (ACMEETS)30, and 
nomination committee meetings (NCMEETS). In each variable we use the number of 
meetings during the year of analysis. Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) argue that boards and 
audit committees which meet commonly should be more efficient monitors of 
28 The Combined code on corporate governance (2003, Section 1, A. 1.2 and A. 1.3) stated that "the annual 
report should set out the number of meetings of the board and those committees, and individual attendance 
by directors. The chairman should hold meetings with the non-executive directors without the executives 
present. Led by the senior independent director, the non-executive directors should meet without the 
chairman present at least annually to appraise the chairman's performance and on such other occasions as 
are deemed appropriate". 
29 We follow Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) in measuring board and committees' activities. 
30 The Combined code on corporate governance (2003, Section 1,2.7) stated that it is for the audit 
committee chairman, in consultation with the company secretary, to decide the frequency and timing of its 
meetings. There should be as many meetings as the audit committee's role and responsibilities require. It is 
recommended there should be not fewer than three meetings during the year, held to coincide with key 
dates within the financial reporting and audit cycle. However, most audit committee chairmen will wish to 
call more frequent meetings. The audit committee should, at least annually, meet the external and internal 
auditors, without management, to discuss matters relating to its remit and any issues arising from the 
audit ". 
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management and find that board activity (which includes board meetings and audit 
committee meetings) are significantly negatively related to bid-ask spread ratio. Also, 
asymmetric information should be smaller for companies whose board and committees 
meet more frequently. The higher the number of board and committees' meeting is an 
indicator for the activeness of the board to solve the company problems. Also, this will 
help in disseminating the information (decreasing the degree of asymmetric information) 
to stockholders through the reports which are published in every meeting. Accordingly, 
we expect that the larger the number of board and committees' meetings, the lower the 
degree of asymmetric information. 
4.4.2.2 Executive Compensation Variables31 
Florackis and Ozkan (2008) stated that that compensation contracts can motivate 
managers to take actions that maximize shareholders' wealth. However, due to 
asymmetric information between managers and shareholders, both equity and 
compensation related incentives are required. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) support the 
same idea. They stated that a better solution is to grant a manager a highly contingent, 
long-term incentive contract ex-ante to align his interests with those of investors. 
According to the results of the literature, we find that there are some effects of 
compensation plans on the degree of asymmetric information, but these effects may differ 
according to the type of compensation plans. Tevlin (1996) stated that, in theory, having 
CEO pay depend on the performance of the firm is the optimal solution to the moral 
hazard problem that exists, because shareholders do not observe the actions of the CEO. 
Also, Wruck (1993) showed that companies with higher information asymmetries have 
CEO compensation emphasizing equity ownership relative to salary and bonus 
incentives. Surprisingly, they also show that CEO compensation in firms with higher 
31 The Combined code on corporate governance (2003, Section 1, B. 1, B. 1.1 and B. 1.2) stated that "levels 
of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality required to run 
the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying more than is necessary for this purpose. A 
significant proportion of executive directors' remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to 
corporate and individual performance. The performance-related elements of remuneration should form a 
significant proportion of the total remuneration package of executive directors, and should be designed to 
align their interests with those of shareholders and to give these directors keen incentives to perform at the 
highest levels. Executive share options should not be offered at a discount, save as permitted by the 
relevant provisions of the Listing Rules ". 
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information asymmetries is more weakly associated with stock performance than 
compensation in lower asymmetry firms. 
For measuring the effect of executive compensation on the degree of asymmetric 
information, we use some variables related to executive compensation. All of these 
variables are collected from the companies' annual reports. 
4.4.2.2.1 CEO's Benefits and Bonuses (%)32 
H4.5: There is a negative relationship between the ratio of the CEO's benefits and 
bonuses and the degree of asymmetric information. 
The CEO benefits and bonuses ratio (CEOBENEFITS) is defined as the ratio of CEO's 
benefits and bonuses to total CEO's annual income. According to the literature, CEO 
benefits and bonuses as a part of any compensation plan in all UK companies are mainly 
designed to enhance shareholder value and to reduce the problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. So, we expect that the higher the ratio of CEO's benefits and bonuses, 
the lower the degree of asymmetric information. 
4.4.2.2.2 CEO Long-term Mix33 
H4.6: There is a negative relationship between CEO long-term incentive schemes and 
the degree of asymmetric information. 
32 The combined code on corporate governance (2003, Schedual A, no. 1) state that "the remuneration 
committee should consider whether the directors should be eligible for annual bonuses. If so, performance 
conditions should be relevant, stretching and designed to enhance shareholder value. Upper limits should 
be set and disclosed. There may be a case for part-payment in shares to be held for a significant period". 
33 The combined code on corporate governance (2003, Schedual A, no. 2,3 and 4) state that "the 
remuneration committee should consider whether the directors should be eligible for benefits under long- 
term incentive schemes. Traditional share option schemes should be weighed against other kinds of long- 
term incentive schemes. In normal circumstances, shares granted, or other forms of deferred remuneration 
should not vest, and options should not be exercisable in less than three years. Directors should be 
encouraged to hold their shares for a further period after vesting or exercise, subject to the need to finance 
any costs of acquisition and associated tax liabilities. Any new long-term incentive schemes which are 
proposed should be approved by shareholders, and should preferably replace any existing schemes, or at 
least form part of a well-considered overall plan, incorporating existing schemes. The total rewards 
potentially available should not be excessive. Payouts or grants under all incentive schemes, including new 
grants under existing share option schemes, should be subject to challenging performance criteria 
reflecting the company's objectives. Consideration should be given to criteria which reflect the company's 
performance relative to a group of comparator companies in some key variables such as total shareholder 
return ". 
100 
CEO long-term mix (CEOLONGCOMP) is defined as a dummy variable that takes the 
value of I if the CEO is remunerated with stock options or payments from the 
performance plan, and 0 otherwise. According to the literature, equity-based 
compensation is the most powerful plan among all other compensation plans in aligning 
the interests of the CEO and shareholders (Kang et al., 2006). So, we expect that long- 
term incentive schemes will encourage better performance and reduce the degree of 
asymmetric information. 
4.4.2.2.3 Executives' Benefits and Bonuses 
H4.7: There is a negative relationship between Executive directors' benefits and 
bonuses schemes and the degree of asymmetric information. 
Executives benefits and bonuses (BENEFITS) is defined as a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if executives (other than the CEO) are remunerated with benefits, bonuses, 
stock options or payments from the performance plan, and 0 otherwise. We expect that 
executive directors' benefits and bonuses schemes will encourage better performance and 
reduce the degree of asymmetric information. 
4.4.2.3 Ownership Structure Variables 
From chapter two and three we concluded that there are contradictions about the effect of 
different ownership structures on the degree and costs of asymmetric information. Some 
results indicate that outside block-holders appear to play a role in mitigating 
informational asymmetries between firms and capital markets, but other results 
concluded that the higher the degree of institutional ownership, the higher the degree of 
asymmetric information. Also, there is little and indirect evidence about the role of 
managerial and insider ownership in reducing the degree of asymmetric information. 
Moreover, there is no study comparing between ownership structures in companies and 
their roles in mitigating or reducing asymmetric information. Accordingly, there is little 
and indirect evidence about the effect of the different ownership structures on the degree 
of asymmetric information. 
Also, the literature did not examine the relationship between ownership structure - as a 
corporate governance mechanism - and asymmetric information. Most of the empirical 
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works deal with asymmetric information as an assumption. So, we will examine directly 
degree of asymmetric information. 
The % Insiders' Ownership (INSIDERSOWN) is the fraction of outstanding shares held 
by insiders. Florackis and Ozkan (2008, P. 38) stated that "managerial ownership can 
align the interest between the two different groups of claimholders and, therefore, 
reduce the agency costs within the firm. At low levels of managerial ownership, 
managerial ownership aligns managers' and outside shareholders' interests by 
reducing managerial incentives for perk consumption, utilization of insufficient effort 
and engagement in non-maximizing projects (alignment effect). After some level of 
managerial ownership, though, managers exert insufficient effort (e. g. focus on 
external activities), collect private benefits (e. g. build empires or enjoy perks) and 
entrench themselves (e. g. undertake high risk projects or bend over backwards to resist 
a takeover) at the expense of other investors (entrenchment effect)': Chiang and 
Venkatesh (1988) support the (entrenchment effect) and find a positive correlation 
between the bid-ask spread as a proxy of asymmetric information, and the percentage of 
ownership by corporate insiders. They concluded that dealers perceive a positive 
relationship between insiders' holdings and information asymmetry. Consistent with the 
empirical evidence of Chiang and Venkatesh (1988), we expect that the higher the ratio 
of insiders' ownership, the higher the degree of asymmetric information. 
4.4.2.3.2 Insiders' size 
H4.9: There is a negative relationship between insiders' size and the degree of 
asymmetric information. 
Insiders' size (INSIDERSSIZE) is the number of owners inside the companies (directors, 
managers, and/or employees). While there is no evidence in literature regarding the 
relationship between the number of insiders and asymmetric information, Monks and 
Minow (2008) argue that stock ownership plans are designed to focus attention on stock 
values, develop company ownership, promote employees' loyalty, reward long-term 
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business success and develop a parallel interest between employees and shareholders. So, 
a larger number of insiders (directors, managers, and/or workers) acts to align the 
interests of insiders with stockholders, and as a result will reduce asymmetric 
information. 
4.4.2.3.3 % Block Ownership 
114.10: There is a positive relationship between the ratio of block ownership and the 
degree of asymmetric information. 
To measure the relationship between % block ownership and asymmetric information we 
use two variables. First, % block ownership (BLOCKOWN) is defined as the fraction of 
outstanding shares owned by block-holders (institutions, families, and anchor investors). 
A block-holder is defined as a shareholder who holds more than 3% of outstanding 
shares. Second, % largest investor (LARGESTOWN) is defined as the fraction of 
outstanding shares owned by the largest block-holder. 
In chapter three we find that there are contradictions regarding the effect of block- 
ownership on the degree of asymmetric information. The first category of results states 
that shareholders with substantial stakes have more incentives to supervise management 
and can do so more effectively (Florackis and Ozkan, 2008; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Campbell and Frye (2006) argue that large shareholders are able to reduce asymmetric 
information and improve long-run performance. Also, Perotti and Thadden (2003) 
concluded that dominant investors, which may be large lenders (banks) or large inside 
equity holders (usually family-controlled holding companies), can influence the publicly 
available information about firms by reducing the cost of information collection. Pawlina 
and Renneboog (2005), Campbell and Frye (2006), Li and Jeong-Bon (2004), and Kini 
and Main (1995) find that block-holders (institutions, families, and anchor investors) 
appear to play a role in mitigating informational asymmetries between firms and capital 
markets. 
The second category of results finds that higher institutional ownership, particularly a 
higher number of institutional investors, is associated with a lower degree of informed 
trading, and not all types of institutions can cause decreases in adverse selection costs as 
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a measure of asymmetric information (Fehle, 2004; O'Neill and Swisher, 2003; Heflin 
and Shaw, 2000). By reviewing the annual reports of the companies in the research 
sample, we find that most of the substantial shareholdings are owned by institutional 
shareholders. Also, Dong and Ozkan (2008), Clarck (2007), and Solomon (2007) 
reflected on the increasing importance of institutional investors in the UK companies, and 
the stake held by institutional investors in the UK stock market has continued to grow. 
They indicated that in 2004 the assets of pension funds and insurance companies totalled 
$ 2.47 trillion, amounting to 116% of GDP. As a consequence, the institutional investors 
have become the major shareholders in the UK. Mallin (2007) supports the same fact that 
the ownership of insurance companies and pension funds in the UK market in 2004 were 
17% and 16%, respectively 34. Also, Clarck (2007, p. 109-110) states that "institutional 
investors have become implicated as one of the insistent forces pressuring corporate 
management towards unacceptable practices in order to inflate their earnings and 
dividends". That is, the institutions themselves are implicated in the causation of volatile 
market conditions. Accordingly, we expect that the effect of block-ownership in the UK 
capital market will be consistent with Fehle (2004) and O'Neill and Swisher's (2003) 
results. We expect that the higher the ratio of block ownership, the higher the degree of 
asymmetric information. 
4.4.2.4 Debt Financing Variables 
H4.11: There is a negative relationship between the % of debt to total capital and the 
degree of asymmetric information. 
To examine the effect of debt on asymmetric information we use two variables related to 
the ratio of debt to capital. First, % Total Debt/Total Capital (DEBTTOCAPITAL) is 
defined as the ratio of total debt to total capital. Second, % Long Term Debt/Total Capital 
(LONGDEBTTOCAPITAL) is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total capital. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stated that debt financing is a mechanism for solving agency 
problems because of the ability of creditors to exercise control. The agency problems 
within a firm are usually related to free cash-flow and asymmetric information problems. 
34 Also, in the USA, Monks and Minow (2008) reflect on the rapid increase in institutional ownership. In 
1998, institutions owned about 26.5% of equity of most large multinational companies. By 2002, 
institutions owned more than 60 % of equity of most large multinational companies. 
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So bank debt incorporates significant signalling characteristics that can mitigate 
informational asymmetry conflicts between managers and outside investors. Also, firms 
with large potential information asymmetries are likely to issue short-term debt because 
of the larger information costs associated with long-term debt (Florackis and Ozkan, 
2008). 
John and Kedia (2003) stated that the bank acquires private information about the 
borrowing firm that enables the bank to monitor the firm and implement the correct 
investment choices. Periodic enforcement of debt covenants also performs a monitoring 
role. Degryse and Jong (2006) find that leverage, and particularly bank debt, is a key 
disciplinary mechanism which reduces the managerial discretion problem. Moreover, 
Florackis and Ozkan (2008) hold that firms with large potential information asymmetries 
are likely to issue short-term debt because of the larger information costs associated with 
long-term debt. Accordingly, we expect that the higher the ratio of debt, the lower the 
degree of asymmetric information. 
4.4.3 The Control Variables 
The prior literature in corporate governance suggests a number of control variables like 
company size (SIZE) and industry (INDUSTRY) classifications (e. g. see Cai et al., 2006; 
Sanda et al., 2005; Sinha, 2006; Florackis and Ozkan, 2008). Accordingly, we use 
company size and industry classification as control variables35. The control variables are 
defined in the next section, along with dependent and independent variables in table 4.2. 
4.5 Research Design 
4.5.1 Sample Selection 
The target population is defined as the non-financial listed UK companies on the London 
Stock Exchange. A non-probability sampling technique was adopted, as only firms with 
the required information were selected for the study. Financial firms were excluded from 
the population of listed firms because they do not have the characteristics (i. e. the Price- 
35 Also, there are other control variables are associated with asymmetric information like: the price to 
earning ratio, the price to book ratio, the percentage of stocks held by institutions and the research 
development expenses and other variables related to growth opportunity. For more details see Draper and 
Paudyal (2008); Ness et al., (2001); Clarke and Shastri, (2001). 
105 
to-Book value) which make them comparable with non-financial firms. Also, we 
excluded any newly listed firms, which listed after 2003, and also excluded any firm 
which did not publish its annual report, or which is unquoted at the date of the analysis. 
Table 4.1 explained the sample composition according to industry, number of companies, 
and the percent of each industry to total sample. 
Table 4.1 shows that the final sample is 392 UK listed companies. Most of this sample is 
concentrated in industrials (43.6 %), consumer services (20.7%), consumer goods (10%), 
and technology (10.7%). We will classify these companies according to the main industry 
to examine the effect of each industry on asymmetric information. 
4.5.2 Time Horizon 
The current research concentrates mainly on studying the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the degree of asymmetric information. So, we mainly use cross-sectional 
data to study the effect of corporate governance on asymmetric information at a particular 
point of time (i. e. the effect of board composition on the degree of asymmetric 
information in the year 2006). Also, we use time series data for calculating the value of 
the bid-ask spread. We use the most recent and annual data for corporate governance and 
asymmetric information for one year for each company. So, the year of analysis for all 
variables depends on the availability of the most recent annual report for each company36. 
Accordingly, the year of analysis differs from one company to another, because the data 
about corporate governance is not available for all companies for all years. But, the time 
period of analysis for all companies falls between 2003 and 2006. So, we will also study 
the robustness by year. 
4.5.3 Data Collection and Techniques 
The data is mainly extracted from the London Stock Exchange website37, the annual 
report for each company, the Bloomberg Database and the DataStream Database. From 
the London Stock Exchange website we collect data about listed companies, main 
industry, and sub-industry. The DataStream and Bloomberg Databases are used to collect 
36 For example, if the recent annual report for a specific company is the report of year 2006, we collect and 
analyse the data for the year 2006. But, if the recent annual report is the report for 2003, we use and analyse 
the data for the year 2003. 
37 http: //www. londonstockexchange. com 
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the financial and market data. From the annual report we collect the corporate governance 
data like board size and composition, executive compensation and ownership structure. 
The values of corporate governance indexes are collected from the Bloomberg Database. 
Table 4.2 explains the data sources and the definition for each variable. 
4.5.4 Data Analysis 
To study the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the degree of asymmetric 
information, we analyse the data through many stages: 
4.5.4.1 Studying the Relationship between Asymmetric Information Proxy Measures 
and Corporate Governance Variables (Bivariate Data Analysis) 
Because there are many measures of asymmetric information (Volatility, Volume, 
Leverage and the bid-ask spread) in this research, we use the Pearson correlation between 
these variables to determine if all of these variables are equally good indicators for the 
degree of asymmetric information. We will also examine the Pearson correlation between 
asymmetric information proxy measures and corporate governance variables. 
4.5.4.2 Studying the Relationship between Corporate Governance Variables and 
Asymmetric Information (Multivariate Data Analysis) 
Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2005) stated that the methodological approach used in 
most prior work examining the impact of corporate governance on various dependent 
variables utilizes a multiple regression of the following general form: 
Y, =a+ Eß Governance Factors +E (3Controls + Ei 
According to the last formula, we study the relationship between corporate governance 
variables and asymmetric information through the following six regression equations. 
Yasyi =a+ß1R1, +ß2X2i +ß3X3i +"""+ß23X231 +£i 
(4'ý 
Where: 
Yasy 1= Volatility as a proxy measure of asymmetric information 
Ya, y 2= Volume as a proxy measure of asymmetric information 
Yasy 3= Leverage (total debt/total assets) as a proxy measure of asymmetric information 
Y. y 4= The bid-ask spread 
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a= Regression intercept 
X, = Board size 
XZ = The number non-executive directors on the board 
X3= CEO/Chairman split (0/1) 
X4 = Non-executive chairman (0/1) 
X5 = The number of directors serving on the Remuneration Committee 
X6 = The number of directors serving on the Nomination Committee 
X7 = The number of directors serving on the Audit Committee 
X8 = Board meetings 
X9 = The number of Remuneration Committee meetings 
X10 = The number of Audit Committee meetings 
X11= The number of Nomination Committee meetings 
X12 =% Females on the board 
X13 = CEO other benefits and bonuses (%) 
X14= CEO long-term mix (0/1) 
X15 = Executives other benefits and bonuses (0/1) 
X16 = Insiders' ownership (%) 
X17 = Insiders' size 
X18 = Block ownership (%) 
X19 = Largest (%) 
X20 = Total debt/total capital (%) 
X21 = Long-term debt/total capital (%) 
X22 = Company size as a control variable 
X23 = Industry as a control variable 
E; = The random error term 
Because there are many dependent variables in this research, we use the last equation 
many times, with each dependent variable alone, to study the effect of corporate 
governance variables and also the control variables (company size and industry) on 
asymmetric information. 
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4.6 Summary 
By reviewing the literature, we find a clear gap in studying the effect of corporate 
governance on the degree of asymmetric information. So, we identify that the main 
objective of the current research is to establish a practical guide for corporate governance 
mechanisms that can be used by companies in the UK to control, minimize and mitigate 
the degree of asymmetric information. 
We identify asymmetric information variables as dependent variables, and corporate 
governance variables as independent variables. To study the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables, we use some secondary sources like the Bloomberg 
Database, the DataStream Database, and the companies' annual reports. All financial 
companies and companies which do not have, or publish an annual report are excluded 
from the sample. Also, all companies not quoted on the LSE, and newly listed companies 
are excluded from the sample. 
For data analysis, we depend mainly on the Pearson correlation and simple and multiple 
regression models. In this way, we study the effect of corporate governance variables on 
asymmetric information and at the same time, measure the quality of corporate 
governance mechanisms through the degree of asymmetric information. 
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Table 4.1 
Sample composition according to industry, number of companies, and the percent of 
each industry to total sample 
Main-Industry Number % 
I Basic Materials 19 5 
2 Consumer Goods 39 10 
3 Consumer Services 81 20.7 
4 Health Care 19 5 
5 Industrials 171 43.6 
6 Oil&Gas 8 2 
7 Technology 42 10.7 
8 Telecommunication 5 1 
9 Utilities 8 2 
Total 392 100 
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Table 4.2 
Variables, definitions, and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
BSIZE (#) The number of directors serving on the board. The company's 
annual re ort 
NONEXESIZE (#) The number of non-executive directors serving on the board. The company's 
annual report 
SPLIT (0/1) A dummy variable that takes the value of I if the positions of the The company's 
CEO and Chairman are split, and 0 otherwise. annual report 
NONEXECHAIR (0/1) A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the chairman is a The company's 
non-executive director and 0 otherwise. annual report 
RCSIZE (#) The number of directors serving on the Remuneration Committee. The company's 
annual report 
NCSIZE (#) The number of directors serving on the Nomination Committee. The company's 
annual report 
ACSIZE (#) The number of directors serving on the Audit Committee. The company's 
annual report 
BOARDMEETS (#) The number of board meetings. The company's 
annual report 
RCMEETS (#) The number of Remuneration Committee meetings. The company's 
annual report 
ACMEETS (#) The number of Audit Committee meetings. The company's 
annual report 
NCMEETS (#) The number of Nomination Committee meetings. The company's 
annual report 
FEMALTOBOARD (%) The number of females serving on the board to board size. The company's 
annual report 
CEOBENEFITS (%) The ratio of CEO annual benefits and bonuses to CEO total annual The company's 
income. annual report 
CEOLONGCOMP (0/1) A dummy variable that takes the value of I if the CEO is The company's 
remunerated with stock options or payments from a performance annual report 
plan, and 0 otherwise. 
BENFITS (0/1) A dummy variable that takes the value of I if other executives The company's 
(than the CEO) are remunerated with benefits, bonuses, stock annual report 
options or payments from a performance plan, and 0 otherwise. 
INSIDERSOWN % The fraction of outstanding shares held by insiders. Bloomberg 
INSIDERSSIZE # The number of owners inside the corporation. Bloomberg 
BLOCKOWN (%) The fraction of outstanding shares owned by block-holders The company's 
(institutions, families, and anchor investors). A block-holder is annual report 
defined as a shareholder who holds more than 3% of outstanding 
shares. 
LARGESTOWN (%) The fraction of outstanding shares owned by the largest block- The company's 
holder. annual report 
DEBTTOASSETS (Leverage) % The ratio of total debt to total assets. Bloomberg 
DEBTTOCAPITAL (%) The ratio of total debt to total capital. Bloomberg 
LONG DEBTTOCAPITAL (%) The ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Bloomberg 
VOLATILITY (%) The standard deviation of the day-over-day difference in the daily Bloomberg 
price change. 
VOLUME (#) The number of shares traded on the corresponding date. Bloomber 
SIZE M£ The market capitalization of the firm. Bloomberg 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES 
AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: 
DATA ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses data analysis and empirical findings which are related to the effect 
of corporate governance mechanisms on asymmetric information. Section 5.2 discusses 
the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables (Volatility, Volume, Leverage and 
Bid-Ask Spread ratios) as proxy measures for asymmetric information. Section 5.3 
discusses descriptive statistics of the independent variables which are related to corporate 
governance variables. Section 5.4 discusses the Pearson correlation results among all 
variables (dependent and independent). Section 5.5 discusses the multiple regression 
analysis results which examine the effect of corporate governance variables on 
asymmetric information. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Asymmetric Information Proxy 
Measures (the Dependent Variables) 
All data which are related to the dependent variables are collected from the Bloomberg 
Database. All definitions of the dependent variables which include: Volatility, Volume 
and Leverage were presented in table 4.3. We follow Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) to 
calculate the mean value of the daily percentage spread (SPREADRATIO)38 as a proxy 
measure for the degree of asymmetric information. We collect daily closing bid and 
closing ask prices from 01/01/2003 to 31/12/2006 from the Bloomberg Database. The 
value of the spread ratio measured as follows: 
SPREADRATIO = (ASK - BID)/ ((ASK + BID)/ 2) * 100 
38 The mean value of the daily percentage spread is calculated for each company for one year to unify the 
year of analysis between the dependent and independent variables. For example, if the data is of corporate 
governance mechanisms (the independent variables), which are collected from companies' annual reports, 
for the year 2006, we calculate the mean value of the daily percentage spread (the dependent variable) for 
the same year of 2006 for the same company. 
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Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent variables for the whole sample, 
which includes 392 non-financial UK companies39 listed in the London Stock Exchange 
from 2003 to 2006. 
Table 5.1 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables as proxy measures for asymmetric 
information 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation CV40 
SPREADRATIO (%) 384 0.02 8.57 0.99 1.13 1.14 
VOLUME (# of shares) 381 97.52 47,373.082 2,142,206 5,100,959 2.38 
VOLATILITY41 (%) 384 3.68 105.46 28.26 12.53 0.44 
LEVERAGE (%) 381 0.00 130.80 18.90 17.74 0.94 
The means of SPREADRATIO, VOLUME and LEVERAGE are 0.99%, 2,142,206 
shares per day, and 18.9%, respectively. These variables have high variability as 
measured by standard deviations of 1.13,5,100,959 and 17.74, respectively. All of the 
coefficients of variation (CV) were close to 1, or more than one (1.14,2.38 and 0.94, 
respectively). But, the mean of the VOLATILITY is 28.26, and has low variability, as 
measured by a standard deviation of 12.53 and coefficient of variation (CV) of 0.44. 
These higher degrees of variability in the proxy measures of asymmetric information 
indicate that there are large differences among the UK companies in the degree of 
asymmetric information. 
To examine the distribution of the data set for the dependent variables, we calculate 
Skewness and Kurtosis values. Based on the measures of Skewness and Kurtosis as 
shown in table 5.2, the distribution of the data set resembles a non-normal distribution for 
all the dependent variables, as the Z-tests for Skewness and Kurtosis ratios were outside 
the range off 1.9642 (Field, 2005). 
39 The number of observations will vary with the measure of asymmetric information because the data were 
not available for all companies for all variables. 
40 CV = Standard deviation/ Mean 
CV is the coefficient of variation. It is a more uniform method of determining the relevance of the standard 
deviation. The closer the CV is to 0, the greater the uniformity of data. The closer the CV is to I or more 
than I, the greater the variability of the data. See, Liu (2006). 
41 VOLATILITY is measured by the standard deviation of the day-over-day difference in the daily price 
change. 
42 The Z-test Skewness Ratio is significant if it is outside off 1.96 (indicating non-normality due to 
Skewness). 
Z Skewness ratio = (Skewness - 0) / Std. Error of Skewness 
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Table 5.2 
Skewness and Kurtosis for the dependent variables before data transformation 
Z-test Std. Error 
Variables Skewness 
Std. Error Skewness Kurtosis of 
Z-test 
of Skewness Kurtosis ratio ratio Kurtosis 
SPREADRATIO 2.96 0.13 23.64 13.50 0.25 54.44 
VOLUME 5.19 0.13 41.48 35.08 0.25 140.88 
VOLATILITY 2.04 0.13 16.29 6.59 0.25 26.59 
LEVERAGE 1.44 0.13 11.53 4.25 0.25 17.08 
The Skewness and Kurtosis statistics that we saw earlier tell us about deviations from 
normality, but they each deal with only one aspect of non-normality43. Another way of 
looking at the problem is to see whether the distribution as a whole deviates from a 
comparable normal distribution. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test compares the scores in 
the sample to a normally distributed set of scores44. Table 5.3 represents the results of this 
test. All the dependent variables have a p-value < 0.05. Accordingly, we reject the 
assumption of normality for all the dependent variables. 
The Z-test Kurtosis Ratio is significant if it is outside of ±1.96 (indicating non-normality due to Kurtosis). 
Z Kurtosis ratio = (Kurtosis - 0) / Std. Error of Kurtosis 
13 See Field (2005, p. 93). 
44 In statistics, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (often called the K-S test) is a goodness of fit test used to 
determine whether two underlying one-dimensional probability distributions differ, or whether an 
underlying probability distribution differs from a hypothesized distribution, in either case based on finite 
samples. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used for larger samples (n > 50) and relies on the probability a 
given data set is normal (e. g., statistical software typically reports a "p value" for the hypothesis that the 
population distribution is normal). If the probability is low (e. g. p<0.05), one "rejects the assumption of 
normality" 
115 
Table 5.3 
Tests of Normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov for the dependent variable before 
data transformation 
Variables 
Kolmo orov-Smirnov 
Statistic df Sig. 
(p-value) normality 
SPREADRATIO 0.20 384 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
VOLUME 0.34 381 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
VOLATILITY 0.13 384 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
LEVERAGE 0.14 381 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
When variables are found to show non-normality, steps were taken to transform the data. 
We utilized the Normal Scores of the dependent variables using Van der Waerden's 
Formula45. This transformation technique was used in previously published studies on 
corporate governance (Cooke, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Al-Baluchi, 2006; 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). 
The values of the dependent variables were transformed by creating rankings based on 
normal scores using the Van der Waerden's Formula (defined by the formula r/ (w+l), 
where w is the sum of the case weight, and r is the rank, ranging from 1 to w). "Ranking" 
refers to simple ranking where the value of the variable is its rank46. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 
summarize Skewness and Kurtosis for the dependent variable and Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test of Normality for the dependent variables after the transformation of data using Van 
der Waerden's Formula. 
as The Van der Waerden test is a statistical test that k population distribution functions are equal. The Van 
der Waerden test converts the ranks from a standard Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance to 
quantiles of the standard normal distribution. These are called normal scores, and the test is computed from 
these normal scores. 
46 See Conover (1999). 
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Table 5.4 
Skewness and Kurtosis for the dependent variable after the transformation of data using 
Van der Waerden's Formula 
Normal Scores of 
the dependent 
variables using Z-test Std. 
Z-test 
Van der Skewness 
Std. Error 
Skewness Kurtosis Error of 
Kurtosis 
of Skewness ratio Waerden's ratio Kurtosis 
Formula 
NSPREADRATIO 0.01 0.13 - 0.73 - 0.18 0.25 0.10 
NVOLUME 0.00 0.13 - 0.66 - 0.17 0.25 0.00 
NVOLATILITY 0.00 0.13 - 0.65 - 0.16 0.25 0.00 
NLEVERAGE 0.18 0.12 - 0.65 - 0.16 0.25 0.00 
Table 5.5 
Tests of Normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov for the dependent variables after 
transformation of data usine Van der Waerden's Formula 
Normal Scores of Kolm ogorov-Smirnov 
the dependent 
variables using 
Van der 
Waerden's Statistic df (S 
p-value) Normality 
Formula 
NSPREADRATIO 0.02 384 0.20(*) Normal since p-value > 0.05 
NVOLUME 0.01 381 0.20(*) Normal since p-value > 0.05 
NVOLATILITY 0.01 384 0.20(*) Normal since p-value > 0.05 
NLEVERAGE 0.07 381 0.00 Not normal since p-value <0.05 
* This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
Based on the measures of Skewness and Kurtosis as shown in table 5.4, the distribution 
of the data set resembles a normal distribution for all the dependent variables, as the Z- 
test for Skewness and Kurtosis ratios were within ±1.96. Also, we find that all the 
dependent variables have a p-value > 0.05 (except LEVERAGE) using the Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov test of normality, as shown in table 5.5. Accordingly, we accept the assumption 
of normality for all the dependent variables after data transformation. In contrast, the 
calculated Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics had p-values less than 0.05 for the 
untransformed and transformed LEVERAGE ratio, which indicates non-normality. This 
may be due to the presence of many non-missing zero values (and non-missing values 
close to zero) in the untransformed LEVERAGE. These non-missing zero values are 
important to the overall objectives of this study. Therefore, they cannot be deleted. 
The normal distribution curves for the dependent variables before and after data 
transformation are summarized in appendix 1, figure 1. From these curves it is clear that 
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all variables after transformation are normally distributed, because the shapes of curves 
resemble the bell-shape normal curves. Also, it is clear that the LEVERAGE normal 
curve has a bell-shape normal curve (appendix 1, figure 1. L) and the distribution of the 
data set resembles a normal distribution for the LEVERAGE ratio, as the Z-tests for 
Skewness and Kurtosis ratios were within ±1.96. This means that some values in the 
untransformed LEVERAGE ratio affect the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. So, 
we conclude that normal scores of the LEVERAGE ratio are close to the normal 
distribution. However, when examining the results of tests using the transformed 
LEVERAGE ratio as a proxy for asymmetric information, we will consider the suspicion 
that LEVERAGE may not be normally distributed. 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance Variables (the 
Independent Variables) 
In this section we summarize the results of the descriptive statistics of corporate 
governance variables. All data which are related to corporate governance variables are 
collected from the companies' annual reports and the Bloomberg Database. Table 5.6 
presents descriptive statistics of corporate governance variables for the whole sample, 
which includes 392 non-financial UK companies listed in the London Stock Exchange 
from 2003 to 2006. 
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Table 5.6 
Descriptive statistics of corporate governance variables 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation cv 
BSIZE (#) 391 3.00 18.00 8.48 2.59 0.31 
NONEXESIZE (#) 388 1.00 12.00 4.46 1.76 0.40 
SPLIT (dummy 0,1) 390 0.00 1.00 0.94 0.23 0.24 
NONEXECHAIR (dummy 0,1) 390 0.00 1.00 0.78 0.41 0.52 
RCSIZE (#) 387 0.00 9.00 3.6 1.33 0.36 
NCSIZE (#) 385 0.00 10.00 3.57 2.09 0.59 
ACSIZE (#) 388 0.00 10.00 3.66 1.37 0.38 
BOARDMEETINGS (#) 381 3.00 63.00 9.14 4.06 0.44 
RCMEETS (#) 378 0.00 12.00 3.96 2.16 0.55 
ACMEETS (#) 383 0.00 11.00 3.55 1.47 0.41 
NCMEETS (#) 384 0.00 12.00 1.92 1.90 0.99 
FEMALTOBOARD % 392 0.00 30.00 3.76 6.92 1.84 
CEOBENFITS % 391 0.00 82.00 37.70 22.38 0.59 
CEOLONGCOMP (dummy 0,1) 380 0.00 1.00 0.96 0.18 0.20 
BENFITS (dummy 0,1) 379 0.00 1.00 0.98 0.11 0.12 
INSIDERSOWN % 390 0.00 82.93 6.86 12.85 1.87 
INSIDERSSIZE (#) 390 0.00 27.00 8.83 4.77 0.54 
BLOCKOWN % 314 0.00 92.10 40.45 19.00 0.47 
LARGESTOWNER % 314 0.00 62.80 15.55 11.14 0.72 
DEBTTOCAPITAL % 377 0.00 310.36 32.10 31.94 1.00 
LONGDEBTTOCAPITAL % 377 0.00 303.82 24.23 28.83 1.19 
COMPANYSIZE (M£) 373 2.27 83037.21 1749.70 6034.1 3.45 
Table 5.6 suggests several conclusions. First, the average BZIZE is 8.5, while, on 
average, NONEXESIZE is 4.5. This suggests that the average board of directors has a 
balance of executive and non-executive directors. Also, the mean of SPLIT is 0.94, 
which means 94% of the UK companies in the sample are splitting the roles of the 
Chairman and the CEO. Moreover, the mean of NONEXECHAIR is 0.78, which implies 
that 78% of the UK companies in the sample have a non-executive director in the 
position of Chairman. Therefore, a very large proportion of the sample complies with the 
combined code of corporate governance for 2003, by enhancing the independence of the 
board of directors from the executives of the companies. This result is consistent with 
results in previous research that there is an increase in the independence of UK boards, as 
measured by an increased willingness to employ independent non-executive directors, 
and to separate the positions of the CEO and the Chairman of the board (Hillier and 
McColgan, 2006; O'Sullivan and Diacon, 2003; Wire and Laing, 2003; O'Sullivan and 
Wong, 1999). 
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Second, the means of RCSIZE, NCSIZE and ACSIZE are 3.6,3.6 and 3.7, respectively 
(about half of the mean of BSIZE, and most of them are non-executive directors). 
Moreover, most of the UK companies in our sample have Remuneration, Audit and 
Nomination Committees. Of the 392 companies (the size of the sample), we find 387 
Remuneration, 385 Nomination and 388 Audit Committees. These results reflect the 
compliance of the UK companies with the combined code, since these committees are 
constructed from 3 independent non-executive directors, at least. 
Third, the mean of RCMEETS and ACMEETS and NCMEETS are 3.9 and 3.6 and 3.7 
times, respectively, and the mean of BOARDMEETINGS is 9.1 times. By reviewing the 
annual reports for the companies in our sample, we find that the annual reports set out the 
number of meetings of the board, and those committees and individual attendances by 
directors. Most of the UK companies follow the recommendation of the combined code 
and have three meetings at least for each committee during the year. 
Fourth, the mean of FEMALTOBOARD is 3.76 %. Moreover, only 102 companies from 
our sample of 392 companies have females in the board. This result reflects the weak 
representation of females on the boards of directors. 
Fifth, the average of CEOBENEFITS is 37.7%. This result means that a large part of the 
CEO annual income comes from benefits and bonuses. Also, the means of 
CEOLONGCOMP and BENFITS are 0.96 and 0.98. This result means that 96% of our 
sample use long-term compensation plans to compensate the CEO, and 98% of the UK 
companies in our sample use short-term compensation plans (like benefit and bonus 
schemes) and long-term compensation plans (like executive share options and directors' 
pension schemes) to compensate the other executives (other than the CEO). 
Sixth, the means of INSIDERSOWN and INSIDERSSIZE are 6.9% and 8.8 (persons), 
respectively. This result reflects that, on average, 6.9% of the UK companies' shares are 
held by 8.8 insiders (executive directors, managers and workers). On the other hand, the 
means of BLOCKOWN and LARGESTOWNER are 40.5% and 15.6%. These results 
reflect that, on average, 40.5% of the UK companies' shares are held by institutions, 
families, and/or anchor investors. Moreover, on average, the largest owner holds about 
15.6% of the total outstanding shares of the company. This reflects the direction of the 
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UK companies in the sample toward ownership concentration, especially through the 
institutional investors47. 
Seventh, the means of DEBTTOCAPITAL and LONGDEBTTOCAPITAL are 32.1% 
and 24.2%. These results reflect that, on average, debt equals about one-third of the UK 
companies' total capital, and most of this debt is long-term debt (24.2% from 32.1%). 
Also, from table 5.1, the mean of the ratio of total debt to assets (LEVERAGE) is 18.9%. 
This means, on average total debt equal 19% of the total assets in the UK companies. 
Table 5.6 shows substantial variations from the means, as evidenced by the standard 
deviations and the coefficients of variation (CVs). The CVs of NCSIZE, RCMEETS, 
NCMEETS, CEOBENFITS, INSIDERSOWN, INSIDERSSIZE, LARGESTOWNER, 
DEBTTOCAPITAL and LONGDEBTTOCAPITAL are 0.59,0.99,0.59,1.87,0.54, 
0.72,1.00 and 1.19. These large degrees of variability may be due to the very high 
degree of variability in COMPANYSIZE as measured by a standard deviation of 6034.1 
and coefficient of variation of 3.45. This large degree of variation among the UK 
companies' sizes reflects differences in board size and composition, compensation plans, 
ownership structure, and debt structure. Moreover, by reviewing the annual reports of the 
research sample, we find that the larger the size of the company the higher the degree of 
compliance with the combined code on corporate governance (2003). So, we expect that 
the size of the company will have a great effect on the quality of corporate governance 
mechanisms and on the degree of asymmetric information. 
In order to examine the normality of corporate governance variables, tables 5.7 and 5.8 
show Skewness and Kurtosis and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) Lilliefors normality 
test statistics for corporate governance variables48. The results suggest that most of the 
corporate governance variables are not normally distributed. Based on the measures of 
47 By reviewing the annual reports and the names of investors in the sample, we find that most of the block- 
owners who have more than 3% of the UK companies' outstanding shares are institutional investors. Also, 
most of the largest owners who have the largest ownership stake in the UK companies are institutional 
investors. 
48 We do not examine the normality of the dummy variables (SPLIT, NONEXECHAIR, CEOLONGCOMP 
and BENFITS) because the data sets of these variables are binary data (0,1). Also, the values of these 
dummy variables concentrated around the value of 1 in most of the UK companies. Accordingly it 
exhibited a non-normal distribution. 
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Skewness and Kurtosis as shown in table 5.7, the distribution of the data set resembles 
non-normal distribution for all corporate governance variables, as most of the Z-tests for 
Skewness and Kurtosis ratios were outside the range of ±1.96. Also, table 5.8 presents 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) Lilliefors normality test statistics. The results suggest 
that the assumptions of normality were not met. All corporate governance variables 
(except BLOCKOWN) have p-values < 0.05. Accordingly, we reject the assumption of 
normality for all corporate governance variables. 
Table 5.7 
Skewness and Kurtosis for corporate governance variables before data transformation 
Variables Skewnes 
s 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Z-TEST 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Std. 
Error of 
Kurtosis 
Z-TEST 
Kurtosis 
BSIZE 0.755 0.123 6.14 0.941 0.246 3.83 
NONEXESIZE 0.874 0.124 7.05 1.404 0.247 5.68 
RCSIZE 0.889 0.124 7.17 2.104 0.247 8.52 
NCSIZE 0.016 0.124 0.13 0.094 0.248 0.38 
ACSIZE 0.874 0.124 7.05 2.408 0.247 9.75 
BOARDMEETINGS 6.403 0.125 51.22 80.496 0.249 323.28 
RCMEETS 0.852 0.125 6.82 0.893 0.25 3.57 
ACMEETS 1.065 0.125 8.52 3.377 0.249 13.56 
NCMEETS 1.396 0.125 11.17 2.768 0.248 11.16 
FEMALTOBOARD 1.693 0.123 1.693 1.837 0.246 1.837 
CEOBENFITS 0.567 0.123 4.61 0.323 0.246 1.31 
INSIDERSOWN 2.756 0.124 22.23 8.432 0.247 34.14 
INSIDERSSIZE 0.714 0.124 5.76 0.704 0.247 2.85 
BLOCKOWN 0.122 0.138 0.88 -0.508 0.274 - 1.85 
LARGESTOWNER 2.046 0.138 14.83 4.79 0.274 17.48 
DEBTTOCAPITAL 2.651 0.126 21.04 16.343 0.251 65.11 
LONGDEBTTOCAPITAL 3.323 0.126 26.37 24.502 0.251 97.62 
COMPANYSIZE 8.713 0.126 69.15 98.444 0.252 390.65 
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Table 5.8 
Tests of Normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov for corporate governance variables before 
data transformation 
Variables Kolmogorov-Smiruov 
Statistic df Sig. Normality 
BSIZE 0.12 391 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NONEXESIZE 0.17 388 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
RCSIZE 0.20 387 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NCSIZE 0.18 385 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
ACSIZE 0.20 388 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
BOARDMEETINGS 0.14 381 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
RCMEETS 0.15 378 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
ACMEETS 0.19 383 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NCMEETS 0.19 384 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
FEMALTOBOARD 0.44 392 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
CEOBENFITS 0.05 391 0.05 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
INSIDERSOWN 0.30 390 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
INSIDERSSIZE 0.11 390 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
BLOCKOWN 0.04 314 0.20 Normal since p-value>0.05 
LARGESTOWNER 0.17 314 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
DEBTTOCAPITAL 0.16 377 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
LONGDEBTTOCAPITAL 0.20 377 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
COMPANYSIZE 0.39 373 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
CGINDUSTRY 0.15 241 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
Because corporate governance variables are found to show non-normality, steps were 
taken to transform the data. We utilized the Normal Scores of corporate governance 
variables using Van der Waerden's Formula. Based on the measures of Skewness and 
Kurtosis as shown in table 5.9, the distribution of the data set resembles a normal 
distribution for all corporate governance variables, as the Z-tests for Skewness and 
Kurtosis ratios were within ±1.96 (except for the Z-test of Skewness of NCMEETS, 
which is 3.15 and Z-TESTs of Kurtosis for NNCMEETS and NFEMALTOBOARD, 
which are -2.13 and 7.32, respectively). 
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Table 5.9 
Skewness and Kurtosis for normal scores of corporate governance variables after transformation of 
data using Van der Waerden's Formula 
Normal Scores of corporate 
governance variables 
using Van der Waerden's 
Formula 
Skewness 
Std. Error of 
Skewness 
Z-TEST 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Std. Error 
of Kurtosis 
Z-TEST 
Kurtosis 
NBSIZE 0.03 0.12 0.26 - 0.18 0.25 - 0.75 
NNONEXESIZE 0.07 0.12 0.54 - 0.16 0.25 - 0.64 
NRCSIZE 0.10 0.12 0.82 - 0.02 0.25 - 0.09 
NNCSIZE 0.22 0.12 1.79 - 0.44 0.25 - 1.78 
NACSIZE 0.09 0.12 0.73 0.02 0.25 0.07 
NBOARDMEETINGS 0.05 0.13 0.36 - 0.21 0.25 - 0.84 
NRCMEETS 0.06 0.13 0.50 - 0.20 0.25 - 0.79 
NACMEETS 0.08 0.12 0.65 - 0.04 0.25 - 0.17 
NNCMEETS 0.39 0.12 3.15 - 0.53 0.25 - 2.13 
NFEMALTOBOARD 0.02 0.12 0.02 7.32 0.24 7.32 
NCEOBENFITS - 0.02 0.12 - 0.20 - 0.29 0.25 - 1.19 
NINSIDERSOWN 0.05 0.12 0.41 - 0.28 0.25 - 1.14 
NINSIDERSSIZE 0.05 0.12 0.40 - 0.28 0.25 - 1.13 
NBLOCKOWN 0.00 0.14 0.02 - 0.19 0.27 - 0.69 
NLARGESTOWNER 0.00 0.14 0.02 - 0.19 0.27 - 0.69 
NDEBTTOCAPITAL 0.15 0.13 1.16 - 0.38 0.25 - 1.52 
NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL 0.24 0.13 1.92 - 0.44 0.25 - 1.74 
NCOMPANYSIZE 0.00 0.13 0.00 - 0.17 0.25 - 0.66 
Table 5.10 presents the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality. The results 
indicated that most of the dependent variables have p-values < 0.05. So, the data set of 
these variables resembles a non-normal distribution. 
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Table 5.10 
Tests of Normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov for Normal Scores of corporate governance 
variables after data transformation using Van der Waerden's Formula 
Normal Scores of corporate Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
governance variables 
using Van der Waerden's Formula Statistic df Sig. Normality 
NBSIZE 0.08 391 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NNONEXESIZE 0.13 388 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NRCSIZE 0.20 387 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NNCSIZE 0.15 385 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NACSIZE 0.20 388 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NBOARDMEETINGS 0.09 381 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NRCMEETS 0.10 378 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NACMEETS 0.16 383 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NNCMEETS 0.16 384 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NFEMALTOBOARD 0.38 392 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NCEOBENFITS 0.01 381 0.20(*) Normal since p-value>0.05 
NINSIDERSOWN 0.53 379 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NINSIDERSSIZE 0.02 390 0.20(*) Normal since p-value>0.05 
NBLOCKOWN 0.05 390 . 009 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NLARGESTOWNER 0.08 319 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NDEBTTOCAPITAL 0.01 314 0.20(*) Normal since p-value>0.05 
NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL 0.07 378 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NCOMPANYSIZE 0.00 373 0.20(*) Normal since p-value>0.05 
Because there are some contradictions regarding the normality of data (after 
transformation using Van der Waerden's Formula) using the measures of Skewness and 
Kurtosis (as shown in table 5.9) and the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (as 
shown in table 5.10), we use the normal distribution curves for the independent corporate 
governance variables as shown in appendix 1, figure 2. From these curves it is clear that 
most of the corporate governance variables after transformation are at least 
approximately normally distributed, because the shapes of the curves resemble the bell- 
shape. 
To sum up, we accept the assumption of normality for all of the corporate governance 
variables after data transformation. However, for some variables, like NNCMEETS, 
FEMALTOBOARD and NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL, we will bear in mind the 
suspicion that these variables may not be normally distributed when interpreting the 
results that assume normality. 
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5.4 The Pearson Correlation between All the Dependent and 
Independent Variables49 
In this section we examine the Pearson correlations between all asymmetric information 
proxy measures and corporate governance variables as shown in table 5.11. We examine 
the Pearson correlation as follows: 
5.4.1 The Pearson correlation between corporate governance variables (the independent 
variables). 
5.4.2 The Pearson correlation between asymmetric information proxy measures (the 
dependent variables). 
5.4.3 The Pearson correlation between corporate governance variables and asymmetric 
information proxy measures. 
5.4.1 The Pearson Correlation between Corporate Governance 
Variables 
Table 5.11 (Panel A) provides the Pearson correlation between corporate governance 
variables. The results reflect strong positive and negative correlations between corporate 
governance variables. NBSIZE has significant positive relations with NNONEXESIZE 
(0.81**), NRCSIZE (0.50**) and NINSIDERSSIZE (0.50**). NNONEXESIZE has 
significant positive relations with NACSIZE (0.52**) and NCOMPANYSIZE (0.59**). 
NRCSIZE has significant positive relations with NNCSIZE (0.54**) and NACSIZE 
(0.77**). NNCMEETS has a significant positive relation with NNCSIZE (0.51**). These 
results reflect that the increase in board size is related to an increase in board 
independence (measured by the number of non-executive directors). Also, the increase in 
the number of non-executive directors is related to an increase in committees' sizes, 
because most of the UK committees are constructed from non-executive directors. 
Consequently, the higher the number of non-executive directors on the board, the larger 
the sizes of the committees are. Moreover, all board size and composition variables are 
positively related to company size (NSIZE). Accordingly, the larger the size of the UK 
companies the larger the size of the board, board independence and committees' sizes 
and meets. 
49 We use the transformed data (using Van der Waerden's Formula) for the entire set of dependent and 
independent variables in preparing the Pearson correlation matrix (table 5.11). 
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NSIZE is significantly positively related to NCEOBENFITS (0.35**), 
NCEOLONGCOM (0.14**) and NBENEFITS (0.13**). These results reflect some 
conclusions. First, the larger the size of the UK companies, the higher the ratio of CEO 
annual benefits and bonuses to CEO total annual income. Second, the larger the size of 
the UK companies, the higher the value of the CEO remuneration with stock options or 
payments from a performance plan. Third, the larger the sizes of the UK companies, the 
higher other executives (than the CEO) are remunerated with benefits, bonuses, stock 
options or payments from a performance plan. 
The ratio of NBLOCKOWN has significant positive relations with NLARGESTOWNER 
(0.73**). But these ratios are significantly negatively related to NCOMPANYSIZE. This 
result reflects that the larger the size of the UK companies, the lower the fraction of 
outstanding shares owned by block-holders (institutions, families, and anchor 
investors)50, and the lower the fraction of outstanding shares owned by the largest block- 
holder. Also, NCOMPANYSIZE is significantly negatively related to 
NINSIDERSOWN, but is significantly positively related to NINSIDERSSIZE. This 
means the larger the size of the UK company, the lower the fraction of outstanding shares 
held by insiders, but the higher the number of shareholders from inside the company. 
These results reflect the direction of the largest UK companies toward minimizing 
ownership concentration by institutions, families, and anchor investors and encouraging 
insiders (directors and workers) toward employees' stock ownership plans as a 
mechanism to solve the agency problem. 
The ratio of NDBETTOCAPITAL has significant positive relations with 
NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL (0.90**). So, the higher the ratio of debt to capital, the 
higher the ratio of long-term debt to capital is. Also NDBETTOCAPITAL and 
NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL are significantly positively related to NCOMPANYSIZE. 
That means the larger the size of the UK companies, the higher the ratio of debt to 
capital, and especially the ratio of long-term debt to capital. 
5o Note: a block-holder is defined as a shareholder who holds more than 3% of outstanding shares. 
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5.4.2 The Pearson Correlation between the Asymmetric Information 
Proxy Measures 
In this section we need to examine the Pearson correlations between the dependent 
variables which include NVOLATILITY, NVOLUME, NLEVERAGE and 
NSPREADRATIO. We are looking to identify the degree of correlation (strong or weak) 
between these variables and at the same time to identify if these variables are positively 
or negatively related to asymmetric information. 
Table 5.11 (Panel B) provides the Pearson correlation between the dependent variables. 
Since the literature strongly supports the notion that NSPREADRATIO is positively 
related to asymmetric information, then we suggest that NSPREADRATIO is like a 
benchmark for asymmetric information. The results reveal a significant positive 
relationship between NSPREADRATIO and NVOLATILITY (0.38**). That means the 
higher the value of NSPREADRATIO and NVOLATILITY, the higher the degree of 
asymmetric information. This result supports the findings of previous studies regarding 
the positive relationship between volatility and asymmetric information (Ness et al. 2001; 
Clarke and Shastri, 2001; Kanagaretnam et al., 2005; Wang, 1993). 
Also, the results reveal a significant negative correlation between NVOLUME (- 0.72**) 
and NLEVEARAGE (- 0.35**)51. That means the higher the value of NVOLUME, and 
NLEVEARAGE, the lower the degree of asymmetric information. This result supports 
the findings of previous studies regarding the negative relationship between trading 
volume, leverage and asymmetric information (Ness et al., 2001; Acker et al., 2002; 
Grishchenko et al., 2003; Tung and Marsden, 2000; Gajewski, 1999; Klein et al., 2002; 
Verschueren and Deloof, 2006). 
5.4.3 The Pearson Correlation between Corporate Governance 
Variables and Asymmetric Information Proxy Measures 
" According to Glosten and Harris (1988), George et al. (1991), Lin et al. (1995), Madhavan et al. (1997), 
Huang and Stoll (1997), and Kanagaretnam et al. (2007), SPREADRATIO is the main micro-structure 
proxy measure of asymmetric information, and the higher the spread ratio the higher the degree of 
asymmetric information. Accordingly, we correlate between SPREADRATIO and the other proxy 
measures of asymmetric information as we consider SPREADRATIO as a synonym of asymmetric 
information. 
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Table 5.11 (Panel B) provides the Pearson correlation between corporate governance 
variables and the asymmetric information proxy measures. Most of the board size and 
compensation variables, ownership variables and debt variables have significant 
relationships to asymmetric information variables which include NSPREADRATIO, 
NVOLUME, NVOLATILITY and NLEVERAGE. Specifically, NBSIZE, 
NNONEXESIZE, NSPLIT, NNONEXECHAIR, NRCSIZE, NNCSIZE, NACSIZE, 
NRCMEETS, NACMEETS, NNCMEETS, NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSSIZE, 
NDEBTTOCAPITAL, NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL and NCOMPANYSIZE are 
significantly negatively related to asymmetric information (measured by 
NSPREADRATIO). So, the higher the value of these variables - which means the 
stronger the corporate governance provisions - the lower the degree of asymmetric 
information. NFEMALTOBOARD52, NINSIDERSOWN, NBLOCKOWN and 
NLARGESTOWNER are significantly positively related to asymmetric information 
(measured by NSPREADRATIO). So, the higher the value of these variables - which 
means the weaker the corporate governance provisions - the higher the degree of 
asymmetric information. So, these correlations suggest that the higher the quality of 
corporate governance, the lower the degree of asymmetric information, and vice versa. 
NBOARDMEETINGS, NCEOLONGCOMP and NBENFITS do not exhibit any 
significant correlations with asymmetric information (measured by NSPREADRATIO) 53 
In general, higher degrees of correlation between pairs of corporate governance proxies 
can lead to multicollinearity between two or more variables in regression models, and the 
data may have minimal or unusual influences on the estimated regressions. Also, even 
when the correlations between the independent variables are not very high, some degree 
of multicollinearity, that is, high collinearity can still exist (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007). 
We therefore further examine the extent to which high collinearity presents a problem in 
the estimation of the relationship between our dependent and independent variables, by 
computing the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for each independent variable. The VIFs 
should not exceed the critical value of 10. Because the VIFs in the model exceed 10 (not 
reported here), we exclude the variables which have high collinearity with each other. So, 
after scanning the correlation matrix, we find that NBSIZE, NRCSIZE, NACSIZE, 
52 Note that NFEMALTOBOARD is positively related to asymmetric information and this contradicts our 
hypothesis three. We will discuss this in detail in section 5.5. 
53 The interpretation of these results will be discussed with the results of multiple regression analysis 
(section 5.5). 
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NNCMEETS, NLARGESTOWNER, NDEBTTOCAPITAL and NCOMPANYSIZE will 
cause multicollinearity with other variables, so we will exclude them from regression 
models 54 
54 In spite of this, we exclude these variables from the next regressions (tables 5.12,5.13 and 5.14). We use 
these variables as alternative proxy measures for corporate governance. Appendix 3, table A. 2 shows the 
multiple regression analysis using different proxy measures for asymmetric information as dependent 
variables, and alternative proxy measures for corporate governance. 
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5.5 The Multiple Regression Analysis between Asymmetric 
Information Proxy Measures and Corporate Governance 
Variables 
"Meeting the assumptions of regression analysis is essential to ensure that the results 
obtained are truly representative of the sample and we obtain the best result possible" 
(Hair et al., 2006, p. 70). Before running the regression analysis, the data were checked to 
evaluate the regression analysis assumptions. All variables were checked for normality of 
distribution and found to be non-normally distributed (in most cases). To solve the 
normality problem, steps were taken to transform the data. We utilized the normal scores of 
the dependent variables using Van der Waerden's Formula (sections 5.2 and 5.3). After the 
transformation of data using Van der Waerden's Formula, we examined Skewness and 
Kurtosis for all variables. Based on the measures of Skewness and Kurtosis, the distribution 
of the data set resembles a normal distribution for all variables, as the Z-tests for Skewness 
and Kurtosis ratios were within ±1.96. Also, we find that all the dependent variables have 
p-values > 0.05 using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality. Accordingly, we accept 
the assumption of normality for all variables after data transformation. 
During the regression analysis we checked multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) for each variable. The rule of thumb is that any VIF of 10 or more provides 
evidence of serious multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2003). So, we excluded BSIZE, 
RCSIZE, ACSIZE, NCMEETS, LARGESTOWNER, DEBTTOCAPITAL and 
COMPANYSIZE from the next multiple regression models because they cause 
multicollinearity with other corporate governance variables. All multiple regression models 
derived in the study had VIF statistics below the level of 5. 
Moreover, hetroskedasticity was examined for all regressions using the Breusch- 
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test. The rule of thumb for the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test 
for hetroskedasticity depends on the P value of chi2. If the P value of chit > 0.05 we reject 
the null hypothesis of hetroskedasticity. We found hetroskedasticity in some regression 
models. So, we used Robust Standard Errors. Robust Standard Errors are also known as 
Huber/White estimators, or sandwich estimators of variance. Heteroskedasticity causes 
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standard errors to be biased. Hence, when heteroskedasticity is present, robust standard 
errors tend to be more trustworthy55. 
After regression analysis, all regression models were checked for normality of residuals. 
The normal probability plot shows that residual points mostly lay on the normal 
distribution line in all regression models (see appendix 2). Also, the histograms of 
regression standardized residuals were normally distributed. The histograms of regression 
standardized residuals resemble the bell-shape normal curve (see appendix 2). The same 
procedures for verifying the regression analysis assumptions were conducted with all 
regression models. 
After analysing the Pearson correlations between the dependent variables we find that 
NSPREADRATIO is significantly positively correlated with NVOLATILITY and 
significantly negatively correlated with NVOLUME and NLEVERAGE. So, the higher the 
NSPREADRATIO and NVOLATILITY, the higher the degree of asymmetric information; 
and the higher the NVOLUME and NLEVERAGE, the lower the degree of asymmetric 
information56. Accordingly, in this section we use NSPREADRATIO, NVOLATILITY, 
NVOLUME and NLEVERAGE as dependent variables for multiple regression analysis to 
provide information on the statistical significance of the independent variables, and 
predictive equations for future use. All regression models are calculated depending on the 
Normal Score of the dependent and the independent variables using Van der Waerden's 
Formula. 
5.5.1 The Multiple Regression Results between Corporate Governance 
Variables and Asymmetric Information (Full Model) 
In this section we present the multiple regression results between corporate governance 
variables and asymmetric information proxy measures using all the independent variables 
(including the dummy variables, but excluding all variables which appeared to have 
multicollinearity). As we found sets of multiple regressions, each of which is testing 
55 In Stata, robust standard errors can usually be computed with the addition of a single parameter, robust. 
56 These results are consistent with our expectations and with the literature results in chapter 4 section 4.4.1 
that asymmetric information is significantly positively correlated with NVOLATILITY and significantly 
negatively correlated with NVOLUME and NLEVERAGE. 
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multiple hypotheses, it is best that initially we simply list the results of each section. Then, 
in section 5.5.3 we will discuss whether these results support the hypotheses of chapter 
four, and present the conclusions. 
Table 5.12 
Regression analysis between the normal scores of asymmetric information proxy measures and the 
normal scores of corporate governance variables (including the dummy variables) 
SPREAD + Sig. VOLATILITY + Si . VOLUME(-) Sig. LEVERAGE(-) Sill. 
Model Summary 
Number of observations 284 284 281 291 
R Square 0.50 0.14 0.49 0.16 
Adjusted RS uare 0.47 0.10 0.46 0.12 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.68 0.88 0.68 0.86 
F 18.87*** 0.00 3.22*'* 0.00 18.19*** 0.00 4.10*** 0.00 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 
test for heterns kedasticity 
chi 
2 2.47 0.12 1.78 0.18 3.09 . 
08 3.01 0.08 
Main variables Coel. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(Constant) 0.01 0.88 0.10 0.43 - 0.02 0.82 - 0.13 0.28 
NNONEXESIZE 
- 0.28*** 0.00 0.01 0.92 0.25*** 0.00 0.07 0.35 
NSPLIT (dummy) 0.05 0.66 0.08 0.56 - 0.10 0.34 0.03 0.80 
NNONEXECHAIR (dummy) 0.06 0.44 0.02 0.88 0.00 0.97 - 0.08 0.42 
NNCSIZE 
- 0.01 0.72 - 0.04 0.22 0.01 0.62 0.03 0.34 
NBOARDMEETINGS 0.06 0.14 0.15*** 0.01 0.04 0.40 0.03 0.59 
NRCMEETS 
- 0.07 0.21 0.01 0.92 0.07 0.17 - 0.04 0.58 
NACMEETS 
- 0.03 0.53 0.04 0.57 0.12** 0.02 0.02 0.77 
NFEMALTOBOARD 0.05 0.60 - 0.08 0.50 - 0.05 0.55 - 0.14 0.19 
NCEOBENFITS 
- 0.14*** 0.00 - 0.04 0.53 0.08* 0.08 0.03 0.61 
NCEOLONGCOMP (dummy) 0.18 0.12 - 0.15 0.29 - 0.06 0.57 0.01 0.92 
NINSIDERSOWN 0.21*** 0.00 0.18*** 0.01 - 0.26*** 0.00 - 0.30*** 0.00 
NINSIDERSSIZE - 0.18*** 0.00 - 0.10 0.11 0.17 *** 0.00 0.09 0.15 
NBLOCKOWN 0.10** 0.02 0.13** 0.02 - 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.41 
NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL 0.15*** 0.00 - 0.03 0.65 0.12**' 0.01 
Note: From the correlation matrix between the dependent variables, SPREAD and VOLATILITY are positively related to asymmetric information 
but VOLUME and LEVERAGE are negatively related to asymmetric information. 
**, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Table 5.12 presents the results of the regression analysis among the normal scores of 
asymmetric information proxy measures and the normal scores of corporate governance 
variables (including the dummy variables). Statistics like R2 and adjusted R2 were also 
reported to determine the goodness of fit of the model. Using NSPREADRATIO, 
NVOLATILITY, NVOLUME and NLEVERAGE as proxy measures for asymmetric 
information, the models are significant at the 1% level of significance, since the F-test 
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significance < 0.01. The R2 of NSPREADRATIO, NVOLATILITY, NVOLUME and 
NLEVERAGE57 are 0.50,0.14,0.49 and 0.16, respectively. 
The full regression model (including dummy variables) using NSPREADRATIO as a 
proxy measure of asymmetric information is summarized by the following equation: 
cG: \vtt. -1    v - -v. va - v. ý. o i. . v. a. n a: u ý. a'. T v. vo i. u  va a ý' v. vu a. výcn ct. nAýn - 0.01 IN[Nk. JIGG 'r 
OARDIIEETINGS - 0.07 NRCM1MEETS - 0.03 NACb1EETS + 0.05 NFEMALTOROARD - 0.14 NCEOBENFITS + 
EOLONGCOMMP + 0.21 NINSIDERSOVVN - 0.18 NINSIDERSSIZE + 0.10 NBLOCKOWN - 
ONGDEBTTOCAPITAL 
The results indicated that NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSSIZE and 
NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL are negatively significantly related to asymmetric 
information, and NINSIDERSOWN and NBLOCKOWN are positively significantly 
related to asymmetric information. All other variables in the regression are not significantly 
related to asymmetric information at a 10% level of significance (including the dummy 
variables). These results mean that the higher the number of non-executive directors 
serving on the board, the ratio of CEO benefits, the number of insiders who have ownership 
in the company and the ratio of long-term debt to capital, the lower the degree of 
asymmetric information. Also, the higher the fraction of outstanding shares held by insiders 
and the fraction of outstanding shares owned by block-holders, the higher the degree of 
asymmetric information. 
The full regression model (including dummy variables) using NVOLATILITY as a proxy 
measure of asymmetric information is summarized by the following equation: 
VOLATILITY = 0.10 - 0.01 NNONEXESIZE + 0.08 NSPLIT + 0.02 NNONEXECIIAIR - 0.04 NNCSIZE + 0.15 
NBOARDMEEIINGS + 0.01 NRCNIEETS + 0.04 NACAIEETS - 0.08 NFENIALTOBOARU - 0.04 NCEOBENFI'I: S - 0.15 
NCEOLONGCONIP + 0.18 NINSIDERSOWN - 0.10 NINSIDERSSIZE + 0.13 NILOCKOWN - 0.03 
NLONC DEITt'OCAPITAL 
Using NVOLATILITY, the results indicated that NBOARDMEETINGS, 
NINSIDERSOWN and NBLOCKOWN are significantly positively related to 
NVOLATILITY, and NINSIDERSSIZE is significantly negatively related to 
NVOLATILITY. All other variables in the regression are not significantly related to 
S' In the LEVERAGE model, we excluded NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL from the regression model because 
there is multicollinearity between NLEVERAGE and NLONG DEBTTOCAPITAL. 
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asymmetric information at the 10% level of significance (including the dummy variables). 
These results mean that the higher the number of board meetings, the higher the fraction of 
outstanding shares held by insiders, and the fraction of outstanding shares owned by block- 
holders, the higher the degree of asymmetric information. Also, the higher the number of 
insiders who have ownership in the company, the lower the degree of asymmetric 
information. 
The full regression model (including dummy variables) using NVOLUME as a proxy 
measure of asymmetric information is summarized by the following equation: 
RDMEETINGS + 0.07 NRCNIEETS + 0.12 NACNIEETS - 0.15 NFEIIALTOBOARD + 0. (18 NCEOBENFITS - 
LONGCONIP - 0.26 NINSIDERSOWN + 0.17 NINSIDERSSIZE - 0.05 NBLOCKOWN + 
NLONCDEB TOCAPITAL 
Using NVOLUME, the results indicated that NVOLUME is significantly positively related 
to NONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSSIZE and NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL 
and significantly negatively related to NINSIDERSOWN. All other variables in the 
regression are not significantly related to asymmetric information at the 10% level of 
significance (including dummy variables). That means the higher the number of non- 
executive directors serving on the board, the ratio of CEO benefits, the number of insiders 
who have ownership in the company and the ratio of long-term debt to capital, the lower 
the degree of asymmetric information. Also, the higher the fraction of outstanding shares 
held by insiders, the higher the degree of asymmetric information. 
The full regression model (including dummy variables) using NLEVERAGE as a proxy 
measure of asymmetric information is summarized by the following equation: 
LEVERAGE =-0.13 + 0.07 NNONEXESIZE + 0.03 NSPLIT - 0.08 NNONEXECIIAIR + 0.03 NNCSIZE + 0.03 
NBOARDMEETINGS - 0.04 NRCNIEETS + 0.112 NACM1EETS - 0.14 NFEN1 ALTOBOARD + 0.03 NCEOBENFITS + 0.01 
NCEOLONGCONIP - 0.30 NINSIDERSON't'N - 0.09 NINSIDERSSILE + 0.05 NBLOCKOWN 
The NLEVERAGE model indicated that NINSIDERSOWN is significantly negatively 
related to NLEVERAGE. All other variables in the regression are not significantly related 
to asymmetric information at the 10% level of significance (including dummy variables). 
This result means the higher the fraction of outstanding shares held by insiders, the higher 
the degree of asymmetric information. 
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To make sure that there is no effect of the dummy variables, we repeat the same regressions 
but without dummy variables58. We find similar conclusions with the full regression model 
(which includes the dummy variables). We conclude that the multiple regression analysis 
using the normal scores of asymmetric information proxy measures for all the independent 
variables (full model) do not make any differences in the results if we include or exclude 
the dummy variables. 
All in all, we find that the dummy variables (which include NSPLIT, NNONEXECHAIR, 
NCEOLONGCOMP and NBENEFITS) and NNCSIZE, NRCMEETS and 
FEMALETOBOARD did not exhibit any significant relationships with any of the proxy 
measures of asymmetric information. Also, NACMEETS and NBOARDMEETINGS did 
not exhibit any significant relationships with most of the proxy measures of asymmetric 
information (especially NSPREADRATIO as the most important measure for asymmetric 
information). So, all of the last variables will be excluded from the next regression models. 
5.5.2 The Multiple Regression Result between Corporate Governance 
Variables and Asymmetric Information (Reduced Models) 
The main objective of this section is to specify the most important corporate governance 
variables which reduce or control asymmetric information. Also, we need to answer some 
questions raised by John and Kedia (2003) about the best mix of corporate governance 
mechanisms. "Are some governance mechanisms more effective when used in 
conjunction? What blend of different mechanisms of corporate governance constitutes 
an optimal governance structure? " Moreover, Weir et al. (2002) argue that "an 
awareness of the interrelationship between internal and external mechanisms is likely to 
become more important as companies move towards prescribed internal governance 
structures in line with the code of best practice": Using Stepwise regression analysis, we 
find that NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSOWN, NINSIDERSSIZE, 
NBLOCKOWN and NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL are the most important factors in 
interpreting the relationship between corporate governance variables and asymmetric 
information proxy measures. In statistics, Stepwise regression includes regression models 
in which the choice of predictive variables is carried out by an automatic procedure. 
Usually, this takes the form of a sequence of F-tests, but other techniques are possible, such 
S8 See appendix 3, table A. 1. 
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as t-tests, and adjusted R-square. We stated NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, 
NINSIDERSOWN, NINSIDERSSIZE, NBLOCKOWN and NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL 
as the most important factors in interpreting the relationship between corporate governance 
variables and asymmetric information proxy measures according to the values of adjusted 
R-square and the significance of t-tests. Webb (2006) stated that corporate governance 
should be viewed as a set, rather than as individual components. Accordingly, we need to 
examine if these six variables (as a set) are enough in interpreting the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and asymmetric information. 
Table 5.13 presents the multiple regression analyses between the normal scores of 
asymmetric information proxy measures and the normal scores of corporate governance 
variables (reduced models). Using NSPREADRATIO, NVOLATILITY, NVOLUME and 
NLEVERAGE as proxy measures for asymmetric information, the F-statistics show that 
the models are significant at the 1% level. The R2 values of NSPREADRATIO, 
NVOLATILITY, NVOLUME and NLEVERAGE are 0.47,0.08,0.47 and 0.16, 
respectively. 
Table 5.13 
Regression analyses between the normal scores of asymmetric information proxy measures and 
the norma l scores of corporat e governance variables (reaucea moaels) 
SPREAD (+) Sig. VOLATILITY + Sig. VOLUME(-) Sig. LEVERAGE - Sig. 
Model St! I%1MARY , 
Number of observations 300 
300 297 304 
R Square 0.47 
0.08 0.47 0.16 
Adjusted R Sauare 0.46 
0.06 0.46 0.14 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.69 0.91 
0.69 0.88 
*** 42 89*** 0.00 4.25*** 0.00 42.4*** 0.00 11.14 0.00 F . 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook- 
Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity 
chi 2 0.49 0.48 0.42 0.52 1.62 0.20 2.70 0.10 
MAIN VARIABLES C_ P>t Cod 
Pit Coef. P>t Coof. P>t 
Constant -0.01 0.80 -0.01 0.80 0.02 0.67 -0.00 1.00 
NNO: NE\ESIZE -0.28*** 0.00 -0.02 
0.83 0.30*** 0.00 0.05 0.43 
NCEOBENFITS -0.15*** 0.00 -0.03 
0.62 0. I0** 0.03 0.07 0.24 
NINSIDERSOWN 0.20*** 0.00 0.12** 
0.05 -0.27*** 0.00 -0.33*** 0.00 
NINSIDERSSI7, E -0.20*** 0.00 - 0.09 
0.12 0.23*** 0.00 0.10* 0.09 
NBLOCKOWN 0.12*** 0.01 0.14*** 0.01 -0.05 0.29 0.03 
0.62 
NI. ONGDEBTTOCAPITAL -0.18*** 0.00 -0.06 0.32 O. 13'"" 0.01 --------- 
""W +** indicate statistical signiticance at the i io, ow, ana 1 u-vo ieveis, respectively. 
The reduced form regression model using NSPREADRATIO as a proxy measure of 
asymmetric information is summarized by the following equation: 
SPREADRATIO = -0.01 - 0.28 NNONEXESIZE - 0.15 NCEORENFITS + 0.20 NINSIDERSOWN - 0.20 NINSIDERSSIZE + 
0.12 NBLOCKOWN - 0.18 NLONCDEHTTOCAPITAI. 
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The results indicated that NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSSIZE and 
NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL are negatively significantly related to NSPREADRATIO, and 
NNINSIDERSOWN and NBLOCKOWN are positively significantly related to 
NSPREADRATIO. These results mean that the higher the number of non-executive 
directors serving on the board, the ratio of CEO benefits, the number of insiders who have 
ownership in the company and the ratio of long-term debt to capital, the lower the degree of 
asymmetric information. Also, the higher the fraction of outstanding shares held by insiders 
and the fraction of outstanding shares owned by block-holders, the higher the degree of 
asymmetric information. 
IL 
The reduced form regression model using NVOLATILITY as a proxy measure of 
asymmetric information is summarized by the following equation: 
VOLATILITY = -0.01 - 0.02 NONEXESIZE - 0.03 CEOBENFITS + 0.12 INSIDERSOWN - 0.09 INSIDERSSIZE + 0.14 
BLOCKOWN - 0.06 LONGDEBTrOCAPITAL 
The results indicated that NINSIDERSOWN and BLOCKOWN are positively significantly 
related to asymmetric information. All other variables in the regression are not significantly 
related to asymmetric information at the 10% level of significance (but the signs of the 
coefficients are identical to the signs of the coefficients using NSPREADRATIO). This 
result supports some of the previous results (table 5.12) using NSPREADRATIO. The 
higher the fraction of outstanding shares held by insiders and the fraction of outstanding 
shares owned by block-holders, the higher the degree of asymmetric information. 
The reduced form regression model using VOLUME as a proxy measure of asymmetric 
information is summarized by the following equation: 
VOLUME = 0.18 + 0.04 NNONEXESIZE + 0.12 NNCSIZE - 0.05 NBOARDWEETINCS + 0.03 NRC4IEETS + 0.19 
NACNIEETS -0.13 NFEAMALTOBOARD -0.02 NCEOBENFITS - 0.29 NINSIUERSOWN + 0.24 NINSIDERSSIZE - 0.01+ 
NBLOCKOWN + 0.06 NLONG UEBYrOCAPITAL 
We find results Kedialar to the results found when using NSPREADRATIO (table 5.12). 
NVOLUME is significantly positively related to NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, 
NINSIDERSSIZE and NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL, and significantly negatively related to 
NINSIDERSOWN. All other variables in the regression are not significantly related to 
asymmetric information at the 10% level of significance. These results mean that the higher 
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the number of non-executive directors serving on the board, the ratio of CEO benefits, the 
number of insiders who have ownership in the company and the ratio of long-term debt to 
capital, the lower the degree of asymmetric information. Also, the higher the fraction of 
outstanding shares held by insiders, the higher the degree of asymmetric information. 
The reduced form regression model using NLEVERAGE as a proxy measure of 
asymmetric information is summarized by the following equation: 
LEVERAGE =-0.00 + 0.05 NONEXESIZE + 0.07 CEOBENFITS - 0.33 INSIDERSOWN + 0.10 INSIDERSSIZE + . 03 
BLOCKOWN 
We find some Kedialar results. NLEVERAGE is significantly negatively related to 
NINSIDERSOWN. NINSIDERSSIZE is significantly positively related to NLEVERAGE. 
All other variables in the regression are not significantly related to asymmetric information 
at the 10% level of significance. That means, the higher the fraction of outstanding shares 
held by insiders, the higher the degree of asymmetric information. Also, the higher the 
number of insiders who have ownership in the company the lower the degree of 
asymmetric information. 
The results of the reduced form multiple regression model (table 5.13) reflect the important 
conclusion that NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSOWN, NINSIDERSSIZE, 
NBLOCKOWN and NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL are the most important factors in 
interpreting the relationship between corporate governance quality and asymmetric 
information in the UK companies59. At least, these factors explain 47% of the changes in 
asymmetric information (measured by the R-square of the SPREADRATIO). Moreover, 
these factors (as a set) may construct the optimal package in interpreting the relationship 
between corporate governance and asymmetric information in the UK capital market. This 
result supports the ideas of Sinha (2006), Cremers and Nair (2005), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), and John and Kedia (2003), that it is difficult for the companies to work with only 
59 As an additional step (see appendix 3, table A. 2), we repeated the reduced model (table 5.13) with some 
alternative corporate governance variables. We replaced NONEXESIZE with BSIZE, CEOBENEFITS with 
CEOSALARY, BLOCKOWN with LARGESTOWNER, and LONGDEBTTOCAPITAL with 
DEBTTOCAPITAL. All the last variables have very high multi-collinearity with each other. The results of 
the repeated regression reflects the same conclusions that NBSIZE, NINSIDERSSIZE and 
NDEBTTOCAPITAL are negatively and significantly related to asymmetric information, and 
NCEOSALARY, NINSIDERSOWN and NLARGESTOWNER are positively significantly related to 
asymmetric information. 
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one mechanism for corporate governance. Internal mechanisms must combine with external 
mechanisms regardless of the type of industry, or the country of analysis. Also, this result 
may answer the questions posed by John and Kedia (2003) regarding the more effective 
governance mechanisms which could be used in conjunction, or the best blend of different 
mechanisms of corporate governance which constitute an optimal governance structure. 
All in all, using the full or the reduced models (table 5.12 and 5.13) indicated that there are 
no significant differences between the values of R-squared or adjusted R-squared if we use 
the full or the reduced models. For example, the R-squared in the NSPREADRATIO in the 
full and reduced models is 50% and 47%, respectively, and the adjusted R-squared in the 
same models is 47% and 46%, respectively. This reflects a new contribution that board 
independence, compensation schemes, ownership structure (as internal corporate 
governance mechanisms measured by NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, 
NINSIDERSOWN, NINSIDERSSIZE and NBLOCKOWN) and large creditors (as an 
external corporate governance mechanism measured by NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL) are 
the most important factors in mitigating or reducing asymmetric information in the UK 
capital market. 
5.5.3 Results' Discussion 
In this section we will consider the results of descriptive statistics of the dependent and 
independent variables (tables 5.1 and 5.6), Pearson correlation (table 5.11) and multiple 
regressions (full models - with or without the dummy variables - and the reduced models 
(tables 5.12 and 5.13)). Also, in the light of these results, we will explain which result 
supports or contradicts the literature and the research hypotheses (chapter 4). Moreover, 
this section will reflect on the research contributions, and on some recommendations for 
future research. 
5.5.3.1 Board Size and Composition Results 
The Pearson correlation results (table 5.11) and the multiple regression results (the full and 
reduced models, tables 5.12 and 5.13) reflect some conclusions. The NSPREADRATIO 
and NVOLUME models indicate that the higher the number of non-executive directors 
(NNONEXESIZE), the lower the degree of asymmetric information. The Pearson 
correlation (table 5.11) reflects that NNONEXESIZE is highly positively correlated with 
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NRCSIZE and NACSIZE, and also, positively correlated with NSPLIT, 
NNONEXECHAIR and NNCSIZE60. Moreover, all of these variables are significantly 
negatively related to asymmetric information (measured by NSPREADRATIO and 
NVOLUME). Accordingly, these results support the research hypothesis (H4.2) that 
"There is a negative relationship between board independence and the degree of 
asymmetric information": Also, the Pearson correlation (table 5.11) reflects that 
NNONEXESIZE is highly positively correlated with NBSIZE61. So, we can conclude that 
board size is significantly negatively related to asymmetric information and accept the first 
hypothesis (H4.1) that "There is a negative relationship between board size and the 
degree of asymmetric information "G2. 
The acceptance of hypothesis two (H4.2) supports the results of Kelton and Yang (2008), 
Rutherford and Buchholtz (2007), Kanagaretnam et al. (2007), Cai et al. (2006), and 
Hsiang-tsai (2005) that asymmetric information is significantly negatively related to board 
independence. Also, Becker-Blease and Irani (2008) find that the size of the audit 
committee mitigates asymmetric information during the seasoned equity offerings. 
Accordingly, board size and independence is negatively related to the degree of asymmetric 
information. Consistent with agency theory predictions, these findings suggest that vigilant 
boards are likely to take actions aimed at reducing the level of information asymmetry. 
The acceptance of the board independence hypothesis (H4.2) reflects new results related to 
the UK capital market. First of all, the study reflects the effect of committees' size on the 
degree of asymmetric information. The higher degree of board independence is related to 
higher levels of remuneration, audit and nomination committees, and accordingly lowers 
the degree of asymmetric information. Second, splitting the roles of Chairman and CEO 
and the independence of the Chairman increases the effect of board independence and plays 
60 NSPLIT, NNONEXECHAIR and NNCSIZE did not exhibit any significant relationship to asymmetric 
information proxy measures (see table 5.12). But these variables exhibit a significant negative relationship to 
asymmetric information using the Pearson correlation. We interpret this result as there is hidden 
multicollinearity between board independence variables (H2). When the correlations between the independent 
variables are not very high, some degree of multicollinearity can still exist (Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). 
So we consider the positive correlation between these variables and NNONEXESIZE, and consider them all 
to have the same effect on asymmetric information. Accordingly, we accept the board independence 
hypothesis (114.2). 
61 We excluded NBSIZE from the multiple regression analysis to avoid the multicollinearity between 
NBSIZE and NNONEXESIZE. 
62 See appendix 3, table A. 2. The multiple regression results using alternative corporate governance variables 
indicated that board size is significantly negatively related to asymmetric information. 
142 
an extra role in reducing asymmetric information. This result also reflects the compliance 
of the UK companies with the combined code on corporate governance regarding the 
recommendation that "there should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of 
the company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the 
running of the company's business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of 
decision" : Third, the results of H4.1 and H4.2 reflect that the increase of board size in the 
UK companies is accompanied by an increase in the number of non-executive directors. 
This result reflects the compliance with the combined code on corporate govenance that 
"the board should include a balance of executive and non-executive directors (and in 
particular independent non-executive directors) such that no individual or small group 
of individuals can dominate the board's decision taking" : All in all, the results of H4.1 
and H4.2 strengthen the board size and composition's mechanisms and play an important 
role in mitigating or reducing the agency problem, and specifically the asymmetric 
information problem. 
The Pearson correlation (table 5.11) and the multiple regression (full model, table 5.12) 
results did not exhibit any significant relationship between NFEMALTOBOARD and 
asymmetric information proxy measures. This result means that the existence of females on 
the board of directors has no effect on the degree of asymmetric information. As a result, 
we reject hypothesis three (H4.3) that "There is a negative relationship between the ratio 
of females to board size and the degree of asymmetric information": This result 
contradicts the result of Cai et al. (2006) that the more diverse the board in terms of the 
presence of female directors, the less the information asymmetry in the market. The 
descriptive statistics' results (table 5.6) indicated that the mean of FEMALTOBOARD is 
3.76%. Moreover, only 102 companies from our sample of 392 companies have females on 
the board. This result reflects the weak representation of females on the boards of directors. 
Accordingly, this weak representation of females in the UK companies' boards does not 
have any effect on asymmetric information. 
The Pearson correlation results (table 5.11) indicated that NNCMEETS, NNACMEETS 
and NRCMEETS are significantly negatively related to asymmetric information (measured 
by NSPREADRATIO, NVOLUME, NVOLATILITY and NLEVERAGE). These results 
mean that the higher the number of meetings by nomination, audit and compensation 
committees, the lower the degree of asymmetric information. These results are consistent 
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with hypothesis four (H4.4) that "There is a negative relationship between the board and 
committees' activities and the degree of asymmetric information': Also, the results are 
consistent with the result of Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) that board structure (which 
includes board meetings and audit committee meetings) is significantly negatively related 
to bid-ask spread ratio. Also, asymmetric information should be smaller for companies 
whose committees meet more frequently. This result reflects a new result about the 
importance of committees' activities in mitigating asymmetric information in the UK 
capital market. Moreover, this result reflects that the compliance with the combined code 
on corporate governance (2003) - regarding the existence of these three committees and the 
minimum number of meetings which are held during the year - is an important mechanism 
in solving the agency problem in general, and reducing asymmetric information 
specifically in the UK capital market. 
The multiple regression results (table 5.12) did not exhibit any significant relationship 
regarding the relationship between NRCMEETS or NACMEETS. We interpret this result 
as there are hidden multicollinearities between NRCMEETS, NACMEETS and 
NNONEXESIZE63. NRCMEETS and NACMEETS are highly correlated with 
NNCMEETS. NNCMEETS is highly correlated with NNONEXESIZE (see table 5.11). 
Accordingly, the significant relationship of NRCMEETS, NACMEETS with asymmetric 
information, disappeared as a result of the strong negative relationship between 
NNONEXESIZE and asymmetric information proxy measures. 
Regarding the number of board meetings, the Pearson correlation (table 5.11) and the full 
multiple regression models (table 5.12) did not exhibit any significant relationship between 
the number of board meeting and asymmetric information. Only the NVOLATILITY full 
model indicates that the higher the number of board meetings, the higher the degree of 
asymmetric information64. This result contradicts hypothesis four (H4.4). Also, the results 
contradict the result of Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) that board structure (which includes 
board meetings and audit committee meetings) is significantly negatively related to the bid- 
ask spread ratio. We interpret this result as there are problems in companies which have 
63 The VIF test results did not indicate that there is multicollinearity between these variables. 
6' The other proxy measures of asymmetric information did not exhibit any significant relationship to the 
number of board meetings. So, we expect that this result may be due to reasons related with volatility rather 
than other asymmetric information measures. 
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higher degrees of asymmetric information. So, these companies hold a large number of 
meetings to solve these problems. More specifically, the problem may be due to the 
differences in the daily price changes, which means a higher ratio of NVOLATILITY 
(which is a proxy measure of asymmetric information). Accordingly, the higher the 
differences in the daily price changes, the higher the number of board meetings to solve the 
volatility problem. 
5.5.3.2 Executive Compensation Results 
The Pearson correlation results (table 5.11), the NSPREADRATIO and NVOLUME 
models (tables 5.12 and 5.13), indicate that the higher the ratio of CEO benefits, the lower 
the degree of asymmetric information. These results support research hypothesis five 
(H4.5) that "There is a negative relationship between the ratio of the CEO's benefits and 
bonuses and the degree of asymmetric information". Also, this result supports the results 
of Brazel and Webb (2006), Douglas (2006), Shumsky and Pinker (2003), Björkman and 
Furu (2000), and Tevlin (1996), that having CEO pay depend on the performance of the 
firm is the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem (which is a part of the asymmetric 
information problem) that exists because shareholders do not observe the actions of the 
CEO. Also, the variable pay for top managers reduces asymmetric information as an 
agency problem. Moreover, the results supported Florackis and Ozkan's (2008) argument 
that that compensation contracts can motivate managers to take actions that maximize 
shareholders' wealth. 
By reviewing the UK companies' annual reports we find that most of the UK companies in 
the sample compensate the CEO with benefits and bonuses (the average of 
CEOBENEFITS is 37.7%). The ratio of CEO's benefits increases in large and industrial 
companies compared to small and non-industrial companies. Accordingly, the higher 
CEO's benefits and bonuses in large and industrial companies have a strong role in 
reducing asymmetric information than in the small and non-industrial companies 65 
The Pearson correlation results (table 5.11) and the full model (table 5.12) did not exhibit 
any significant relationship between NCEOLONGCOMP and NBENEFITS (dummy 
variables) with asymmetric information. The descriptive statistics (table 5.6) indicated that 
65 We will discuss this result in section 5.4 (robustness analysis). Also see table 5.14. 
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the means of CEOLONGCOMP and BENFITS are 0.96 and 0.98. This result means that 
96% of our sample use long-term compensation plans to compensate the CEO, and 98% of 
the UK companies in our sample use short-term compensation plans (like benefits and 
bonuses schemes) and long-term compensation plans (like executive share options and 
Directors' pension schemes) to compensate the other executives (other than the CEO). 
Accordingly, the effect of NCEOLONGCOMP and NBENEFITS on asymmetric 
information is not clear, as there is not much variation in the data. So, we rejected 
hypotheses six and seven (H4.6 and H4.7) that "There is a negative relationship between 
CEO long-term incentive schemes and the degree of asymmetric information" and 
"There is a negative relationship between Executive directors' benefits and bonuses 
schemes and the degree of asymmetric information': 
The above results do not mean that CEO and other executives' compensation plans have no 
effect on asymmetric information. But, the effect of CEO and other executives' 
compensation plans is not clear for two reasons. First, most of the UK companies use these 
compensation schemes to reward executives. Second, NCEOLONGCOMP and 
NBENEFITS are two dummy variables (0,1) and in most cases the value was one (which 
means most of the UK companies compensate executives with long- and short-term 
compensation schemes). So, these two variables need more and in-depth study in future 
research. Perhaps new proxy variables need to be constructed to test these hypotheses? 
5.5.3.3 Ownership Structure Results 
The Pearson correlation (table 5.11) and the NSPREADRATIO, NVOLATILITY, 
NVOLUME and NLEVERAGE models (tables 5.12 and 5.13) indicate that the higher the 
fraction of outstanding shares held by insiders, the higher the degree of asymmetric 
information. This result supports the research hypothesis (H4.8) that "There is a positive 
relationship between the ratio of insiders' ownership and the degree of asymmetric 
information'. Also, this result supports the result of Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) and 
Mishra et al. (2004) that there is a positive correlation between the bid-ask spread as a 
proxy of asymmetric information and the percentage of ownership by corporate insiders. 
Florackis and Ozkan (2008, P. 38) stated that "after some level of managerial ownership, 
though, managers exert insufficient effort (e. g. focus on external activities), collect 
private benefits (e. g. build empires or enjoy perks) and entrench themselves (e. g. 
undertake high risk projects or bend over backwards to resist a takeover) at the expense 
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of other investors (entrenchment effect). Therefore the relationship between managerial 
ownership on agency costs is non-linear. The ultimate effect of managerial ownership on 
agency costs depends upon the trade-off between the alignment and entrenchment 
effects' Accordingly, we conclude that the higher levels in managerial ownership in the 
UK capital market increase the problem of asymmetric information. 
The NSPREADRATIO, NVOLATILITY and NVOLUME models (tables 5.12 and 5.13) 
indicate that the higher the number of insiders who have ownership in the company, the 
lower the degree of asymmetric information. This result is consistent with our hypothesis 
nine (H4.9) that "There is a negative relationship between the insiders' size and the 
degree of asymmetric information". This result indicates that the increased number of 
insiders (CEO, managers, or workers) who have ownership in the company can align the 
interest between insiders and shareholders, therefore, reduce the agency problems within 
the firm. 
The acceptance of H4.8 and H4.9 reflects a new result, in general, and specifically in the 
UK capital market. Increasing the number of insiders who have ownership in the company 
is more important than increasing the ownership of a small number of insiders in reducing 
the problem of asymmetric information. The higher ratio of insiders' ownership is related 
to the entrenchment effect, but the higher number of insiders is related to the alignment 
effect. This suggests that the theoretical entrenchment effect is related to the higher ratio of 
insiders' ownership, and the alignment effect is related to the higher number of owners 
inside the company. 
The NSPREADRATIO and NVOLATILITY models indicate that the higher the fraction of 
outstanding shares owned by block-holders (who hold more than 3% of outstanding 
shares), the higher the degree of asymmetric information. This result is consistent with 
research hypothesis ten (H4.10) that "There is a positive relationship between the ratio of 
block ownership and the degree of asymmetric information" : This result supports the 
results of Kelton and Yang (2008) that a lower percentage of block ownership reduces 
asymmetric information. Also, Fehle (2004), O'Neill and Swisher (2003), and Heflin and 
Shaw (2000) find that higher institutional ownership, particularly a higher number of 
institutional investors, is associated with a lower degree of informed trading, and not all 
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types of institutions can cause decreases in adverse selection costs as a measure of 
asymmetric information. 
By reviewing the names of block-holders in the companies' annual reports and in the 
Bloomberg Database, we find that most of the UK companies' block ownerships are 
concentrated in the hands of institutional investors. The concentrated ownership by 
institutional investors66 in the UK capital market reflects a new result that the higher ratios 
of block-holdings by the UK institutional investors increase the degree of asymmetric 
information. This confirms Clarck's (2007) argument that "institutional investors have 
become implicated as one of the insistent forces pressuring corporate management 
towards unacceptable practices in order to inflate their earnings and dividends. The 
massive developments in the scale of the institutional investors, together with increases 
in their level of corporate governance activity, suggest the possibility of the beginnings of 
a new era in the relationships between investment institutions and the corporate in which 
they invest". Moreover, the acceptance of H4.8 and H4.10 means that the higher ratios of 
ownership - managerial or institutional - increase the degree of asymmetric information in 
the UK capital market. 
5.5.3.4 Large Creditors' Results 
The results of the Pearson correlation (table 5.11) and the NSPREADRATIO and 
NVOLUME models (tables 5.12 and 5.13) indicate that the higher the ratio of long-term 
debt to capital, the lower the degree of asymmetric information. This result supports 
research hypothesis eleven (H4.11) that "There is a negative relationship between the % 
of long-term debts to total capital and the degree of asymmetric information": Also, this 
result supports the result of Degryse and Jong (2006) that leverage, and particularly bank 
debt, is a key disciplinary mechanism which reduces the managerial discretion problem. 
Also, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stated that bank debt incorporates significant signalling 
characteristics that can mitigate informational asymmetry conflicts between managers and 
outside investors. Moreover, the bank acquires private information about the borrowing 
firm that enables the bank to monitor the firm (John and Kedia, 2003). 
The acceptance of H4.11 reflects new conclusions in the UK capital market. First, debt 
financing is a mechanism for reducing asymmetric information and solving agency 
66 See chapter 4, section 4.4.2.3.3. 
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problems, because of the ability of creditors to exercise control. Second, the results reflect 
that long-term debt is a more powerful mechanism in mitigating asymmetric information 
than short-term debt. 
To sum up, we find that the results are consistent whether using NSPREADRATIO, 
NVOLATILITY or NVOLUME models. That means the higher the number of non- 
executive directors serving on the board, the ratio of CEO benefits, the number of insiders 
who have ownership in the company, and the ratio of long-term debt to capital, the lower 
the degree of asymmetric information. Also, the higher the fraction of outstanding shares 
held by insiders and the fraction of outstanding shares held by block-holders, the higher the 
degree of asymmetric information. The NLEVERAGE model does not show a significant 
relationship to most of the corporate governance variables. Moreover, all of the dummy 
variables have no significant relationships with asymmetric information proxy measures. 
5.5.4 Robustness Analysis 
Table 5.14 presents some additional analyses to determine whether the previous results are 
robust. We examined the robustness between 2005 and 2006, for large and small 
companies, and finally industrial and non-industrial companies. Because most of the data 
(353 companies) are concentrated in the years 2005 and 2006, we checked on the 
robustness of the results between the years of 2005 and 2006. Also, we classified 
companies into large and small according to company size, which is measured by the 
market capitalization of each company. Moreover, all companies which have market 
capitalization less than the median 
67 (£ 277 M) are classified as small companies; and large 
otherwise. Moreover, because a large number of companies are concentrated in the 
industrial sector in this sample, we checked on the robustness of the results between 
industrial and non-industrial companies. 
The results of the multiple regression models (tables 5.12 and 5.13) indicated that 
SPREADRATIO is the best proxy measure in interpreting the relationship with asymmetric 
67 We use the median rather than the mean in splitting the sample to large and small companies for two 
reasons. First of all, some studies prefer to use the median rather than the means in splitting the sample into 
two groups (Lara et al., 2009). Second, the difference between the mean (£ 1749.7 M) and the median (£ 277 
M) is very large. When using the mean to split the sample, there are very few "big companies", but using the 
median gives a better balance between the numbers of "large" and "small" companies. Accordingly, if we 
use the mean, we will classify some large companies as small companies; and this is not accurate. 
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information. In all regressions the SPREADRATIO has the highest R-squared value and 
adjusted R-squared value. So, to do the robustness analysis, we will use the 
NSPREADRATIO model as a proxy measure for asymmetric information (the dependent 
variable). Also, as a result of section 5.5.2, we use the most important corporate 
governance variables (NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSOWN, 
NINSIDERSSIZE, NBLOCKOWN and NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL) as the independent 
variables. 
Using NSPREADRATIO as a proxy measure for asymmetric information, all models in the 
robustness analysis are significant at the 5% level of significance, since the F-test 
significance was < 0.05. Table 5.14 presents these results. 
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The results of the robustness analysis (table 5.14) are not affected by year of analysis or 
industry effects, and support our main findings (tables 5.11,5.12 and 5.13) that 
NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENIFTS, NINSIDERSSIZE and NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL 
are significantly negatively related to asymmetric information, and NINSIDERSOWN and 
NBLOCKOWN are significantly positively related to asymmetric information68. 
The results of the multiple regression analysis using NSPREADRATIO for large 
companies indicated that NSPEARDRATIO is significantly negatively related to 
NNONEXESIZE and NCEOBENFITS, and significantly positively related to 
NINSIDERSOWN. All other variables in the regression (NINSIDERSSIZE, 
NBLOCKOWN and NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL) are not significantly related to 
asymmetric information at the 10% level of significance. However, the signs of the 
coefficients are identical when using SPREADRATIO as a proxy measure for asymmetric 
information in tables 5.12 and 5.13, and with the signs of the coefficients of the robustness 
analysis for 2005,2006, industrial and non-industrial companies. 
The results of the multiple regression analysis using NSPREADRATIO for small 
companies indicated that NSPEARDRATIO is significantly negatively related to 
NINSIDERSSIZE, and nearly significantly positively related to NINSIDERSOWN (at a 
12% level of significance). All other variables in the regression are not significantly related 
to asymmetric information at the 10% level of significance. 
The differences in the results between large and small companies reflect new conclusions 
in the UK capital market. First, the results of the robustness analysis support the finding of 
Barrett (2008) that board independence is less common in small companies than in large 
companies69. Accordingly, the bigger the size of the UK companies, the higher the degree 
of board independence, and the lower the degree of asymmetric information. 
Second, CEO compensation is significantly positively related to company size. This result 
supports the finding of Eichholtz (2008) that company size is positively related to 
ba We repeated the robustness analysis regression with alternative corporate governance variables and find 
similar conclusions (see appendix 3, table A. 12). 
69 The study of Barrett (2008) was applied on the US capital market. 
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executive compensation, and company size is the most important variable in explaining the 
level of executive compensation. However, we extend these findings to show that for large 
companies, NCEOBENFITS is influential in reducing asymmetric information, but 
NCEOBENEFITS is not influential in reducing asymmetric information in small 
companies. Moreover, this provides a justification for the different compensation schemes 
for CEOs, depending upon whether they work for large or small companies. 
The last two results, regarding the positive relationship between board independence and 
executive compensation to company size (see table 5.11), support the idea that the larger 
the size of the company, the higher the degree of compliance with the combined code on 
corporate governance. Akkermans et al. (2007), De Silva Rosa et al. (2007), and Werder et 
al. (2005) find that the extent of compliance is positively associated with company size. 
Large companies can more easily afford to comply due to scale of economies, since the 
costs of compliance are fixed, at least to some extent. Donnelly and Kelly (2005) find that 
larger companies have more diffuse shareholdings, which allow management more power. 
Accordingly, we concluded the compliance with the combined code increases in large 
companies compared to small companies, and this makes the large UK companies more 
able to mitigate the asymmetric information problem. 
Third, there is no evidence in the literature regarding the relationship between company 
size, the number of internal owners and asymmetric information. The robustness results 
(table 5.14) indicated that NINSIDERSSIZE is significantly negatively related to 
asymmetric information in small companies, but is insignificant in large companies. This 
may be due to two reasons. First, in large companies the number of external owners 
(especially institutional investors) is higher than the number of internal owners. 
Accordingly, this large number of external owners reduces the effective role of insiders in 
mitigating the problem of asymmetric information. Second, conversely, in small companies 
there are a smaller number of external owners. So, the role of internal owners is clear and 
more effective in mitigating the free-rider problem, and as a result, the degree of 
asymmetric information. 
The results of the robustness analysis (table 5.14) reflect another conclusion. 
NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL is significantly negatively related to asymmetric information 
in non-industrial companies, but insignificant in industrial companies. This result supports 
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the result of Florackis and Ozkan (2008), Kedia (2003), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
that bank debt incorporates significant signalling characteristics that can mitigate 
informational asymmetry conflicts between managers and outside investors. This means 
that the effect of long-term debt in mitigating asymmetric information is clear in non- 
industrial sectors. Because there is no evidence regarding the role of debt in industrial and 
non-industrial sectors, this conclusion opens a new window for future research to study the 
effect of debt in mitigating asymmetric information in industrial and non-industrial sectors 
in the UK companies. 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter we examined the effect of corporate governance variables on asymmetric 
information. The results of the Pearson correlation and the multiple regression analysis 
indicated that board and committees' size, independence and activity, CEO's benefits, 
insiders' numbers, and the ratio of debt to total capital are significantly negatively related 
to asymmetric information. Insiders' ownership and block ownership are significantly 
positively related to asymmetric information. 
The results reflect new empirical conclusions in the UK capital market. First, 
NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSOWN, NINSIDERSSIZE, 
NBLOCKOWN and NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL are the most important factors in 
interpreting the relationship between corporate governance quality and asymmetric 
information in the UK companies. Moreover, these factors (as a set) may construct the 
optimal package in interpreting the relationship between corporate governance and 
asymmetric information in the UK capital market. 
Second, the higher degree of board independence is related to higher levels of 
remuneration, audit and nomination committees, and accordingly lowers the degree of 
asymmetric information. Also, splitting the roles of Chairman and CEO, and the 
independence of the Chairman, increase the effect of board independence and play an extra 
role in reducing asymmetric information. Moreover, the weak representation of females on 
the UK companies' boards does not have any effect on asymmetric information. 
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Third, the results reflect the importance of committees' activities in mitigating asymmetric 
information in the UK capital market. Moreover, the compliance with the combined code 
on corporate governance (2003) - regarding the existence of audit, remuneration and 
nomination committees and the minimum number of meetings which are held during the 
year - is an important mechanism in solving the agency problem in general, and reducing 
asymmetric information specifically in the UK capital market. 
Fourth, the results reflect a new contribution that increasing the number of insiders who 
have ownership in the company is more important than increasing the ownership of a small 
number of insiders in reducing the problem of asymmetric information. The higher ratio of 
insiders' ownership is related to the entrenchment effect, but the number of internal owners 
is related to the alignment effect. Also, the higher ratio of insiders' ownership has a strong 
significant positive effect on asymmetric information in large companies, but it has no 
effect in small companies. Conversely, the higher the number of insiders who have 
ownership, has a strong significant negative effect in small companies, but it has no effect 
in large companies. We concluded that in small companies, the role of internal owners is 
clear and more effective in mitigating the free-rider problem, and as a result, reduces the 
degree of asymmetric information. This conclusion opens a new window for future 
research to study the effect of company size, insiders' ownership and insiders' numbers on 
asymmetric information. 
Fifth, concentrated ownership by institutional investors in the UK capital market reflects a 
new result that the higher ratios of block-holdings by UK institutional investors increase 
the degree of asymmetric information. This result confirms the evidence that institutional 
investors have become implicated as one of the insistent forces pressuring corporate 
management towards unacceptable practices in order to inflate their earnings and 
dividends. 
Sixth, debt financing is a mechanism for reducing asymmetric information and solving 
agency problems, because large creditors can exercise control. Also, long-term debt is a 
more powerful mechanism in mitigating asymmetric information. Moreover, the robustness 
analysis indicated that the effect of long-term debt in mitigating asymmetric information is 
clear in non-industrial sectors. This conclusion opens a new window for future research to 
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study the effect of debt in mitigating asymmetric information in industrial and non- 
industrial sectors in the UK companies. 
Seventh, NSPREARDRATIO and NVOLUME (as proxy measures of asymmetric 
information) exhibit strong, significant and Kedialar conclusions regarding the relationship 
between corporate governance variables and asymmetric information than NVOLATILITY 
and NLEVERAGE. So, we can use NSPREARDRATIO and NVOLUME as alternatives in 
measuring asymmetric information in the UK capital market. 
Eighth, the results of the robustness analysis indicated that board independence is less 
common in small companies than in large companies. Also, CEO benefits are significantly 
positively related to company size. The last two results, regarding the positive relationship 
between board independence and executive compensation for the company, support the 
idea that the larger the size of the company, the higher the degree of compliance with the 
combined code on corporate governance. Accordingly, we concluded that the compliance 
with the combined code increases in large companies more than in small companies, and 
this makes the large UK companies more able to mitigate the asymmetric information 
problem. 
All in all, the results reflect a high degree of compliance of the UK companies with the 
code on corporate governance (2003). This compliance increases the quality of corporate 
governance, and as a result, mitigates or reduces asymmetric information and contributes 
to solving the agency problem. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEXES 
AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: 
METHODOLOGICAL AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is an extension of chapter five. Chapter five discussed the effect of corporate 
governance variables on asymmetric information, and the results indicated that the higher 
the quality of corporate governance variables, the lower the degree of asymmetric 
information. In this chapter the main objective is to examine the effect of corporate 
governance indexes on asymmetric information. The main idea of using indexes rather than 
using the individual variables of corporate governance is that the indexes see corporate 
governance as a set. The index reflects the effect of a group of corporate governance 
variables rather than measuring the effect of each individual variable (Webb, 2006). 
Moreover, the use of indexes supports the idea of interaction between corporate governance 
mechanisms. The other idea in this chapter is to examine the interdependence relationship 
between corporate governance indexes and variables, and if these variables and indexes 
complete each other and strengthen the measure of corporate governance quality. For 
example, there are some new aspects related to the audit index (CGAUDIT) that have not 
been discussed in chapter five, such as: audit fees, auditor rotation, and auditor ratification. 
So, the use of the audit index to examine its effect on asymmetric information can support 
our results in chapter 5 regarding the effect of audit characteristics on asymmetric 
information. 
There are a number of empirical studies that have used corporate governance indexes in 
their analysis to examine the impact of corporate governance on other variables rather than 
on asymmetric information. Kelton and Yang (2008) use the corporate governance index 
(GOV) obtained from the IRRC Database to examine the impact of corporate governance 
on internet financial reporting. Chen et al. (2007) use transparency and disclosure (T&D) 
rankings as a proxy measure for corporate governance, and examine its effect on equity 
liquidity. Webb (2006) uses some corporate governance indexes to examine the 
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relationship between board structure and takeover defence. Accordingly, we use the recent 
idea of measuring corporate governance as indexes to examine its effect on asymmetric 
information. 
The Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) issued new7° corporate governance indexes 
measuring the quality of corporate governance in the UK capital market. ISS is the world 
leading provider of proxy voting and corporate governance services, with over 20 years of 
experience. ISS serves more than 1,600 institutional and corporate clients worldwide with 
its core business - analysing proxies and issuing informed research and objective vote 
recommendations for more than 33,000 companies across 115 markets worldwide. ISS' 
Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) was designed to assist institutional investors in 
evaluating the quality of corporate boards, and the impact governance practices may have 
on portfolio performance. Many of the world's largest and most respected financial 
institutions have incorporated ISS' CGQ ratings into various aspects of their equity 
research and investment decision-making processes71. 
In this chapter we will use the ISS' indexes as proxy measures for corporate governance to 
examine its effect on asymmetric information. The next section discusses the 
methodological issues of ISS' corporate governance indexes. Then, section 6.3 discusses 
descriptive statistics which are related to corporate governance indexes. Finally, sections 
6.4 and 6.5 discuss the Pearson correlation and the simple and multiple regression results of 
the relationship between corporate governance indexes and asymmetric information proxy 
measures. 
6.2 Corporate Governance Indexes (Methodological Issues) 
From the Bloomberg Database, we collected data about the ISS corporate governance 
indexes. The corporate governance quintile depends on the analysis of the components of a 
company's corporate governance characteristics. Each company is scored individually, 
based on 63 variables, and is ranked relative to its index and industry peer group. CGQ 
70 These indexes were initially launched in June 2002. 
71 CGQ is the industry's most comprehensive corporate governance database, scoring more than 8,000 
companies worldwide, representing more than 98% of the US equity market and all of the major global 
indexes. 
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ratings are calculated on the basis of eight core categories: 1) board of directors, 2) audit, 3) 
charter and bylaw provisions, 4) laws of the state of incorporation, 5) executive and 
director compensation, 6) qualitative factors, 7) ownership, and 8) director education. But, 
some of these ratings are not available for the UK companies. So, we collect all data which 
is available for the UK companies. Then a weighting is applied by the ISS to these profile 
characteristics to produce a raw score for each company. Table 6.1 presents the main 
corporate governance ratings and the global corporate governance quotient criteria which 
are used in measuring the ratings. 
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Table 6.1 
The main corporate governance ratings and the global corporate governance quotient 
criteria 
Corporate Governance Criteria 
Ratings 
1. Corporate Governance " Board composition 
Quintile for Board (CGQ " Nominating committee 
Board) " Compensation committee 
" Governance committee 
" Board structure 
" Board size 
" Changes in board size 
" Cumulative voting 
" Boards served on - CEO 
" Boards served on - other than CEO 
" Former CEOs 
" Chairman/CEO separation 
" Board guidelines 
" Response to shareholder proposals 
" Board attendance 
" Board vacancies 
" Related party transactions 
2. Corporate Governance " Audit committee 
Quintile for Audit (CGQ " Audit fees 
Audit) " Auditor rotation 
" Auditor ratification 
3. Corporate Governance Ownership criteria: 
Quintile for Comp/Stock " Director ownership 
Ownership (CGQ " Executive stock ownership guidelines 
Comp/Stock Ownership) " Director stock ownership guidelines 
" Officer and director stock ownership 
Executive and director compensation criteria 
" Cost of option plans 
" Option re-pricing 
" Shareholder approval of option plans 
" Compensation committee interlocks 
" Director compensation 
" Pension plans for non-employee directors 
" Option expensing 
" Option burn rate 
" Corporate loans 
4. Corporate Governance The anti-takeover provisions applicable under country (local) laws. 
Quintile for Takeover 
Defence (CGQ Takeover 
Defence 
5. Corporate Governance A general quintile rating relative to industry peers. It depends on the 
Quintile for Industry (CGQ weighting of the four areas: 40% for the board, 30% for compensation 
Industry) and ownership, 10% for audit, and 20% for anti-takeover. 
6. Corporate governance It depends on the weighting of the four areas: 40% for the board, 30% 
general index (for all for compensation and ownership, 10% for audit, and 20% for anti- 
industries) takeover. This index compares the company with all companies in the 
market. 
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The ISS' corporate governance indexes criteria include new aspects (related to board size 
and composition, audit, compensation, ownership structure and takeovers provisions) that 
have not been examined in chapter 5. These new aspects will support our results of chapter 
5 regarding the role of corporate governance mechanisms in controlling, reducing or 
mitigating asymmetric information. According to ISS' indexes, the higher the value of the 
index, the higher the quality of corporate governance. Because there are no studies 
measuring the effect of these indexes on the degree of asymmetric information, we expect 
that the higher the value of these indexes, the lower the degree of asymmetric information. 
So, the main hypothesis is: 
"There is a negative relationship between the rate of ISS' corporate governance indexes 
and the degree of asymmetric information': 
The definitions, new variables which are related to each index and the rank for each 
corporate governance index are stated in section 6.2.1. 
6.2.1 Corporate Governance Quintile for Board (CGBOARD) 
H6.1: "There is a negative relationship between tue rate of CGBOARD and the degree of 
asymmetric information ". 
CGBOARD is a quintile ranking within index peers for CGQ board characteristics. The 
value of the rate ranked from 1 to 5 (5 is the top ranking. 1 is the worst). Table 6.1 reflects 
that this index includes some corporate governance variables that were examined in chapter 
5, like board size, composition, committees and attendance. But there are some new 
variables related to board characteristics that were not discussed like: governance 
committee, changes in board size, cumulative voting, boards served on - CEO, boards 
served on - other than CEO, former CEOs, board guidelines, response to shareholder 
proposals and board vacancies. All the data of these new variables which construct the 
board index were not available on the secondary databases like the Bloomberg Database, 
the companies' annual reports or the DataStream Database. So, all of these variables - as a 
package - which construct the board index, can support our results in chapter 5 regarding 
the role of board size and composition in mitigating asymmetric information. Accordingly, 
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the higher the rate of the board index, the higher the quality of board and the lower the 
degree of asymmetric information. 
CGAUDIT is a quintile ranking within index peers for CGQ Audit characteristics. The 
ratings range from 1 to 5 (5 is the top ranking. 1 is the worst). In chapter 5, the variables 
which are related to audit committee size and meetings have been discussed. But there are 
some new aspects related to audit characteristics that have not been discussed in chapter 
five like: audit fees, auditor rotation and auditor ratification. So, the use of the audit index 
to examine its effect on asymmetric information can support our results in chapter 5 
regarding the effect of audit characteristics on asymmetric information. Accordingly, we 
expect that the higher the rate of audit index, the lower the degree of asymmetric 
information. 
6.2.3 Corporate Governance Quintile for Compensation and Stock 
Ownership (CGCOMP/OWN) 
H6.3: "There is a negative relationship between the rates of CGCOMP/OWN and the 
degree of asymmetric information" 
CGCOMP/OWN is a quintile ranking within index peers for CGQ compensation and 
ownership characteristics. The value of the ratings range from I to 5 (5 is the top ranking. I 
is the worst). Table 6.1 shows that this index includes two groups of variables. The first 
group is related to compensation variables. Some of these compensation variables have 
been discussed in chapter five, like directors' compensation. But there are some new 
aspects related to compensation characteristics like: cost of option plans, option re-pricing, 
shareholder approval of option plans, compensation committee interlocks, pension plans 
for non-employee directors, option expensing, option burn rate and corporate loans. The 
second group is related to ownership variables. In chapter five, the variables of ownership 
were related to the size and the ratios of internal and external owners. But this index 
reflects new aspects related to ownership like: executive stock ownership guidelines, 
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6.2.2 Corporate Governance Quintile for Audit (CGAUDIT) 
director stock ownership guidelines and officer and director stock ownership. These new 
dimensions of compensation and ownership structure support the use of the 
CGCOMP/OWN index in examining the effect of ownership and compensation 
mechanisms on asymmetric information, and can support our results in chapter 5. 
Accordingly we expect that the higher the rate of the CGCOMP/OWN index, the lower the 
degree of asymmetric information. 
6.2.4 Corporate Governance Quintile for Takeover Defence 
(CGTAKEOVERS) 
H6.4: "There is a negative relationship between the rates of CGTAKEOVERS and the 
degree of asymmetric information" 
CGTAKEOVERS is a quintile ranking within index peers for CGQ Takeover Defence 
characteristics. The value of the ratings range from I to 5 (5 is the top ranking and means a 
higher degree of takeover defence. 1 is the worst, and means a lower degree of takeover 
defence). This measures the rate the company uses the anti-takeover provisions applicable 
under country (local) laws72. In chapter five we did not use any variables to measure the 
effect of takeovers as an external corporate governance mechanism. So, the use of this 
index will reflect new conclusions regarding the effect of takeover defence on asymmetric 
information in the UK capital market. Accordingly, we expect that the higher the rate of the 
CGTAKEOVERS index, the lower the degree of asymmetric information. 
6.2.5 Corporate Governance Quintile for Industry (CGINDUSTRY) 
H6.5: "There is a negative relationship between the rates of CGINDUSTRY and the 
degree of asymmetric information". 
CGINDUSTRY is a general quintile rating relative to industry peers. The value of the 
ratings range from 1 to 100 (100 is the top ranking). After measuring the last four rates, the 
company is then compared to their industry group peers. Sub-scores are also produced by 
the ISS for their index peers. The weighting of the four areas are: 40% for the board, 30% 
for compensation and ownership, 10% for audit, and 20% for anti-takeover. The higher the 
72 There are no specific factors stated by ISS regarding the main factors which are related to the takeovers' 
defence index. 
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a 
rate of this index the lower the degree of asymmetric information. So, we expect that the 
higher the rate of the CGINDUSTRY index, the lower the degree of asymmetric 
information. 
6.2.6 Corporate Governance General Index (CGINDEX) 
H6.6: "There is a negative relationship between the rates of CGINDEX and the degree of 
asymmetric information' 
CGINDEX is a general quintile rating relative to all industries measuring the rate of 
corporate governance of a specific company compared to all of the other companies in the 
market. The value of the ratings range from 1 to 100 (100 is the top ranking). After 
measuring the first four rates, the company is then compared to all of the other companies 
in the market. The weighting of the four areas are: 40% for the board, 30% for 
compensation and ownership, 10% for audit, and 20% for anti-takeover. The higher the rate 
of this index the lower the degree of asymmetric information. Accordingly, we expect that 
the higher the rate of the CGINDEX index, the lower the degree of asymmetric 
information. 
To examine the effect of corporate governance indexes on asymmetric information proxy 
measures, we use the same sample which is used in examining the effect of corporate 
governance variables on asymmetric information in chapter 5 (392 non-financial 
companies listed in the London Stock Exchange). Cross-sectional data are used to study the 
effect of corporate governance indexes on asymmetric information at a particular point in 
time (i. e. the effect of CGBOARD on the degree of asymmetric information in the year 
2006). Accordingly, the year of analysis differs from one company to another because the 
data about corporate governance indexes is not available for all companies for all years. 
But the time period of analysis for all companies falls between 2003 and 2006. In the 
current research, all data which are related to corporate governance indexes and 
asymmetric information proxy measures were collected from the Bloomberg Database. 
We examine the relationship between corporate governance indexes and asymmetric 
information using the Pearson correlation and the multiple regression analysis. The 
multiple regression form for this stage is stated as follows: 
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Yasy i=a+4i CGBOARD i+ E(32 CGAUDIT i+ E(33 CGCOMP/OWN i+ E(i4 
CGTAKEOVERS i+ Ei ................ (1) 
Where: 
Yasy I= P/B ratio as a proxy measure of asymmetric information 
Yasy 2= P/E ratio as a proxy measure of asymmetric information 
Yasy 3= Volatility as a proxy measure of asymmetric information 
Yasy 4= Volume as a proxy measure of asymmetric information 
Yasy 5= Leverage (total debt/total assets) as a proxy measure of asymmetric information 
Yasy 6= Spread ratio 
a= Regression intercept 
CGBOARD = Quintile ranking within index peers for CGQ board characteristics 
CGAUDIT = Quintile ranking within index peers for CGQ Audit characteristics 
CGCOMP/OWN = Quintile ranking within index peers for CGQ ownership and 
compensation characteristics 
CGTAKEOVERS = Quintile ranking within index peers for CGQ takeover defence 
characteristics 
Ei = The random error term 
Because there are many dependent variables in this research, we use the last equation many 
times, with each dependent variable alone, to study the effect of corporate governance 
indexes. Also, we use simple regression models to examine the relationship between 
asymmetric information variables and the general indexes of corporate governance, which 
include CGINDEX and CGINDUSTRY, using the following equation: 
Yasy i=a+ Eß CGINDUSTRY + Ei .................................................. (2) 
Yasy i=a+ Eß CGINDEX + Ei .................................................. (3) 
Where: 
Yasy 1= P/B ratio as a proxy measure of asymmetric information 
Yasy 2= P/E ratio as a proxy measure of asymmetric information 
Yasy 3= Volatility as a proxy measure of asymmetric information 
Yasy 4= Volume as a proxy measure of asymmetric information 
166 
Yasy 5= Leverage (total debt/total assets) as a proxy measure of asymmetric information 
Yasy 6= Spread ratio 
a= Regression intercept 
CGINDUSTRY = Quintile rating relative to industry peers 
CGINDEX = Quintile rating relative to all industries 
Ei = The random error term 
6.3 Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance indexes 
Table 6.2 presents descriptive statistics of corporate governance indexes (as the 
independent variables) for the whole sample, which includes 392 non-financial UK 
companies73 listed in the London Stock Exchange from 2003 to 200674. 
Table 6.2 
Descriptive statistics of comorate governance indexes 
vanames N minimum maximum mean Std. Deviation Cv 
CGAUDIT 201 1.00 5.00 4.29 . 77 0.18 
CGBOARD 201 1.00 5.00 4.25 . 75 0.18 
CGCOMPIOWN 216 1.00 5.00 3.98 1.05 0.26 
CGTAKEOVERS 172 1.00 5.00 4.75 . 94 0.20 
CGINDEX % 257 5.36 100.00 84.93 12.09 0.14 
CGINDUSTRY % 241 5.00 100.00 83.46 15.79 0.19 
Table 6.2 shows that the means of CGAUDIT, CGBOARD, CGCOMP/OWN, and 
CGTAKEOVERS equal 4.29,4.25,3.98 and 4.75. These results indicate that, on average, 
most of the UK companies have higher rates of corporate governance indexes because all 
of the sub-indexes are nearly close to five. Also, the means of the general corporate 
governance indexes (CGINDEX and CGINDUSTRY) equal 85% and 84%, respectively. 
These results mean that most of the UK companies are in compliance with the combined 
code of the best practices of 2003 and have higher corporate governance quality. All 
variables have relatively low degrees of variability, because the coefficients of variation 
(CVs) were equal to, or less than 0.26 for all indexes. However, the standard deviation 
73 The number of observations will vary with the measure of asymmetric information because the data were 
not available for all companies for all variables. 
74 The descriptive statistics which are related to asymmetric information proxy measures (the dependent 
variables) were presented in chapter 5, table 5.1. 
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remains close to, or more than one for all indexes. So, substantial variations in the data 
remain. 
To examine the distribution of the data set for corporate governance indexes, Skewness 
and Kurtosis values have been calculated. Based on the measures of Skewness and 
Kurtosis as shown in table 6.3, the distribution of the data set resembles a non-normal 
distribution for most of the independent variables, as the Z-tests for Skewness and Kurtosis 
ratios were outside the range of±1.96 75 (Field, 2005). 
Table 6.3 
Skewness and Kurtosis for corporate governance indexes before data transformation 
Indexes Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Z-TEST 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Std. Error 
of Kurtosis 
Z-TEST 
Kurtosis 
CGAUDIT - 0.90 0.17 - 5.23 0.60 0.34 1.76 
CGBOARD - 0.61 0.17 - 3.53 - 0.50 0.34 - 1.46 
CGCOMP/OWN - 0.79 0.17 - 4.73 - 0.11 0.33 - 0.33 
TAKEOVERS - 3.62 0.19 - 19.57 11.43 0.37 31.05 
CG INDEX - 2.47 0.15 - 16.24 13.13 0.30 43.34 
CGINDUSTRY - 2.09 0.16 - 13.30 6.44 0.31 20.65 
Another way of looking at the problem of normal distribution is to see whether the 
distribution, as a whole, deviates from a comparable normal distribution. The Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov test compares the scores in the sample to a normally distributed set of scores. 
Table 6.4 represents the results of this test. All the dependent variables have p-values < 
0.05. Accordingly, we reject the assumption of normality for all the dependent variables. 
Table 6.4 
Tests of Normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov for corporate governance indexes before 
transformation of data 
Indexes Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic df Sig. Normality 
CGAUDIT 0.29 201 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
CGBOARD 0.27 201 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
CGCOMP/OWN 0.24 216 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
CGINDEX 0.11 257 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
CGTAKEOVERS 0.54 172 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
CGINDUSTRY 0.15 241 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
75 Z-test Skewness Ratio is significant if it is outside of±1.96 (indicating non-normality due to Skewness). 
Z Skewness ratio = (Skewness - 0) / Std. Error of Skewness 
Z-test Kurtosis Ratio is significant if it is outside oft 1.96 (indicating non-normality due to Kurtosis). 
Z Kurtosis ratio = (Kurtosis - 0) / Std. Error of Kurtosis 
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When variables are found to show non-normality, steps are taken to transform the data. We 
utilized the Normal Scores of the independent variables using Van der Waerden's Formula. 
This transformation technique was used in previously published studies on corporate 
governance (Cooke, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Al-Baluchi, 2006; Mangena and 
Tauringana, 2007). 
Table 6.5 presents the results of Skewness and Kurtosis for Normal Scores of corporate 
governance indexes. The distribution of the data set resembles a normal distribution for 
NCGINDEX and NCGINDUSTRY (continuous data), as the Z-tests for Skewness and 
Kurtosis ratios were within ±1.96. Conversely, the distribution of the data set resembles a 
non-normal distribution for NCGAUDIT, NCGBOARD, NCGCOMPENASATION and 
NCGTAKEOVERS (ordinal data), as the Z-tests for Skewness and Kurtosis ratios were 
outside ±1.96 (except for the Z-test of Kurtosis of NCGAUDIT, NCGBOARD and 
NCGCOMPENASATION which were within ±1.96). Also, all the independent variables 
have p-values < 0.05 (except NCGINDUSTRY) using the Kolmogorov-Smimov test of 
normality, as shown in table 6.6. This is because all data of these indexes are ordinal data 
(ranging from I to 5) and the values are concentrated in some values. For example, most of 
the UK companies in the sample have CGTAKEOVERS indexes equal to 5. So, because 
these values are important in the analysis, we will not exclude any of these values or 
variables. 
Table 6.5 
Skewness and Kurtosis for Normal Scores of corporate governance indexes after transformation 
of data using Van der Waerden's Formula 
Normal Scores of 
corporate governance 
indexes Skewness 
Std. Error of Z-TEST Kurtosis Std. Error Z-TEST 
using Van der Waerden's 
Skewness Skewness of Kurtosis Kurtosis 
Formula 
NCGAUDIT -0.61 0.17 - 3.53 - 0.61 0.34 - 1.78 
NCGBOARD -0.52 0.17 - 3.03 - 0.64 0.34 - 1.88 
NCGCOMP/OWN -0.54 0.17 - 3.29 - 0.63 0.33 - 1.91 
NCGTAKEOVERS -3.45 0.19 - 18.63 10.12 0.37 27.47 
NCGINDEX 0.00 0.15 - 0.01 - 0.20 0.30 - 0.67 
NCGINDUSTRY - 0.04 0.16 - 0.29 - 0.31 0.31 - 1.01 
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Table 6.6 
Tests of Normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov for Normal Scores of corporate governance 
indexes after transformation of data 
Normal Scores of corporate Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
governance indexes 
using Van der Waerden s Formula 
Statistic df Sig. Normality 
NCGAUDIT 0.11 378 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NCGBOARD 0.30 201 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NCGCOMP/OWN 0.28 201 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NCGINDEX 0.25 216 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NCGTAKEOVERS 0.54 172 0.00 Not normal since p-value<0.05 
NCGINDUSTRY 0.02 241 0.20 Normal since p-value>0.05 
Because there are some contradictions regarding the normality of data (after transformation 
using Van der Waerden's Formula) using the measures of Skewness and Kurtosis (as 
shown in table 6.5) and the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (as shown in table 6.6), 
we use the normal distribution curves for the independent corporate governance variables 
and indexes as shown in appendix 1, figure 2. From these curves it is clear that most of the 
independent variables, after transformation, are at least approximately normally distributed 
because the shapes of curves resemble the bell-shape. But, NCGAUDIT, NCGBOARD, 
NCGCOMPENASATION and NCGTAKEOVERS do not exhibit normal distribution 
curves. This result supports the results of Skewness and Kurtosis and the results of the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests regarding non-normality of these four indexes. 
To sum up, we accept the assumption of normality for CGINDUSTRY and CGINDEX 
after data transformation, and reject the assumption of normality for NCGAUDIT, 
NCGBOARD, NCGCOMPENASATION and NCGTAKEOVERS76. However, for these 
four indexes, notably NCGAUDIT, NCGBOARD, NCGCOMPENASATION and 
NCGTAKEOVERS, we will bear in mind that these variables are not normally distributed 
when interpreting the results that assume normality. 
76 We will consider the non-normality distribution of these variables in interpreting the results. 
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6.4 The Pearson Correlation between Corporate Governance 
Indexes, Variables and Asymmetric Information Proxy 
Measures77 
This section discusses the Pearson correlations between corporate governance indexes, 
asymmetric information proxy measures and corporate governance variables, as shown in 
table 6.778. The Pearson correlation is examined as follows: 
6.4.1 The Pearson Correlation between Corporate Governance Indexes 
and Variables (the Independent Variables) 
Table 6.7 (panel A) provides the Pearson correlation between corporate governance 
variables and indexes. There are significant positive and negative correlations between 
corporate governance variables and corporate governance indexes. For example 
NCGBOARD is significantly positively related to NBSIZE (0.22**), NNONEXESIZE 
(0.34**), NSPLIT (0.24**), NNONEXECHAIR (0.28**), NCEOBENFITS (0.18*) and 
NINSIDERSSIZE (0.19**). Also, NCGBOARD is significantly negatively related to 
NINSIDERSOWN (-0.33**), NBLOCKOWN (- 0.21**) and NLARGESTOWNER (- 
0.20**). The same results are found using NCGINDEX and NCGINDUSTRY. 
NCGINDEX and NCGINDUSTRY are significantly and positively related to NBSIZE, 
NNONEXESIZE, NSPLIT, NNONEXECHAIR, NCEOBENFITS and NINSIDERSSIZE. 
Also, NCGINDEX and NCGINDUSTRY are significantly and negatively related to 
NINSIDERSOWN, NBLOCKOWN and NLARGESTOWNER. 
These results reflect that corporate governance variables - which are collected from 
companies' annual reports - are consistent with the values of corporate governance indexes 
which are collected from the Bloomberg Database. For example, the positive relationship 
between NCGBOARD and NBSIZE, NNONEXESIZE, NSPLIT, NNONEXECHAIR 
reflects that any increase in these corporate governance variables will increase the value of 
NCGBOARD, and vice versa. That means corporate governance variables replicate 
" We use the transformed data (using Van der Waerden's Formula) for all the dependent and independent 
variables in preparing the Pearson correlation matrix (table 5.12). 
78 The Pearson correlations between corporate governance variables and asymmetric information were 
discussed in chapter 5, table 5.11. So, table 6.7 does not include these correlations. 
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information about corporate governance indexes, and conversely, corporate governance 
indexes replicate information about corporate governance variables. This interdependence 
relationship means that corporate governance variables and indexes complement each 
other. So, we have proposed that corporate governance variables and indexes could be used 
as collaborative tools in interpreting the causes of asymmetric information. Moreover, we 
will examine if we can predict the values of corporate governance indexes using corporate 
governance variables in chapter 7. 
6.4.2 The Pearson Correlation between Corporate Governance Indexes 
Table 6.7 (panel B) presents the results of the Pearson correlation between corporate 
governance indexes. All of the corporate governance indexes are significantly positively 
correlated (except NCGTAKEOVERS). For example, NCGINDEX is significantly 
positively related to NCGAUDIT (0.42**), NCGBOARD (0.67**), 
NCGCOMPEANSATION (0.29**) and NCGINDUSTRY (0.87**). This result reflects the 
strong relationship between corporate governance indexes in the UK capital market. That 
is, if a company has a "good" score on NCGBOARD, it tends to have a "good" score in 
NCAUDIT as well. Accordingly, we expect that all indexes will have the same effect on 
asymmetric information. NCGTAKEOVERS reflects weak correlations with the other 
corporate governance indexes. This is because most of the UK companies in the sample 
have CGTAKEOVERS indexes equal to 5. 
6.4.3 The Pearson Correlation between Corporate Governance Indexes 
(the Independent Variables) and Asymmetric Information Proxy 
Measures (the Dependent Variables) 
Table 6.7 (panel B) presents the Pearson correlation results between corporate governance 
indexes and asymmetric information proxy measures. Most of the corporate governance 
indexes are negatively related to asymmetric information proxy measures (except 
NCGTAKEOVERS). For example, NSPREADRATIO and NVOLATILITY are 
significantly negatively related to NCGAUDIT, NCGBOARD, NCGINDISTRY and 
NCGINDEX. NVOLUME is significantly positively related to NCGAUDIT, 
NCGBOARD, NCGCOMP/OWN NCGINDISTRY and NCGINDEX. These results 
confirm the same results of chapter five, that the higher the quality of corporate governance 
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(measured by the rate of corporate governance indexes, the lower the degree of asymmetric 
information. 
Table 6.7 
The Pearson correlation between all corporate governance indexes, asymmetric information proxy 
measures and corporate governance variables 
Panel A: The Pearson correlation between all corporate governance indexes and corporate governance 
variables 
NCGAUDIT NCGBOARD N COMPENSATION NCGTAKEOVERS NCGINDEX NCGINDUSTRY 
N BSIZE 0.111 . 217(**) . 149(*) -0.019 . 204(**) . 246(**) 
NONEXESIZE 0.1 . 337(**) . 166(*) 0.006 . 361(** . 387(**) 
N SPLIT . 217(**) 
0.052 0.078 . 290(**) . 296(**) 
N NONEXECHAIR 0.05 . 281(*") 
0.016 0.068 . 278(**) . 299(**) 
N RCSIZE 0.132 . 206(**) 0.067 
0.037 . 184(**) . 228(**) 
N NCSIZE 0.113 . 239(**) 0.1 
0.021 . 254(**) . 261(**) 
ACSIZE . 167(*) . 205(**) 0.125 
0.021 . 216(**) . 251 *' 
N BOARDMEETINGS -0.046 -0.07 -0.051 0.092 -0.026 -0.035 
N RCMEETS 0.124 . 233(**) 0.029 0.122 . 187(**) 0.122 
N ACMEETS . 139(*) . 285(**) 
0.123 0.093 . 244(**) . 253(**) 
N NCMEETS . 149(*) . 222(**) . 168(" -0.02 . 234(**) . 183(**) 
FEMALTOBOARD 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.1 -0.11 
N CEOSALARY -. 158(* -. 168(" -0.077 -0.047 -. 207(*' -. 204(**) 
N CEOBENFITS . 173(*) . 182(**) 0.084 0.047 . 199(*` . 193(**) 
N CEOLONGCOMP 0.057 0.101 0.065 0.116 0.057 0.071 
N BENFITS -0.069 0.027 -0.072 -0.021 -0.035 0.018 
N INSIDERSOWN -. 186("* -. 329(*' -0.028 -0.108 -. 305(**) -. 300(*" 
N INSIDERSSIZE . 230(**) . 190(--) 172(*) 0.033 . 272(**) . 247(*` 
N BLOCKOWN -. 256(** -. 
205(** -. 172(*) -0.056 -. 270(**) -. 277(**) 
N BLOCKSIZE -0.068 -0.098 0.009 -0.042 -0.081 -0.086 
N LARGEST OWNER -. 280(**) -. 192(` -. 181 ` 0.001 -. 274(**) -. 269(**) 
N DEBTTOCAPITAL 0.114 . 146(*) -0.091 0.031 0.119 0.107 
N LONGDEBTTOCAPITAL 0.122 . 200(** -0.065 0.031 . 124 *) 0.119 
NCOMPANYSIZE . 245(**) . 408(**) . 231(** 0.074 . 367(* *) . 364(**) 
Panel B: The Pearson correlation between corporate governance indexes and asymmetric information 
proxy measures 
SPREADRATIO -. 166(*) -. 347(** -. 218(**) -0.041 
7334(** 
-. 316(**) 
N VOLUME . 181 " . 450(**) . 204(**) 
0.088 . 355(**) . 347(**) 
N VOLATILITY -. 190(*" -. 171 *) -0.045 -0.013 -. 198 *" -. 150(*) 
NLEVERAGE 0.083 0.123 -0.033 0.005 0.09 0.08 
N CGAUDIT 1 . 467(**) 0.068 0.01 . 424(**) . 392(*" 
N CGBOARD 1 0.062 0.114 . 665(**) . 607(**) 
N COMPENSATION 
1 -0.097 . 
285(**) 
. 
286(**) 
NCGTAKEOVERS 1 0.076 0.032 
N CGINDEX 1 . 
866(**) 
N CGINDUSTRY 1 
No` to The Pearson correlation between corporate governance variables and asymmetric intormation proxy measures was mentioned in chapter 5, table 5.11. 
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6.5 The Multiple Regression Analysis between Asymmetric 
Information Proxy Measures and Corporate Governance Indexes 
In this section we use Corporate Governance Quintile Indexes (ratings) to examine its effect 
on asymmetric information. These indexes were collected from the Bloomberg Database for 
the whole sample, which includes 392 non-financial UK companies listed in the London 
Stock Exchange from 2003 to 200679. These indexes are divided into two groups. The first 
group are the sub-indexes which include: CGBOARD, CGAUDIT, CGCOMP/OWN and 
CGTAKEOVERS. The second group are general indexes, which are CGINDUSTRY and 
CGINDEX. 
As we stated in chapter 5, before running regression analysis, the data were checked to 
evaluate the regression analysis assumptions. The same procedures for verifying the 
regression analysis assumptions will be conducted prior to running any regression model 
throughout the following analysis. First, all variables were checked for normality of 
distribution. Some indexes show non-normal distributions because the data sets of these 
variables are ordinal data. Second, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was calculated for 
each variable to check multicollinearity. All multiple regression models derived in the study 
had VIF statistics below the level of 580. Third, all regression models were checked for 
normality of residuals. All regressions' residuals were normally distributed (see appendix 2). 
Also, the histograms of regression standardized residuals were normally distributed for most 
of the variables. The histograms of regression standardized residuals resemble the bell-shape 
normal curve (see appendix 2). Fourth, hetroskedasticity was examined for all regressions 
using the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test. No hetroskedasticity had been found in any 
regression model81. 
79 We unified the year of analysis between corporate governance variables and indexes. For example, if the data 
of corporate governance mechanisms, which are collected from companies' annual reports, are for the year 
2006, we collect the indexes for the same year of 2006. 
SOThe rule of thumb is that any VIF of 10 or more provides evidence of serious multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 
2003). 
81 See tables 6.8 and 6.9. It is clear that the significance of Chi2 is more than 5% in all regressions. That means 
there is no hetroskedasticity. 
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6.5.1 The Multiple Regression Analysis between Asymmetric Information 
Proxy Measures and Corporate Governance Sub-Indexes 
Table 6.8 presents the main results of the multiple regression analysis between the normal 
scores of asymmetric information proxy measures as dependent variables and the normal 
scores of corporate governance sub-indexes82. Using NSPREADRATIO, NVOLATILITY 
and NVOLUME as proxy measures for asymmetric information, the models are significant at 
the 5% level of significance since the F-test significance was < 0.05. The R2 values of 
NSPREADRATIO, NVOLATILITY and NVOLUME are 0.13,0.07, and 0.20, respectively. 
The NLEVERAGE model is not significant at the 10% level since the F-test significance was 
0.76. 
Table 6.8 
The main results of the multiple regression analysis between the normal scores of asymmetric 
information proxy measures as dependent variables and the normal scores of corporate governance 
sub-indexes 
NSPREAD (+) Sig. NVOLATILITY(+) Sig. NVOLUNIE(-) Sig. NLEVERAGE(-) Sig. 
Model SUMMARY 
Number of observations 161 161 161 160 
R Square 0.13 0.07 0.20 0.01 
Adjusted R Square 0.11 0,041 0.18 0.01 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
0.81 0.871 0.74 0.86 
F 5.81**' 0.00 2.69*** 0.03 9.56*** 0.00 0.47 0.76 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook- 
Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity 
chi2(1 
0.79 0.37 0.03 0.86 2.82 0.09 1.44 0.23 
MAIN VARIABLES Coef P>t Cod. P>t Cod. P>t Cod. P>t 
(Constant) 
_ 0.38*** 0.00 - 0.01 0.85 0.36*** 0.00 0.08 0.26 
NCGAUDIT 0.04 0.70 - 0.20* 0.07 - 0.05 0.57 - 0.00 0.99 
NCGBOARD 0.31*** 0.00 - 0.16 0.12 0.43*** 0.00 0.11 0.26 
NCGCONIP/OWN 0.19*** 0.01 0.04 0.65 0.18*** 0.01 - 0.04 0.64 
NCGTAKEOVERS 0.03 0.90 0.27 0.32 0.10 0.67 - 0.16 0.55 
Note: From the correlation matrix between the dependent variables, NSPREADRATIO and NVOLATILITY are positively related to 
asymmetric information, but NVOLUME and NLEVERAGE are negatively related to asymmetric information. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
82 Note that we use the transformed values of each variable in the regression. As stated before in chapter 5, 
when variables are found to show non-normality, steps were taken to transform the data. We utilized the 
Normal Scores of the dependent variables using Van der Waerden's Formula. This transformation technique 
was used in previously published studies on corporate governance (Cooke, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Al- 
Baluchi, 2006; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). 
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The regression models using NSPREADRATIO, NVOLATILITY and NVOLUME as proxy 
measures of asymmetric information are summarized by the following equations. 
YSPREADR4TIO =-0.38 -0.04 CGAUDIT - 0.31 CG1IOARD -0.19 CGCOMP/OWN - 0.03 CGTAKEOVERS 
YVOLATIIJTY = -0.01 - 0.20 CGAUDIT - 0.16 CGBOARD + 0.04 CGCOMP/OWN + 0.27 CG'1'AKEOVEKS 
YVOLUME = 0.36 - 0.05 CGAUDIT + 0.43 CGBOARD + 0.18 CGCOMP/OWN + 0.10 CGTAKEOVERS 
The results of the Pearson correlation (table 6.7) and the multiple regression models (table 
6.8) indicated that asymmetric information measured by NSPREADRATIO and 
NVOLUME 83 are negatively significantly related to NCGBOARD and NCGCOMP/OWN. 
These results mean that the higher the rate of Corporate Governance Quintile for Board, and 
Corporate Governance Quintile for Compensation and Stock Ownership, the lower the 
degree of asymmetric information. Also, the results indicated that NVOLATILITY is 
negatively and significantly related to NCGAUDIT. These results mean that the higher the 
rate of Corporate Governance Quintile for Audit, the lower the volatility of the stock price, 
and consequently the lower the degree of asymmetric information. All other variables in the 
regressions are not significantly related to asymmetric information at the 10% level of 
significance. 
The negative relationship of NCGBOARD to asymmetric information supports the results of 
chapter five, which find a negative relationship between board size and composition and 
asymmetric information. Also, the results reach new conclusions regarding the sub-factors of 
NCGBOARD which include governance committee, changes in board size, cumulative 
voting, boards served on as CEO or other than CEO, former CEOs, board guidelines, 
response to shareholder proposals and board vacancies. The higher the rate of NCGBOARD, 
the higher the quality of these factors, and accordingly, the lower the degree of asymmetric 
information. The result supports hypothesis one (H6.1) that "There is a negative relationship 
between the rates of CGBOARD and the degree of asymmetric information". Moreover, the 
results support the results of Cai et al. (2006), Rutherford and Buchholtz (2007), 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2007), and Hsiang-tsai (2005) that changes in bid-ask spreads are 
significantly negatively related to board independence. Accordingly, the higher the 
83 Note that the other indexes are negatively related to asymmetric information (measured by 
NSPREADRATIO) but they are not significant. That means all indexes are negatively related to 
asymmetric information. So, the higher the rate of any index, the lower the degree of asymmetric 
information. 
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proportion of outside directors on a board, the lower the degree of asymmetric information. 
Consistent with agency theory predictions, these findings suggest that vigilant boards are 
likely to take actions aimed at reducing the level of information asymmetry. 
The negative relation of NCGAUDIT to asymmetric information supports the results of 
chapter five, which find a negative relationship between audit committee's size and meetings. 
Moreover, the results reflect a new result regarding the sub-factors of NCGAUDIT which 
include audit fees, auditor rotation and auditor ratification. The higher the rate of 
NCGAUDIT, the higher the quality of these factors, and accordingly, the lower the degree of 
asymmetric information. The result supports hypothesis (H6.2) that "There is a negative 
relationship between the rates of CGA UDIT and the degree of asymmetric information': 
The acceptance of H6.1 and H6.2 supports our hypothesis in chapter 5 (H4.1, H4.2, H4.3 and 
H4.4) that board and committees' size, composition and activity are very important corporate 
governance mechanisms in solving the agency problem and mitigating asymmetric 
information. 
The negative relation of NCGCOMP/OWN to asymmetric information supports the results of 
chapter five which find a negative relationship between CEO's benefits, CEO's long-term 
benefits and executives' long- and short-term compensation schemes with asymmetric 
information. Also, this index includes new sub-factors of NCGCOMP/OWN which are cost 
of option plans, option re-pricing, shareholder approval of option plans, compensation 
committee interlocks, director compensation, pension plans for non-employee directors, 
option expensing, option bum rate and corporate loans. The higher the rate of 
NCGCOMP/OWN, the higher the quality of these factors, and accordingly, the lower the 
degree of asymmetric information. Moreover, these results are consistent with the results of 
Florackis and Ozkan (2008), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Tevlin (1996), and Wruck (1993) 
that a better solution is to grant CEOs and managers a highly contingent, long-term incentive 
contract ex-ante to align their interests with those of investors. 
Additionally, the negative relation of NCGCOMP/OWN to asymmetric information supports 
some results regarding ownership structure. This index include new sub-factors which are 
executive stock ownership guidelines, director stock ownership guidelines and officer and 
director stock ownership. The higher the rate of NCGCOMP/OWN, the higher the quality of 
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these factors, and accordingly, the lower the degree of asymmetric information84. The results 
show the importance of the ownership structure as a corporate governance mechanism in 
mitigating asymmetric information, as stated by Denis and McConnell (2003) and Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997). The result supports hypothesis three (H6.3) that "There is a negative 
relationship between the rates of CGCOMP/OWN and the degree of asymmetric 
information" 
But, the value of the index is not enough to explain how ownership structure could be a good 
corporate governance mechanism. The index does not reflect the type of ownership 
(institutional, individual or managerial ownership) or the ratio of ownership for each type. In 
this case, our discussions in chapter five could help in interpreting the relationship between 
ownership structure and asymmetric information. This result clarifies the interdependence 
relationship between corporate governance variables and indexes, and it is better to use both 
variables and indexes in studying the effect of corporate governance on asymmetric 
information. 
To sum up, the negative relation of corporate governance indexes to asymmetric information 
produce new results in the UK capital market. First, there is a high degree of compliance with 
the combined code on corporate governance (2003). Most of the UK companies in our 
sample have higher rates in corporate governance indexes which are related to board, audit, 
compensation and ownership, and takeovers. This compliance increases the quality of 
corporate governance and leads to mitigation of asymmetric information. Second, there is 
interdependence between corporate governance variables and indexes. Corporate governance 
indexes and corporate governance proxy variables reach the same conclusions. Accordingly, 
investors and management in the UK companies could use corporate governance indexes and 
variables as alternatives to evaluate corporate governance quality, and to identify the 
weaknesses which may cause the agency problem or asymmetric information problem. 
6.5.2 The Simple Regression Analysis between Asymmetric Information 
Proxy Measures and Corporate Governance General Indexes 
Table 6.9 presents the main results of the simple regression analysis between the normal 
scores of asymmetric information proxy measures as dependent variables and the normal 
84 Unfortunately, we cannot find any information about the way in which the ISS used to evaluate the sub-index 
factors. So, we just mention that the higher the rate of the index, the higher the quality of these sub-indexes, and 
accordingly, the lower the degree of asymmetric information. 
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scores of the corporate governance general index (NCGINDEX)85. Using NSPREADRATIO, 
NVOLATILITY and NVOLUME as proxy measures for asymmetric information, the models 
are significant at the 1% level of significance since the F-test significance was 0.000. The R2 
values of NSPREADRATIO, NVOLATILITY, and NVOLUME are 0.11,0.04 and 0.13, 
respectively. The NLEVERAGE model is not significant at the 10% level since the F-test 
significance was 0.15 
Table 6.9 
The main results of the simple regression analysis between the normal scores of asymmetric 
information proxy measures as dependent variables and the normal scores of corporate governance 
genera( index (NCGINDEX 
SPREAD (+) Sig. VOLATILITY(+) Sig. VOLUME(-) Sig. LEVERAGE(-) Sig. 
Model summary 
Number of observations 255 254 255 240 
R Square 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.01 
Adjusted R Square 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.01 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.80 0.88 0.81 0.87 
F 31.85*** 0.00 10.23*** 0.00 36.39** 0.00 2.06 0.15 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook- 
Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity 
chit 1.68 0.195 0.78 0.378 2.12 0.146 0.86 0.354 
MAIN VARIABLES Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(Constant) 
- 0.36*** 0.00 - 0.04 0.43 0.33*** 0.00 0.15*** 0.01 
NCGINDEX 
- 0.29*** 0.00 - 0.18*** 0.00 0.31*** 0.00 0.08 0.15 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The full regression model using NSPREADRATIO, NVOLATILITY and NVOLUME as 
proxy measures of asymmetric information is summarized by the following equations: 
From table 6.9 the results indicated that NSPREADRATIO and NVOLATILITY are 
significantly and negatively related to NCGINDEX, and NVOLUME is significantly and 
positively related to NCGINDEX. That means the higher the rate of NCGINDEX, the lower 
the degree of asymmetric information. Because NCGINDEX is a general index, the higher 
the rate of NCGINDEX, the higher the quality of corporate governance in the UK companies. 
as Note that we followed the same econometric steps as previously discussed in section 4.5. 
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Accordingly, the higher the quality of corporate governance, the lower the degree of 
asymmetric information, and vice versa. This result supports hypothesis six (H6.6) that 
"There is a negative relationship between the rates of CGINDEX and the degree of 
asymmetric information" 
As an additional step, we repeat the last regression using the normal scores of the Corporate 
Governance Quintile for Industry (NCGINDUSTRY). The main objective of this step is in 
examining the effect of corporate governance indexes on asymmetric information at the 
industry level. Table 6.10 presents the main results of the simple regression analysis between 
the normal scores of asymmetric information proxy measures as dependent variables, and the 
normal scores of the corporate governance industry index (NCGINDUSTRY). Using 
NSPREADRATIO, NVOLATILITY and NVOLUME as proxy measures for asymmetric 
information, the models are significant at the 5% level of significance since the F-test 
significances were 0.05. The R2 values of NSPREADRATIO, NVOLATILITY and 
NVOLUME are 0.10,0.02 and 0.20, respectively. The NLEVERAGE model is not 
significant at the 10% level since the F-test significance was 0.22. 
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Table 6.10 
The main results of the simple regression anal sis using corporate governance industry index 
SPREAD (+) Sig. VOLATILITY(+) Sig. VOLUME(-) Sig. LEVERAGE(-) Sig. 
Model SUMMARY 
Number of observations 240 238 239 240 
R Square 0.10 0.02 0.12 . 01 
Adjusted R Square 0.10 0.02 . 12 . 00 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.79 0.88 0.80 0.87 
F 26.46*** 0.00 5.43** 0.02 32.54*** 0.00 1.52 0.22 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook- 
Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity 
chit 
0.77 0.38 0.07 0.794 0.93 0.34 1.66 0.20 
MAIN VARIABLES 
(Constant) -0.34*** 0.00 -0.05 0.43 0.33*** 0.00 0.18*** 0.00 
NCGINDUSTRY -0.27*** 0.00 -0.14** 0.02 0.30*** 0.00 0.07 0.22 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The full regression model using NSPREADRATIO, NVOLATILITY, and NVOLUME as 
proxy measures of asymmetric information is summarized by the following equations: 
Y SPREADRATIO =-0.34 - 0.27 NCCINDIJSTRI' 
Y VOLATILITY =-0.05 - 0.14 NCGINDUSTRY 
Y VOLUNI E=0.33 + 0.30 NCC INDUSTRI' 
The results confirm the previous results of table 6.9, and indicate that NSPREADRATIO and 
NVOLATILITY are significantly and negatively related to NCGINDUSTRY, and 
NVOLUME is significantly and positively related to N CGINDUSTRY. That means the 
higher the rate of NCGINDUSTRY, the lower the degree of asymmetric information. The 
result supports hypothesis five (H6.5) that "There is a negative relations/rip between the 
rates of CGINDUSTRY and the degree of asymmetric information': 
The Pearson correlation, simple regression and multiple regression results support the results 
of Kelton and Yang (2008), Chen et al. (2007), and Webb (2006) that higher corporate 
governance indexes' rates are related to higher corporate governance quality, and as a result, 
mitigate asymmetric information. All in all, these results support our main hypothesis (H6.6) 
that "There is a negative relationship between the rates of corporate governance indexes 
and the degree of asymmetric information". The acceptance of this hypothesis reflects that 
most of the UK companies are in compliance with the combined code of corporate 
governance, which increases corporate governance quality and at the same time mitigates 
asymmetric information problems between managers and stockholders. 
181 
6.6 Conclusion 
The effect of corporate governance mechanisms (measured by corporate governance indexes) 
on asymmetric information have been examined in this chapter. The descriptive statistics, 
Pearson correlation, simple and multiple regression results (tables 6.2,6.3,6.7,6.8,6.9 and 
6.10) reflect the following conclusions. 
First, the results indicated that NCGBOARD, NCGAUDIT and NCGCOMP/OWN (as sub- 
indexes of corporate governance) are negatively and significantly related to asymmetric 
information. These results mean that the higher the rate of Corporate Governance Quintile for 
Board, Corporate Governance Quintile for Audit and Corporate Governance Quintile for 
Compensation and Stock Ownership, the lower the degree of asymmetric information. 
Second, NCGTAKEOVERS did not exhibit any significant relation to asymmetric 
information. That is because most (more than 95%) of the UK companies have rated 5 out of 
5 in takeovers. We conclude that the takeovers sub-index (as a number) of corporate 
governance is not enough to show the differences between the UK companies regarding 
takeovers. The differences between the UK companies' takeover provisions may show the 
relationship between takeovers and asymmetric information. 
Third, the results indicate that NSPREADRATIO and NVOLATILITY are significantly and 
negatively related to NCGINDEX, and NVOLUME is significantly and positively related to 
NCGINDEX. That means the higher the rate of NCGINDEX, the lower the degree of 
asymmetric information. From this result we conclude that the higher the quality of corporate 
governance, the lower the degree of asymmetric information, and vice versa. 
Fourth, NLEVERAGE does not exhibit any significant relation to corporate governance in 
general, or to sub-indexes. This result supports the weakness of Leverage ratio as a measure 
of asymmetric information in the UK capital market. 
Fifth, the results indicate that NSPREADRATIO and NVOLATILITY are significantly and 
negatively related to NCGINDUSTRY, and NVOLUME is significantly and positively 
related to CGINDUSTRY. That means the higher the rate of NCGINDUSTRY, the lower the 
degree of asymmetric information. 
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Sixth, the results of chapter six confirmed the results of chapter 5, that ownership structure 
are important and can improve corporate governance indexes. Conversely, the sub-factors 
which form corporate governance indexes could be used as additional corporate governance 
variables. To sum up, corporate governance variables and indexes support each other in 
interpreting the negative relationship with asymmetric information. 
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CHAPTER 7 
PREDICTING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEXES' 
VALUES AND THE DEGREE OF ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION USING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
VARIABLES 
7.1 Introduction 
The results of chapter five suggested that NONEXESIZE, CEOBENFITS, 
INSIDERSOWN, INSIDERSSIZE, BLOCKOWN and LONGDEBTTOCAPITAL are 
the most important corporate governance variables. These variables explained 
significant negative relationships with asymmetric information. Also, the results of 
chapter six suggested that CGBOARD, CGAUDIT, CGCOMP/OWN, CGINDEX and 
CGINDUSTRY are negatively and significantly related to asymmetric information. As 
a result, we concluded that this set of corporate governance variables (which include 
NONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSOWN, NINSIDERSSIZE, 
NBLOCKOWN and NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL) could be used as a package to 
predict corporate governance indexes' values and the degree of asymmetric 
information. 
The corporate governance indexes are used as short-hand, accessible, single value 
summary statistics for those stakeholders wishing to know whether the company has a 
"good" corporate governance structure. An unresolved issue is whether these indexes 
actually measure the quality of corporate governance. We know from chapter six that 
these indexes are associated with corporate governance proxies in our sample. 
However, if these indexes actually measure the quality of corporate governance then 
values of corporate governance proxies, used by the literature to measure corporate 
governance, should be related to the values of the indexes in an out of sample test. 
Accordingly, the first objective of this chapter is using corporate governance variables 
to predict corporate governance indexes' rates using the ordered probit regression 
analysis. For example, if an investor needs to construct his investment portfolio and 
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believes that corporations with higher corporate governance standards form a "better" 
investment, and the corporate governance index values are missing for a group of 
companies, then being able to anticipate the corporate governance index values will 
enable him to select the companies that have higher standards of corporate governance. 
The second objective of this chapter is using corporate governance variables to predict 
the degree of asymmetric information using the probit regression. If the corporate 
governance variables actually predict the degree of asymmetric information in an out of 
sample test, all stakeholders of the company can use these predictions in building their 
investment and financial strategies. For example, some banks consider the importance 
of asymmetric information in the debt maturity decision. "Low-risk" companies will 
have low degrees of asymmetric information and so will qualify for long term loans. 
Accordingly, being able to anticipate the degree of asymmetric information values will 
enable them to select the companies that have a lower degree of asymmetric 
information, and then take a suitable decision for debt maturity of long-term loans86. 
In the next section, the methodological issues of the ordered probit and the probit 
regressions used to predict corporate governance indexes' values and the degree of 
asymmetric information will be discussed. Then, we will present the results of ordered 
probit and probit regressions. 
7.2 The Methodology of Probit and Ordered Probit 
Regressions 
The probit and ordered probit regression models have been used by a number of papers 
in the literature on corporate governance (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Werner and 
Zimmermann, 2006; Chen et al., 2006; Gruszczynski, 2006; Fich and White, 2005). 
Accordingly, we will follow the methodology of these papers. 
In this section, the analysis includes two empirical studies that will be carried out. The 
first will use ordered probit to predict corporate governance indexes' values (as 
dependent variables) using corporate governance variables (as independent variables). 
We depend on the ordered probit regression because the data of corporate governance 
86 For more details about this example see Berger et al. (2005 and 2006). 
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indexes is ordinal. The main objective of this step is to determine whether corporate 
governance variables can be used to predict corporate governance indexes' rates. 
Accordingly, can we anticipate the rates of corporate governance indexes through the 
values of corporate governance variables? The anticipated values of corporate 
governance indexes could help all stakeholders in building their investment plans and 
in making decisions. 
The second study will use ordinary probit to predict asymmetric information (as 
measured by SPREADRATIO, VOLUME, VOLATILITY, and LEVERAGE) using 
corporate governance variables (as independent variables). As explained in detail later, 
we transform the SPREADRATIO, VOLUME, VOLATILITY, and LEVERAGE data 
into binary form so that the probit regression method is appropriate. The main objective 
of this step is to determine whether corporate governance variables can be used to 
predict the degree of asymmetric information. Accordingly, can we anticipate the 
degree of asymmetric information for a specific company through the values of 
corporate governance variables? 
7.2.1 Using the Ordered Probit to Predict Corporate Governance 
Indexes 
In this section the ordered probit analysis will include the general and sub-indexes of 
corporate governance, specifically: CGAUDIT, CGBOARD, CGCOMP/OWN, 
CGINDEX and CGINDUSTRY87. Because the data set of CGINDEX and 
CGINDUSTRY is continuous (ranging from 0% to 100%), we transform it into ordinal 
data so that the ordered probit regression method is appropriate. For CGINDEX and 
CGINDUSTRY we developed a scale from five points and divided the data as follows: 
- If the actual value is from 0% to 20% the transformed value will be 1. 
- If the actual value is from 21% to 40% the transformed value will be 2. 
- If the actual value is from 41% to 60% the transformed value will be 3. 
- If the actual value is from 61% to 80% the transformed value will be 4. 
- If the actual value is from 81 % to 100% the transformed value will be 5. 
87 We exclude the CGTAKEOVERS index because this index did not reflect any significant relation to 
asymmetric information (see table 6.8). 
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We develop an ordered probit model that can predict the value of each corporate 
governance index using corporate governance variables. The standard ordered probit 
model is widely used to analyze ordinal data and is built around a regression of the 
following form: 
jai=X I+E 
Where x and ß are standard variable and parameter matrices, and E is a vector matrix of 
normally distributed error terms (Yang and Raehsler, 2005). 
Because the rate of corporate governance indexes (Y) is ranked from I to 5 (discrete 
data) so, Y has 5 ordered categories (1,2,3,4 and 5). For ordered probit estimation, the 
normal distribution curve is cut into 5 sections by 4 cut points. STATA software will 
estimate these as µl, p2, µ3, and µ4 by the maximum likelihood procedure. 
-Y= 1 (or rank of 1) If Xiß < µl ................................................ (1) 
" Y= 2 (or rank of 2) If µl < Xiß < µ2 ......................................... (2) 
" Y= 3 (or rank of 3) If µ2 < Xiß < µ3 .......................................... (3) 
"Y=4 (or rank of 4) If µ3< Xiß < µ4 .......................................... (4) 
"Y=5 (or rank of 5) If Xiß > µ4 ................................................ (5) 
The multiple regression form for this stage is stated as follows: 
Yi=a+ß1 X1i+ß2X2i+ß3X3i+......... +(36X61+ci ..........,. (6) 
Where Yi can take one of the values of: 
YCGBOARD = Quintile ranking within index peers for Corporate Governance Quintile 
(CGQ) board characteristics 
YcGcoMPiowN = Quintile ranking within index peers for CGQ ownership and 
compensation characteristics 
YCGAUD! T = Quintile ranking within index peers for CGQ audit characteristics 
YcGINDUSTRY = Quintile rating relative to industry peers 
YCGINDEX = Quintile rating relative to all industries 
a= Regression intercept 
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Xi = the normal score of non-executive directors size (NNONEXESIZE) 
X2 = the normal score of the ratio of CEO benefits and bonuses (NCEOBENFITS) 
X3 = the normal score of the ratio of insiders' ownership (NINSIDERSOWN) 
X4= the normal score of insiders' size (NINSIDERSSIZE) 
X5 = the normal score of the ratio of block-holders ownership (NBLOCKOWN) 
X6 = the normal score of long-term debt/total capital (NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL) 
and, 
Ei = the random error term 
Because there are five corporate governance indexes in this research, we use equation 6 
five times. Depending on the model, we can predict the values of corporate governance 
indexes using corporate governance variables. To do so, we use the same sample which 
is used in chapter 5 and 6 (392 non-financial companies listed in the London Stock 
Exchange). The time period of analysis for all companies falls between 2003 and 2006. 
The data of corporate governance indexes and variables are divided into two categories. 
The first category includes "in sample data" which is used to calculate the ordered 
probit regression. The second category includes "out of sample data"88. The out of 
sample data are used to test the accuracy of the ordered probit results. We used a 
"systematic sampling" method. We sorted our data alphabetically by company name 
and then used every fourth company from our data set to construct "out of sample 
data". The rest of the companies construct "in sample data"89. 
Furthermore, the prior regression coefficients will be used to compute the linear 
predictor (x*beta) for each observation90. The linear predictor will generate the 
predicted value (yi). Then, the predicted values (yi) will be compared with the actual 
values of corporate governance indexes (using the out of sample data). Next, the 
absolute value of the forecast error will be calculated using the following equation: 
Ei= I Yi - yi 
I 
................................................ (7) 
"The size of the out of and in sample data will be different in every regression model since the data is 
not available for all variables for all companies. 
89 The number of observations changes according to the availability of data for each index. 
90We calculated the linear predictor using STATA software. It creates the variable That containing the 
linear predictor (x*beta) for each observation. 
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Where: 
Ei is the forecast error for company i, 
yi is the forecast value of the index for company i, and 
Yi is the actual value of the index for company i. 
If the Ei of company (i) equals zero, that means the actual value of the index equals the 
predicted value and we count it as a success. On the other hand, if the Ei of company (i) 
is more than zero, that means the actual value of the index is not equal to the predicted 
value and we count it as a fail. Then, we will measure the ratio of prediction failure and 
success following Howe and Olsen (2006), as follows: 
Prediction fail = (7_ Ei / sample size)*100 ............... (8) 
% Prediction success= 100% -% Prediction fail ............... (9) 
The closer the prediction fail ratio is to zero, the higher the forecasting accuracy and the 
higher the accuracy of the ordered probit model in predicting the rates of corporate 
governance indexes. 
7.2.2 Using Ordinary Probit to Predict Asymmetric Information 
Chapters five and six show that the relationship between corporate governance 
variables and the degree of asymmetric information is negative. Accordingly, we will 
use the probit regression model to anticipate the degree of asymmetric information 
(measured by SPREADRATIO, VOLUME, VOLATILITY and LEVERAGE) using 
corporate governance variables. We divided the sample into two categories according 
to the mean of each asymmetric information proxy measure. For SPREADRATIO and 
VOLATILITY, the first category is the companies that have lower degrees of 
asymmetric information (below the mean). The second category is the companies that 
have higher degrees of asymmetric information (above the mean), and the opposite was 
done for VOLUME and LEVERAGE. The value of 0 was given for the proxies' values 
below the mean, and the value of 1 for the proxies' values above the mean. 
Accordingly, the values of asymmetric information proxy measures transferred to 
binary data could be used to predict the degree of asymmetric information (High or 
Low). 
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The general form of probit regression with multiple regressors is stated as follows: 
Pr (Yi =11 Xi1, Xi2) _ (ßi0 + ßi1 Xi1 + ßi2 Xi2) ......... (10) 
Accordingly, 
Pr (Yi=11Xi1, Xi2,..., Xi6)=D(ßiO+ßilXi1+ßi2Xi2+li3Xi3+......... +(3i6 
Xi6) .................. (11) 
Where Yi can take one of the values of: 
Yspread = the ratio of the bid-ask spread (SPREADDUMMY (0,1)); a proxy measure of 
asymmetric information 
Yvola= Volatility as a proxy measure of asymmetric information (VOLADUMMY (0, 
1)) 
Yvo1= Volume as a proxy measure of asymmetric information (VOLDUMMY (0,1)) 
Ylev = Leverage (total debt/total assets) as a proxy measure of asymmetric information 
(LEVEDUMMY (0,1)) 
1= The cumulative normal distribution function 
(30= Regression intercept 
Xi= Non-executive directors' size (NONEXESIZE) 
X2 = The ratio of CEO benefits and bonuses (NCEOBENFITS) 
X3 = The ratio of insiders' ownership (NINSIDERSOWN) 
X4 = Insiders' numbers (NINSIDERSSIZE) 
Xs = The ratio of block-ownership (NBLOCKOWN) 
X6 = Long-term debt/total capital (NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL) 
We use the same sample as used in chapter 5 and 6 (392 non-financial companies listed 
in the London Stock Exchange). The time period of analysis for all companies falls 
between 2003 and 2006. The corporate governance and asymmetric information data 
are dividend into two categories. The first category includes "in sample data" which is 
used to calculate the probit regression. The second category includes "out of sample 
data" which is used to test the accuracy of the probit regression model. To select "in 
sample data" and "out of sample data" and to state the accuracy of prediction, we 
follow the same steps which have been mentioned in the last section, 7.2.1. 
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7.3 Predicting with Corporate Governance Indexes Using the 
Ordered Probit Regression 
7.3.1 The Results of the Ordered Probit Regression 
Table 7.1 (panel A) presents the results of ordered probit regression using the 
"systematic sampling" method in selecting the "in sample" data. We have used the 
normal scores of corporate governance variables (independent variables) to predict the 
rate of corporate governance indexes. Statistics like Pseudo RZ measure the goodness of 
fit of the model. Using NCGAUDIT, NCGBOARD, NCGCOPM/OWN, NCGINDEX 
and CGINDUSTRY as dependent variables, the models are significant at least at the 10 
% level of significance, since the P-value of LR chi2 significance is < 0.10. The Pseudo 
R2 of NCGAUDIT, NCGBOARD, NCGCOPM/OWN, NCGINDEX and 
CGINDUSTRY are 0.07,0.09,0.03,0.11 and 0.10, respectively. 
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The ordered probit regression model using NCGAUDIT (as shown in table 7.1, panel 
A) is summarized by the following equation: 
YCGAUUIT =-0.03 NNONEXESIZE + 0.16 NCEOBENFITS - 0.14 NINSIDERSOWN + 0.20 NINSIDERSSIZE - 0.25 
NBLOCKOWN - 0.04 NLONG DEB"ITOCAPITAL 
The results indicated that the NCGAUDIT index (which reflects the quality of the audit 
committee and activities) is significantly positively related to NINSIDERSSIZE and is 
negatively significantly related to NBLOCKOWN. All other variables in the probit 
regression are not significantly related to NCGAUDIT at the 10% level of significance. 
These results reflect some conclusions. First, the higher the number of owners inside 
the company, the higher the probability that the rate of NCGAUDIT will increase. 
Also, the higher the fraction of outstanding shares owned by block-holders, the higher 
the probability that the rate of NCGAUDIT will decrease. 
Second, the significant relationship between the NCGAUDIT index and 
INSIDERSSIZE and BLOCKOWN (as in corporate governance variables related to 
ownership) reflects an important conclusion regarding the interactions between 
corporate governance mechanisms. This result means that audit characteristics (audit 
committee, audit fees, auditor rotation and auditor ratification)92 are affected by 
ownership structure variables (INSIDERSSIZE and BLOCKOWN). This result opens a 
new window for future research to study the relationship between ownership structure 
and audit characteristics or quality. 
Third, these results support some of chapters five and six's results that the increase of 
INSIDERSSIZE and the decrease of BLOCKOWN are related to an increase in 
corporate governance quality in the UK capital market. Also, the result supports our 
hypotheses H4.8 and H4.1093. 
The ordered probit regression model using NCGBOARD (as shown in table 7.1, panel 
A) is summarized by the following equation: 
YCGHOARD = 0.27 NNONEXESIZE + 0.13 NCEOBENFITS - 0.23 NINSIDERSOW'N + 0.18 NINSIDERSSIZE - 0.06 
NBLOCKOWN + 0.02 NLONGDEB ITOCAPITAL 
92 See chapter six, table 6.1. 
93 See chapter 5, section 5.5.3. 
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The results indicated that NCGBOARD (which reflects the quality of board 
independence and activities) is significantly positively related to NONEXESIZE and 
significantly negatively related to NINSIDERSOWN. All other variables in the probit 
regression are not significantly related to NCGBOARD at the 10% level of 
significance. These results reflect some conclusions. First, the higher the number of 
non-executive directors serving on the board, the higher the probability that the rate of 
CGBOARD will increase. Also, the higher the fraction of outstanding shares held by 
insiders, the higher the probability that the rate of CGBOARD will decrease. 
Second, CGBOARD (as an index) and NONEXESIZE (as a variable) which are related 
to board factors, are significantly positively related and reinforce information about 
each other. 
Third, the results support the ideas of John and Kedia (2003) and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) regarding the interactions between corporate governance mechanisms, since the 
same ownership factors like NISIDERSOWN affect the quality of corporate 
governance measured by NCGBOARD. That means board characteristics94 which are 
related to NCGBOARD are affected by the ratio of insiders' ownership. This result 
opens a new window for future research to study the relationship between ownership 
structure and board characteristics or quality. 
Fourth, the above results support some of chapters five and six's results that the 
increase of NONEXESIZE and the decrease of INSIDERSOWN are related to an 
increase in corporate governance quality in the UK capital market. Also, these results 
support our hypotheses H4.2, and H4.895. 
- 0.25 NULOCKO\VN - 0.03 NLONGDEWTTOCAPITAI. 
94 See table 6.1. 
95 See chapter 5, section 5.5.3. 
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The ordered probit regression model using NCGCOPM/OWN (as shown in table 7.1, 
panel A) is summarized by the following equation: 
The results indicated that NCGCOPM/OWN (which reflects the quality of 
remuneration committee and activities, and also reflects ownership structure in each 
company) is negatively significantly related to NBLOCKOWN. All other variables in 
the probit regression are not significantly related to NCGCOPM/OWN at the 10% level 
of significance. These results reflect some conclusions. First, the higher the fraction of 
outstanding shares owned by block-holders, the higher the probability that the rate of 
NCGCOPM/OWN will decrease. This result supports some of chapters five and six's 
results that the decrease of BLOCKOWN is related to an increase in corporate 
governance quality in the UK capital market. Also, this result supports our hypothesis 
H4.1096. 
Second, the result reflects the interdependence between corporate governance indexes 
and variables, since some factors which construct NCGCOPM/OWN are related to 
ownership concentration (like the BLOCKOWN variable). 
The ordered probit regression models using NCGINDEX and NCGINDUSTRY (as 
shown in table 7.1, panel A) are summarized by the following equations: 
YCcINDUSTRI' = (1.29 NNONEXESIZE + 0.02 NCEOBENFITS - 0.28 NINSIUERSOWN + 0.19 NINSIDERSSIZE - 0.19 
NBLOCKOWN - 0.18 NLONGDEB"ITOCAPITAL 
The results indicated that NCGINDEX and NCGINDUSTRY are significantly 
positively related to NNONEXESIZE and significantly negatively related to 
NINSIDERSOWN. Accordingly, the higher the number of non-executive directors on 
boards of directors, the higher the probability that the rate of NCGINDEX and 
NCGINDUSTRY will increase. Conversely, the higher the fraction of outstanding 
shares owned by block-holders, the higher the probability that the rate of NCGINDEX 
and NCGINDUSTRY will decrease. Also, NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL is significantly 
negatively related to CGINDEX, which means that the higher the ratio of long-term 
debt to capital, the higher the probability that CGINDEX will decrease. All other 
96 See chapter five, section 5.5.3. 
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variables in the probit regression are not significantly related to NCG INDEX and 
NCGINDUSTRY at the 10% level of significance. The results indicated that board 
independence (as measured by NNONEXESIZE) and ownership concentration (as 
measured by NINSIDERSOWN) are important factors in determining the quality of 
corporate governance (measured by NCGINDEX and NCGINDUSTRY). 
7.3.2 Robustness Analysis Results 
Table 7.1 (panel B) shows the robustness analysis of our results using a different 
method of selecting "in sample" data. We change the method of selecting the "in 
sample" and "out of sample" data by using the data of the year 2005 as "in sample" and 
the data of year 2006 as "out of sample" data. That means we will use year 2005's data 
to predict the corporate governance indexes' rates of the year 2006. 
Most of the results of the ordered probit regressions for all indexes using the systematic 
sampling's "in sample data" (Panel A) are consistent with the results of the 2005's "in 
sample data" (Panel B). But, the robustness analysis reflected new results. First, 
NCGCOMP/OWN is significantly positively related to NONEXESIZE, whereas before 
it was not significant (see table 7.1, panel A). That means the higher the number of non- 
executive directors on the board, the higher the probability that CGCOMP/OWN will 
increase. Second, NCGBOARD, NCGINDEX and NCGINDUSTRY are significantly 
positively related to NISIDERSSIZE, whereas before they were not significant (see 
table 7.1, panel A). That means the higher the number of owners inside the company, 
the higher the probability that the rates of NCGBOARD, NCGINDEX and 
NCGINDUSTRY will increase. Third, NCGINDUSTRY is significantly and negatively 
related to NBLOCKOWN, whereas before it was not significant (see table 7.1, panel 
A). That means the higher the fraction of outstanding shares owned by block-holders, 
the higher the probability that the rate of CGINDUSTRY will decrease, and 
accordingly, the lower the quality of corporate governance on the industry level. 
On the other hand, several other previously significant variables are no longer 
significant. Form table 7.1, panel B, NBLOCKOWN became insignificant with 
NGAUDIT, NNONEXESIZE is insignificant with NCGBOARD, 
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NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL is insignificant with NCGINDEX and NINSIDERSOWN 
is insignificant with NCGINDUSTRY. 
Overall, the results are about as significant as the "systematic sampling" method, and so 
should prove to be no better than the systematic method in predicting out of sample 
effects. Nevertheless, to be sure, we will use both the "systematic sampling" method 
and "2005-2006" method to divide the sample into the "in and out of sample" data sets 
to test the ability of corporate governance variables to predict corporate governance 
indexes' values out of sample. 
7.3.3 Measuring the Accuracy of Prediction Using the Ordered Probit 
Regression 
To test the accuracy of the prediction of the ordered probit regression models using 
NCGAUDIT, NCGBOARD, NCGCOMP/OWN, NCGINDEX and NCGINDUSTRY 
we use the prior regression coefficients to compute the linear predictor (x*beta) for 
each observation. Table 7.2 (panels A and B) presents the summary of prediction 
results using the ordered probit regression between corporate governance indexes and 
corporate governance variables. 
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From table 7.2, panel A and B, we see that corporate governance indexes have 5 rates 
(1,2,3,4 and 5). The table presents the actual number of companies which have each 
rate in the sample, the number of prediction successes and failures, and the ratios of 
success and failure. 
The results of table 7.2, panel A, indicate that the CGAUDIT, CGBOARD, CGINDEX 
and CGINDUSTRY models are reasonably successful over the entire set of companies. 
The ratio of success equals 54%, 58%, 68.1% and 68.2%, respectively. But it is clear 
that the success rate increased with the higher CGAUDIT, CGBOARD, CGINDEX and 
CGINDUSTRY rates. For example, the success ratio for rate 5 equals 92.3% in the 
CGAUDIT model, 91 % in the CGBOARD model, 97.8% in the CGINDEX model and 
97.8% in the CGINDUSTRY model. This is because most of the actual values of these 
indexes' rates of the UK companies ranged from 3 to 5. 
Moreover, the results indicated that the NCGCOPM/OWN ordered probit regression 
model is not reasonably successful over the entire sample. The ratio of success equals 
40.4%. But it is clear that the success rate increased with the fifth NCGCOPM/OWN 
rate. The success ratio for rate 5 equals 90%. This is because most of the actual values 
of NCGCOPM/OWN rates of the UK companies ranged from 3 to 5. Accordingly, the 
ordered probit regression was affected by these higher values of NCGCOPM/OWN. 
Table 7.2, panel B, using 2006 "out of sample" data, shows consistent results for 
CGINDEX and CGINDUSTRY models, and they are reasonably successful over the 
entire set of companies. The ratios of success equal 69.6% and 60.6%, respectively. 
But, CGAUDIT, CGBOARD and NCGCOPM/OWN are not reasonably successful 
over the entire sample. The ratios of success equal 44.4%, 35.5% and 44.3%, 
respectively. But the results of table 7.3, panels A and B, are roughly consistent, 
because the success rate increased with the higher corporate governance indexes' rates. 
This is because most of the actual values of these indexes' rates of the UK companies 
ranged from 3 to 5. Accordingly, the ordered probit regression was affected by these 
higher values of these indexes. 
200 
Moreover, we have calculated the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE)97. The RMSE is 
calculated twice. The first RMSE measures the accuracy of prediction of each ordered 
probit model by calculating the differences between the actual and predicted values of 
each index using the following equation: 
N 
(Y1-yl)2 
RMSE(Model) _ .............................. (12) N 
Since: 
Yi is the actual rate of the index for company i. 
yi is the predicted rate of the index for company i. 
N is the "out of sample" size for each index. 
The second RMSE measures the accuracy of the predictions by comparing the actual 
values with the mode of actual indexes' rates98 using the following equation: 
ri 
- Mode)2 
RMSE(Mode) _ ....................... 
(13) _N, N 
We use the mode because it is the rate of each index that occurs most frequently. Since 
the rate of each index ranged between 1 and 5, we find that the mode of all indexes is 5 
in the systematic sampling's "in sample" data. By comparing the RMSEs of the 
predictions with the RMSEs of the mode, we can decide which method of prediction is 
accurate in anticipating the rate of the index. In other words, are we better off simply 
getting all companies that have the most frequently occurring index values of 5, rather 
than using the predictions of the model developed in this chapter? If so, then the RMSE 
when using the mode should be lower than the RMSE when using the predictions from 
the model developed in this chapter. Table 7.3, panel A and B, summarizes the results 
of RMSEs using the ordered probit models and the mode. 
97 We follow Diebold and Li (2006) and Diebold and Mariano (1995) in using RMSE as a method in 
calculating prediction accuracy. 
" We used the mode rather than the mean because the data is ordinal, there is no value of 4.5, the 
mean, but either 4 or 5 is observed. 
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Table 7.3 
The results of RMSEs using the ordered probit models and the mode 
Panel A: "Systematic sampling" out of sample data 
RMSE of predicted values 
Index using the ordered probit 
RMSE of the mode of 
model each 
index 
CGAUDIW 0.91 0.92 
CGBOARD 0.79 0.96 
CGCOMP/OWN 1.45 1.56 
CGINDEX 0.59 0.60 
CGINDUSTRY 0.67 0.71 
Panel B: 2006 "out of sample data" 
RMSE of predicted values 
Index using the ordered probit 
RMSE of the mode of 
model 
each index 
CGAUDII' 1.31 1.35 
CGBOARD 1.16 1.32 
CGCOMP/OWN 1.19 1.25 
CGINDEX 0.77 0.79 
CGINDUSTRY 0.99 1.06 
Table 7.3, panel A, using "systematic sampling" out of sample data, shows that the 
RMSEs of predicted corporate governance indexes' rates using the ordered probit 
models are less than the RMSEs of the mode of each index. Also, table 7.3, panel B, 
using 2006 "out of sample" data, shows consistent results with panel A. The results 
indicate that the RMSEs of predicted corporate governance indexes' rates using the 
ordered probit models are less than the RMSEs of the mode of each index. This result 
reflects that our predictions with the rate of corporate governance indexes using the 
ordered probit regression models are more accurate than using the mode, and provide 
evidence that, in fact, the corporate governance indexes actually do measure the quality 
of corporate governance. Moreover, these results suggest that one can predict the 
general quality of corporate governance using observable measures of corporate 
governance. 
Because the values of RMSE are near to each other (for example: 0.91 and 0.92 for 
RMSEs of the CGAUDIT index in panel A), we use a paired-sample t-test to examine 
if there is a significant difference between the predictions using the ordered probit 
model and the predictions using the mode. A paired-sample t-test is used to determine 
whether there is a significant difference between the average values of the same 
202 
measurement made under two different conditions. Both measurements are made on 
each unit in a sample, and the test is based on the paired differences between these two 
values. In our discussion, the paired-sample t-test is mainly used to examine if there are 
significant differences between the forecast error of the prediction using the ordered 
probit model (actual values of the index - predicted values using the probit model) and 
the forecast error of the prediction using the mode (actual values of the index - mode). 
So, we are comparing the prediction errors of two different models that have been 
applied to the same dataset99. Table 7.4 (panel A) presents the main results of the 
paired-sample t-test. 
99 A paired-sample t-test is used to determine whether there is a significant difference between the 
average values of the same measurement made under two different conditions. Both measurements are 
made on each unit in a sample, and the test is based on the paired differences between these two values. 
The paired-sample t-test is a more powerful alternative to a two sample procedure, such as the two 
sample t-test, but can only be used when we have matched samples (see Field, 2005, pp. 288-294). 
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The results of table 7.4, panel A, indicate that there are significant differences at the 10% 
level between the forecasting errors of predictions using the ordered probit models and 
the predictions using the mode. Only the t-value of CGINDEX is insignificant at the 10% 
level. But at least the RMSE of CGINDEX (table7.3, panel A) using the ordered probit 
regression model is lower than the RMSE using the mode. Moreover, the results of table 
7.4, panel B, show consistent results with table 7.4, panel A, that there are significant 
differences at the 10% level between the forecasting errors of predictions using the 
ordered probit models and the predictions using the mode for all indexes. Accordingly, 
we conclude that the predictions of corporate governance indexes using the ordered 
probit regression models are more accurate and significant than using the mode of these 
indexes. 
The results of tables 7.1,7.2,7.3 and 7.4 suggest that corporate governance variables, 
namely NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSSIZE, 
NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL, NINSIDERSOWN and NBLOCKOWN, could be used to 
predict corporate governance index values, especially for the companies which have 
higher rates of corporate governance index values. This means that these indexes actually 
measure the quality of corporate governance. Also, the idea of using corporate 
governance (variables) to predict with corporate governance (indexes) should enable 
firms to choose these companies with good corporate governance even when the short- 
hand corporate governance index values are not available. 
As an additional robustness analysis, we have repeated all of the previous procedures of 
predictions for CGINDEX and CGINDUSTRY using the probit regression rather than 
using the ordered probit regression. We have transformed the values of CGINDEX and 
CGINDUSTRY into binary values (0,1) depending on the value of the mean of each 
index. If the value of the index is less than the mean, we transform it into 0, and if it is 
more than the mean we transform it into 1. Appendix 4, tables 12,13 and 14 show the 
results of the probit regressions, the prediction results and the RMSE test results for 
CGINDEX and CGINDUSTRY using "systematic sampling" as a method of determining 
"in and out of sample" data. The results support and confirm our results, that we can use 
corporate governance variables in predicting corporate governance indexes' rates (using 
the probit regression) with higher degrees of accuracy. 
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7.4 Predicting the Degree of Asymmetric Information Using Probit 
Regression 
In this section we examine if corporate governance variables could be used as predictors 
for the degree of asymmetric information. In order to do that, we use the probit regression 
model to predict the degree of asymmetric information using corporate governance 
variablesloo Table 7.5, panel A, presents the results of the probit regression using the 
normal scores of corporate governance variables to predict the degree of asymmetric 
information. We use the systematic sampling method to divide the data into the "in and 
out of sample" sub-sets. Using SPREADDUMMY, VOLUDUMMY and 
LEVERDUMMY as dependent variables, the model is significant at the 1% level, since 
the P-value of LR chi2 significance is < 0.01. The Pseudo R2 of NSPRAEDRATIO, 
NVOLUME and LEVERDUMMY is 0.28,0.34 and 0.10. NVOLATILITY is not 
significant at the 10% level since the P-value of LR chi2 significance is 0.16. 
10° Section 7.2.2 describes the Probit methodology of using corporate governance variables to predict the 
degree of asymmetric information. 
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The results of table 7.5, panel A, support the same conclusions of chapter 5 (tables 5.12 
and 5.13) that SPREADDUMMY is significantly negatively related to 
NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSSIZE and 
NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL, and significantly positively related to NBLOCKOWN. 
Second, VOLDUMMY and LEVEDUMMY are significantly negatively related to 
NINSIDERSOWN and significantly positively related to NINSIDERSSIZE. Third, 
VOLDUMMY is significantly positively related to NNONEXESIZE and 
NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL. 
In general, these results reflect that the higher the number of non-executive directors 
serving on the board, the ratio of CEO benefits, the number of insiders who have 
ownership in the company, and the ratio of long-term debt to capital, the higher the 
probability that asymmetric information will decrease. Also, the higher the fraction of 
outstanding shares owned by block-holders and insiders, the higher the probability that 
asymmetric information will increase. 
Table 7.5, panel B, shows the robustness analysis of our results using different in 
sample and out of sample data. We change the method of selecting the "in sample" and 
"out of sample" data by using the data of the year 2005 as "in sample" and the data of 
2006 as "out of sample" data. Most of the results of the probit regression using 
systematic sampling of the out of sample data (Panel A) are consistent with the results 
of 2006 out of sample data (Panel B). But, the robustness analysis reflected some 
different results. First, SPREADDUMMY is significantly positively related to 
NINSIDERSOWN. This result supports our results that the higher the fraction of 
outstanding shares owned by insiders, the higher the probability that asymmetric 
information will increase. Second, several other previously significant variables are no 
longer significant. Form table 7.5, panel B, NCEOBENFITS became insignificant with 
SPREADDUMMY, NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL is insignificant with VOLDUMMY 
and NINSIDERSSIZE is insignificant with LEVEDUMMY. 
Overall, the results are about as significant as the "systematic sampling" method and so 
should prove to be no better than the systematic method in predicting out of sample 
effects. Nevertheless, to be sure, we will use both the "systematic sampling" method 
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and "2005-2006" method to divide the sample into the "in and out of sample" data sets 
to test the ability of corporate governance variables to predict the degree of asymmetric 
information out of sample. 
The above results of table 7.5 (panels A and B) reinforce the conclusions of chapters 
five and six. Corporate governance variables: NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, 
NINSIDERSSIZE, NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL, NINSIDERSOWN and 
NBLOCKOWN are related to asymmetric information and suggest that they can be 
used to predict with the degree of asymmetric information. 
To test the accuracy of the prediction of the probit regression models using 
SPREADDUMMY, VOLDUMMY, LEVEDUMMY we use the prior probit regression 
coefficients to compute the linear predictor (x*beta) for each observation. Table 7.6 
(panels A and B) present the summary of prediction results using the ordered probit 
regression between corporate governance indexes and corporate governance variables. 
We chose to drop the VOLADUMMY, as the P-value of the model is not significant at 
the 10% level of significance (0.16). 
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Table 7.6 
Prediction results for asymmetric information proxy measures using the results of probit 
regressions 
Panel A: "Systematic sampling" out of sample data 
Asymmetric Number of times Percent 
information No. Successfully Successfully Successfully Successfully 
proxy Actual 
Fail Fail Total 
companies predict predict predict predict 
measures high high low 
high low successes 
high low 
SI'READDt J1\IY 90 26 18 47 8 17 7016 69.2% 73.4 
VOLDUMMY 90 20 15 26 5 44 38.9% 75% 37.1% 
LEVEDIIMMY 92 48 44 14 4 30 63% 91.7% 31.8% 
Panel B: 2006 out of sample data 
Asymmetric Number of times Percent 
information No. Successfully Successfully Successfully Successfully 
Actual Fail Fail Total 
proxy companies predict predict predict predict 
measures High high low 
high low successes 
high low 
SPRE: U)lll %I-Nil 131 70 56 39 5 31 72.5% 91. R 6. 55.7'%, 
VOLDUMMY 127 100 90 15 10 12 82.7% 55.6% 90% 
LEVEDUMMY 131 66 58 26 8 39 64.1% 87.9% 40% 
Table 7.6, panel A, presents the numbers of times the probit regression model 
successfully predicts, and fails to predict, the high and low in the asymmetric 
information proxy measures and the percentage of the success rate for the overall 
sample. The results indicate that the SPREADDUMMY and LEVEDUMMY probit 
models are reasonably successful over the entire set of companies as the total success 
ratios are 70 % and 63%, respectively. But the VOLDUMMY probit model is not 
successful over the entire range of companies and the ratio of total success is 38.9%. 
Table 7.6, panel B results are better than Table 7.6 panel A results since the ratio of 
total successes of the SPREADDUMMY, VOLDUMMY and LEVEDUMMY probit 
models are 72.5%, 82.7% and 64.1%, respectively. We interpret the difference in the 
results between table 7.6 panels A and B as there are higher numbers of observations in 
panel B that makes the predictions more accurate. 
Moreover, we have calculated the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE). The RMSE was 
calculated twice. The first RMSE measures the accuracy of the probit model by 
calculating the differences between the actual and predicted values of the asymmetric 
information proxy measures using the following equation: 
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N 
(Yi - yi)2 
RMSE(Model) _ (14) N N 
The second RMSE measures the accuracy of the prediction by comparing the actual 
values with the mode of asymmetric information proxy measures: 
L (Yi - Mode)2 
RMSE(Mode) _ (15) N 
We use the mode because the asymmetric information measures' data has been 
transformed into binary data. Since the values of these measures ranged between 0 and 
1, we find that the mode of asymmetric information measures is 0 in the "in sample" 
data. By comparing the RMSEs of the predictions with the RMSEs of the mode we can 
determine whether there is a significant relationship between corporate governance 
indexes and asymmetric information in an out of sample context, or whether there is no 
relationship, as one can simply guess that all companies have lower than average 
asymmetric information and do just as well as our model. Table 7.7 (panels A and B) 
summarizes the results of RMSEs using the probit models and the mode. 
Table 7.7 
The results of RMSEs using the probit models and the mode 
Panel A: "Systematic sampling" out of sample data 
Variable 
RMSE of predicted values 
using the probit model 
RMSE of the mode of 
each index 
SPREADDUMaw 0.57 0.62 
VOLDUMMY 0.74 0.47 
t. FVFDUMatV 0.61 0.73 
Panel B: 2006 out of sample data 
Variable 
RMSE of predicted values 
usin the robit model 
RMSE of the mode of 
each index 
SPRE: tDDUMan 0.52 0.58 
VOLDUn1MY 0.42 0.47 
LEVEDUMMY 0.59 0.69 
Table 7.7, panel A, shows that the RMSEs of predicted values using the 
SPREADDUMMY, VOLDUMMY and LEVEDUMMY probit models are 0.57,0.74 
and 0.61 compared to 0.62,0.47 and 0.73 for the RMSEs of the mode, respectively. 
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Only the VOLDUMMY probit model prediction has an RMSE larger than the RMSE of 
the mode, and this may be as a result of the small out of sample size. 
Table 7.7, panel B, indicates better results. The values of RMSEs of the 
SPREADDUMMY, VOLDUMMY and LEVEDUMMY probit models are 0.52,0.42 
and 0.59 compared to 0.58,0.47 and 0.69 for the RMSEs of the mode, respectively. 
These results suggest that our prediction using the probit regression models is more 
accurate than using the mode. 
Moreover, to determine whether there is a significant difference between the 
predictions using the probit model and the mode, we use paired-sample t-tests, because 
both prediction methods are applied on the same data set. Table 7.8, panel A and I3, 
presents the main results of the paired-sample t-test. 
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The results of table 7.8, panel A and B, indicate that there are significant differences at 
the 1% level between forecasting errors of the probit model predictions and the mode 
predictions, since the P-values of the t-tests are less than 1%. Accordingly, we conclude 
that the predictions with the degree of asymmetric information using the probit 
regression models are more accurate than using the mode of these indexes. 
The above results of tables 7.5,7.6,7.7 and 7.8 reinforce the conclusions of chapters 
five and six. Corporate governance variables which include: NNONEXESIZE, 
NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSSIZE, NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL, NINSIDERSOWN 
and NBLOCKOWN can be used to predict at least the direction (high or low) of the 
degree of asymmetric information with higher degrees of accuracy. Accordingly, 
corporate governance variables actually predict the degree of asymmetric information 
in an out of sample test, and all stakeholders of the company can use these predictions 
in building their investment and financial strategies. 
7.5 Summary 
In this chapter we have added two new contributions to the literature of corporate 
governance and asymmetric information. The first contribution is that corporate 
governance variables which include NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, 
NINSIDERSSIZE, NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL, NINSIDERSOWN and 
NBLOCKOWN can predict corporate governance indexes' values. The results indicate 
that the ordered probit regression model is reasonably successful in predicting the 
corporate governance indexes' rates out of sample. The ratio of success for CGAUDIT, 
CGBOARD, CGCOMPENSATION, CGINDEX and CGINDUSTRY equal 54%, 58% 
and 40.4%, 68.1 and 68.2, respectively (using systematic sampling "in and out of 
sample" data). But it is clear that the success rate for all of the corporate governance 
indexes increased with higher rates. That is because the actual values of these indexes 
are concentrated between 4 and 5 in most of the UK companies in our sample. 
Nevertheless, the RMSE statistic and the paired-sample t-test indicate that our 
predictions are more accurate and significant than using the mode as a predictor for 
corporate governance indexes' values. Finally, the robustness analysis using year 2005 
as in, and 2006 as out of sample data, confirms and supports the above results, and 
indicated that corporate governance variables can predict corporate governance 
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indexes' rates with a higher degree of accuracy and significance. This is good news, as 
firstly this suggests that corporate governance indexes actually measure what they 
claim to measure: corporate governance. Moreover, these results suggest that corporate 
governance indexes' values are predictable in an out of sample context. So, those 
wishing to invest in companies with "good" corporate governance can do so by using 
our ordered probit model applied on observable proxies for corporate governance. 
The second contribution is that corporate governance variables which include: 
NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSSIZE, NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL, 
NINSIDERSOWN and NBLOCKOWN can predict at least the direction (high or low) 
of the degree of asymmetric information. The results indicated that we can predict the 
degree of asymmetric information using SPREADDUMMY, VOLDUMMY and 
LEVEDUMMY with degrees of accuracy equalling 70%, 38.9% and 63%, respectively 
(using "systematic sampling" in and out of sample data). Moreover, the robustness 
analysis indicated better results when using the year 2005 as in, and 2006 as out of 
sample data. The degrees of prediction accuracy increased to 72.5%, 82.7% and 64.1% 
for SPREADDUMMY, VOLDUMMY and LEVEDUMMY, respectively. In general, 
the RMSE test and the paired-sample t-test indicated that our predictions are more 
accurate than using the mode as a predictor for the degree of asymmetric information. 
This is good news, as firstly asymmetric information proxy measures' degrees are 
predictable in an out of sample context. Moreover, banks planning to select the 
companies that have lower degrees of asymmetric information to take a suitable 
decision for debt maturity can do so by using our probit model applied on observable 
proxies for corporate governance. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
By reviewing the literature, we find that there is a clear gap in examining the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on asymmetric information. According to the results 
of Kelton and Yang (2008), Kanagaretnam et al. (2007), Rutherford and Buchholtz 
(2007), and Chen et al. (2007) there is no comprehensive and direct study that examines 
the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on asymmetric information. Also, there 
is little evidence about the effect of each corporate governance mechanism (internal or 
external) on asymmetric information in general, and in the UK corporations in 
particular. Asymmetric information is a main cause of the agency problem between 
shareholders or stakeholders and managers. Also, corporate governance is a set of 
mechanisms to solve any existing or potential agency problem. Accordingly, the main 
objective of this research is to establish a practical guidance for corporate governance 
mechanisms that can be used by the UK companies to control, minimize or mitigate 
asymmetric information. Also, the research seeks to know if the UK companies' 
compliance with the combined code on corporate governance (2003) is solving the 
agency problem of asymmetric information. 
We examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on asymmetric 
information (for 392 non-financial companies listed in the London Stock Exchange 
from 2003 to 2006) in two stages. In the first stage, we examine the effect of internal 
and external corporate governance variables on asymmetric information. The data of 
these variables have been collected from the companies' annual reports and from the 
Bloomberg Database. For the second stage, we use some general and sub-indexes for 
corporate governance (issued by The Institutional Shareholder Services ( ISS)) and 
examine its effect on asymmetric information. The index reflects the effect of a group 
of corporate governance variables rather than measuring the effect of each individual 
variable. The data of these indexes had been collected from the Bloomberg Database. 
The results of the first and the second stages resulted in a new contribution to the 
literature; that corporate governance quality is negatively related to asymmetric 
information in general, and in the UK capital market in particular. 
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This main contribution is reinforced by using the probit and ordered probit regressions 
to predict with asymmetric information and corporate governance indexes using 
corporate governance variables. The results indicated that corporate governance 
variables could be used to predict corporate governance indexes and the degree of 
asymmetric information in the UK capital market. 
In this concluding chapter, we will describe the research contributions. Then, will 
summarize the preceding chapters and discuss the results of the empirical studies, 
limitations and recommendations for further research. 
8.2 Contributions of the Research 
This research has made several contributions to the theory and practice of finance. First 
of all, whereas there is a vast amount of literature in the area of corporate governance 
and in the area of asymmetric information, this research examines the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms (internal and external) on asymmetric information. 
Second, the study relates corporate governance with asymmetric information using the 
agency theory. Asymmetric information is a main cause of the agency problem, and 
corporate governance is a group of mechanisms used to solve the agency problem 
between shareholders or stakeholders and managers. Accordingly, the research 
specifically links the theoretical thinking of two different topics, and concludes that the 
agency theory is a theory for corporate governance and asymmetric information. 
Third, the study relates theoretically and empirically among internal and external 
corporate governance mechanisms through the interaction between them. We find that 
it is difficult for the companies to work with only one mechanism for corporate 
governance. Internal mechanisms must combine with external mechanisms regardless 
of the type of industry or the country of analysis. The empirical results suggest that 
NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSOWN, NINSIDERSSIZE, 
NBLOCKOWN and NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL are the most important factors in 
interpreting the relationship between corporate governance variables and asymmetric 
information proxy measures in the UK capital market. 
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Fourth, the research examined empirically if the financial ratios which include 
VOLATILITY, LEVERAGE, VOLUME and SPREADRATIO are good proxy 
measures of asymmetric information. The results reflect that SPREADRATIO and 
VOLATILITY are significantly positively related to asymmetric information, but 
VOLUME and LEVERAGE are significantly negatively related to asymmetric 
information. Moreover, VOLUME and SPREADRATIO are the best measures for 
asymmetric information and could be used as alternative proxy measures for 
asymmetric information in the UK capital market. 
Fifth, the research study clarifies the effect of remuneration, audit and nomination 
committees' size and activities in mitigating asymmetric information. The results 
reflect a significant negative relationship between committees' size and activities and 
asymmetric information. 
Sixth, the research examined empirically the effect of debt financing in mitigating 
asymmetric information. The results reflect that debt financing is a mechanism for 
reducing asymmetric information and solving agency problems, because of the ability 
of large creditors to exercise control. Moreover, long-term debt is a more powerful 
mechanism in mitigating asymmetric information than short-term debt. 
Seventh, the robustness analysis by company size and industry added new 
contributions. The results reflect that some corporate governance mechanisms are more 
effective in mitigating asymmetric information in large companies, but are not effective 
in small companies, like board independence and executive compensation. Conversely, 
some corporate governance mechanisms are more effective in mitigating asymmetric 
information in small companies, but are not effective in large companies, like the 
number of owners inside the company. Moreover, the results reflect that debt financing 
is an effective mechanism in mitigating asymmetric information in non-industrial 
companies more than in industrial companies. 
Eighth, the analysis of chapter six concentrates on the idea of measuring the effect of 
corporate governance as a group of indexes (rather than variables) on the degree of 
asymmetric information. We use the ISS's indexes as new measures for the quality of 
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corporate governance in the UK capital market to examine its effect on asymmetric 
information. The results indicated that corporate governance indexes are good measures 
for corporate governance and reflected a significant negative effect with asymmetric 
information. 
Ninth, the research uses the probit and ordered probit regression in predicting with 
asymmetric information and corporate governance indexes using corporate governance 
variables. The results suggest that corporate governance variables could be used to 
predict with asymmetric information and corporate governance index values. 
8.3 Summary of Chapters and Research Findings 
The main objective of this research is to provide a comprehensive analysis and direct 
examination regarding the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on asymmetric 
information in the UK capital market. Chapter two concentrates on the two main 
theories of corporate governance, which are the agency theory and stakeholder theory. 
We conclude that regardless which theory holds, every theory must try to find cost 
effective mechanisms to resolve conflicts between management and stockholders or 
stakeholders. Then, the chapter presents the definitions of corporate governance 
according to the theory - the theory of agency or the theory of stakeholder - which the 
definitions serve. Also, the chapter reviews the literature of corporate governance 
mechanisms (internal and external). The internal corporate governance mechanisms 
include board size and composition, executive compensation and ownership structure's 
mechanisms. The external corporate governance mechanisms include takeovers, large 
creditors and the legal system's mechanisms. The results of the literature review of 
corporate governance mechanisms support the necessity of interaction between internal 
and external corporate governance mechanisms. Finally, the chapter discusses the 
different practices of corporate governance around the world. We conclude that there 
are differences between corporations in the same country in applying corporate 
governance mechanisms. The different interactions that happen among governance 
mechanisms make each firm has its own corporate governance structure. Also, the 
differences between countries in legal, political, cultural and social systems make each 
country has a different system of corporate governance. 
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In chapter three, we first reviewed the theoretical and conceptual background of 
asymmetric information. The literature showed that an agency relationship implies that 
there is a degree of asymmetric information occurring when one party (shareholders or 
stakeholders) has insufficient or inaccurate information necessary to make or take an 
optimal decision. Also, because the interests of companies' stockholders or 
stakeholders and that of management are not always identical, the same phenomenon of 
agency theory could also be described in terms of the asymmetric information theory. 
So, the agency theory is a theory for corporate governance and asymmetric 
information. Second, the chapter presents the main measures of asymmetric 
information. Third, the chapter discusses the general concept of asymmetric 
information. The discussion reflects that there are no boundaries for the subject of 
asymmetric information. It is used in different levels (macro and micro), markets 
(agriculture, manufacturing, and services), and also in different subjects in finance, and 
has many extensions and applications in industrial organization and microeconomic 
dynamics; new theories of unemployment; new theories of credit market rationing; and 
models of economic development and global financial stability. Finally, the chapter 
reviews the literature that relates corporate governance mechanisms to asymmetric 
information. This review finds that there is little and indirect evidence relating 
corporate governance mechanisms to asymmetric information. Most of the literature 
deals with asymmetric information as an assumption, not as a variable. Accordingly, 
there is little specific evidence regarding the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms (internal or external) on asymmetric information. 
The main objective of chapter four is to choose the data and the proxy variables to be 
used in the first empirical study of the effect of corporate governance variables on 
asymmetric information. We chose financial ratios (VOLUME, VOLATILITY and 
LEVERAGE) and a micro-structure measure (SPREADRATIO) as proxy measures for 
asymmetric information to be used later as the dependent variables. Also, we chose 
corporate governance variables related to board and committees' size and composition, 
executive compensation, ownership structure and large creditors to be used later as the 
independent variables. Company size and industry are used as control variables. The 
final sample includes 392 non-financial companies listed in the London Stock 
Exchange from 2003 to 2006. 
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Chapter five presents the descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation and the multiple 
regression results regarding the effect of corporate governance variables on asymmetric 
information. All in all, the results suggest that UK companies have a high degree of 
compliance with the combined code (2003). This compliance increases the quality of 
corporate governance, and as a result, mitigates or reduces asymmetric information and 
contributes to solving the agency problem. 
The results reveal new empirical conclusions in general, and in the UK capital market 
in particular. First, board and committees' size, activities and independence; executive 
compensation; the number of investors inside the company and debt financing are 
significantly negatively related to asymmetric information. These results supports the 
results of Kelton and Yang (2008), Rutherford and Buchholtz (2007), Kanagaretnam 
et al. (2007), Cai et al. (2006), and Hsiang-tsai (2005) that asymmetric information is 
significantly negatively related to board independence. Also, Becker-Blease and Irani 
(2008) find that the size of the audit committee mitigates asymmetric information 
during the seasoned equity offerings; Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) that board structure 
(which includes board meetings and audit committee meetings) is significantly 
negatively related to bid-ask spread ratio; Brazel and Webb (2006), Douglas (2006), 
Shumsky and Pinker (2003), Björkman and Furu (2000), and Tevlin (1996) that 
having CEO pay depend on the performance of the firm is the optimal solution to the 
moral hazard problem. But our results contradict the result of Cai et al. (2006) that the 
more diverse the board in terms of the presence of female directors, the less the 
information asymmetry in the market. 
Second, the ratios of insiders' ownership and block ownership are significantly 
positively related to asymmetric information. These results supports the results of 
Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) and Mishra et al. (2004) that there is a positive 
correlation between the bid-ask spread as a proxy of asymmetric information and the 
percentage of ownership by corporate insiders. Also, supports the results of Kelton 
and Yang (2008) that a lower percentage of block ownership reduces asymmetric 
information. 
Third, increasing the number of insiders who have ownership in the company is more 
important than increasing the ownership of a small number of insiders in reducing the 
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problem of asymmetric information. The higher ratio of insiders' ownership is related 
to the entrenchment effect, but the higher number of insiders is related to the alignment 
effect. 
Fourth, NSPREARDRATIO and NVOLUME (as proxy measures of asymmetric 
information) exhibit Kedialar, strong and more significant conclusions regarding the 
relationship between corporate governance variables and asymmetric information than 
NVOLATILITY and NLEVERAGE. So, we can use NSPREARDRATIO and 
NVOLUME as alternatives in measuring asymmetric information in the UK capital 
market. 
Fifth, the results of the robustness analysis indicated that board independence is less 
common in small companies than in large companies. Also, CEO compensation is 
significantly positively related to company size. The positive relationship between 
board independence and executive compensation with company size supports the idea 
that the larger companies have a higher degree of compliance with the combined code 
on corporate governance (2003). This results support the finding of Barrett (2008) that 
board independence is less common in small companies than in large companies. 
Also, support the finding of Eichholtz (2008) that company size is positively related 
to executive compensation, and company size is the most important variable in 
explaining the level of executive compensation. 
Accordingly, we conclude that large UK companies are more able to mitigate the 
asymmetric information problem. Also, NINSIDERSSIZE is significantly negatively 
related to asymmetric information in small companies, but insignificant in large 
companies. We concluded that, in small companies, the role of internal owners is clear 
and more effective in mitigating the free-rider problem, and as a result, reduces the 
degree of asymmetric information. Finally, the robustness analysis indicated that the 
effect of long-term debt in mitigating asymmetric information is clear in non-industrial 
sectors. This conclusion opens a new window for future research to study the different 
effects of debt in mitigating asymmetric information in industrial and non-industrial 
sectors. 
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Chapter six presents the methodological and empirical results regarding the effect of 
corporate governance indexes on asymmetric information. The chapter presents the 
descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation, simple and multiple regression results 
regarding the effect of corporate governance indexes on asymmetric information. The 
results indicate that first, NCGBOARD, NCGAUDIT and NCGCOMP/OWN (as sub- 
indexes of corporate governance) are negatively and significantly related to asymmetric 
information. These results mean that the higher the corporate governance quintile for 
the board, audit and compensation and stock ownership, the lower the degree of 
asymmetric information. 
Second, NCGTAKEOVERS did not exhibit any significant relationship with 
asymmetric information. That is because most (more than 95%) of the UK companies 
have rated 5 out of 5 in takeovers. We conclude that the takeovers sub-index (as a 
number) of corporate governance is not enough alone to show the differences between 
the UK companies regarding takeovers. 
The results of chapter five and chapter six support each other. The results of chapter 
five suggest that additional variables like ownership structure and debt variables are 
important and can improve corporate governance indexes. Conversely, the sub-factors 
which form corporate governance indexes could be used as additional corporate 
governance variables. To sum up, corporate governance variables and indexes support 
each other in interpreting the negative relationship with asymmetric information. 
Chapter seven presents the methodological and empirical issues regarding the 
prediction of corporate governance indexes and asymmetric information using 
corporate governance variables. We use the ordered probit regression to predict 
corporate governance indexes' values because the dataset of the indexes is ordinal. 
Also, we use the probit regression to predict asymmetric information because the 
dataset of asymmetric information is binary. The results supported our results in 
chapters five and six, and reflect new conclusions. 
First, corporate governance variables which include NNONEXESIZE, 
NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSSIZE, NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL, NINSIDERSOWN 
and NBLOCKOWN can predict corporate governance indexes' values. The results 
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indicate that the ordered probit regression model is reasonably successful in predicting 
the corporate governance indexes' rates out of sample. The ratios of success for 
CGAUDIT, CGBOARD, CGCOMPENSATION, CGINDEX and CGINDUSTRY 
equal 54%, 58% and 40.4%, 68.1 and 68.2, respectively (using systematic sampling "in 
and out of sample" data). But it is clear that the success rate for all of the corporate 
governance indexes increased with higher rates. That is because the actual values of 
these indexes are concentrated between 4 and 5 in most of the UK companies in our 
sample. Nevertheless, the RMSE statistic and the paired-sample t-test indicate that our 
predictions are more accurate and significant than using the mode as a predictor for 
corporate governance indexes' values. Finally, the robustness analysis using year 2005 
as in, and 2006 as out of sample data, confirms and supports the above results and 
indicates that corporate governance variables can predict corporate governance indexes' 
rates with high degrees of accuracy and significance. 
Second, corporate governance variables which include NNONEXESIZE, 
NCEOBENFITS, NINSIDERSSIZE, NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL, NINSIDERSOWN 
and NBLOCKOWN can predict at least the direction (high or low) of the degree of 
asymmetric information. The results indicate that we can predict the degree of 
asymmetric information using SPREADDUMMY, VOLDUMMY and LEVEDUMMY 
with degrees of accuracy equalling 70%, 38.9% and 63%, respectively (using 
"systematic sampling" in and out of sample data). Moreover, the robustness analysis 
indicated better results when using the year 2005 as in, and 2006 as out of sample data. 
The degrees of prediction accuracy increased to 72.5%, 82.7% and 64.1% for 
SPREADDUMMY, VOLDUMMY and LEVEDUMMY, respectively. In general, the 
RMSE test and the paired-sample t-test indicated that our predictions are more accurate 
than using the mode as a predictor for the degree of asymmetric information. 
8.4 Implications of the Research 
The results of this research have some important implications to financial markets, 
shareholders, other investors and companies' directors and managers. All companies 
incorporated in the UK and listed on the main market of the London Stock Exchange 
need to be sure that they comply with the combined code on corporate governance 
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(2003). All companies which comply with the code have a higher quality of corporate 
governance, and as a result have a very low degree of asymmetric information. 
First, from one side, all companies need to consider the size of the board and the 
number of non-executive directors. Because the companies which have higher size of 
the board and higher board independence ( measured by the number of non-executive 
directors, non-executive chairman, non-executive members in audit, remuneration and 
nomination committees, and splitting between the positions of the chairman and the 
CEO) have lower degree of asymmetric information. From the other side, all 
shareholders and investors could benefit from these indicators in building their finance 
and investment strategies. The companies which have higher board size and board 
independence will have higher quality of corporate governance, lower degree of 
asymmetric information and also lower agency problems. 
Second, all companies need to consider the number of board and committees' meetings 
which reflects the activeness of the board and committees. The results indicate that the 
higher the number of board and committees' meetings the lower the degree of 
asymmetric information. Also, investors and other stakeholders must give attention to 
companies which have higher board and committees activeness because this means that 
the board and management are aligning their own benefits with the benefits of 
shareholders and stakeholders and trying to solve agency problems during their 
continuous meetings. Moreover, the higher the number of board and committees' 
meetings will increase the number of reports and information which it will 
disseminated to investors and the other stakeholders about the general activity of the 
company and the activities of the different committees inside the company. 
Third, company managers and shareholders have to consider the importance of 
executive compensation, especially long-term compensation plans (like stock options) 
as a good mechanism in aligning the interest between managers and shareholders. 
Fourth, from one side, UK companies' managers could use the general and sub-indexes 
issued by ISS to evaluate corporate governance quality. From the other side, investors 
and other stakeholders who are interested with specific company could use these 
indexes as a short hand in building their financial and investment strategies because 
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these indexes reflect easily the quality of corporate governance and at the same time the 
degree of asymmetric information. 
Fifth, the results suggest that corporate governance indexes' values are predictable in an 
out of sample context. So, investors wishing to invest in companies with "good" 
corporate governance can do so by using our ordered probit model applied on 
observable proxies for corporate governance. This has enormous practical implications: 
investors and stakeholders wishing to know the quality of a given corporation's 
corporate governance can indeed rely on these indexes as a short-hand for sufficient 
statistics giving the information they seek. 
Sixth, the results indicate that asymmetric information proxy measures' degrees are 
predictable in an out of sample context. So, banks (or any other stakeholder) planning 
to select the companies that have lower degrees of asymmetric information to take a 
suitable decision for debt maturity can do so by using our probit model applied on 
observable proxies for corporate governance. 
Seventh, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) as the United Kingdom's independent 
regulator responsible for promoting confidence in corporate reporting and governance 
have to consider some issues in corporate governance related to ownership and large 
creditors. The combined code on corporate governance (2003) does not have any rules 
to organize the minimum or maximum ratios of ownership. Since the results reflect that 
the higher ratios of ownership by insiders or institutional investors increase the degree 
of asymmetric information, and as a result increase the agency problem, the FRC need 
to suggest the maximum levels of ownership. Moreover, since the results reflect that the 
higher ratios of debt increase the role of large creditors in controlling managers, and as 
a result mitigate the asymmetric information problem, the FRC need to support the role 
of large creditors in controlling management. 
Eighth, investors and stakeholders must consider the difference in corporate governance 
quality and the degree of asymmetric information between small and large companies. 
The results indicated that the higher the size of the companies the higher the 
compliance with the combined code on corporate governance, the higher the quality of 
corporate governance and the lower the degree of asymmetric information. 
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Ninth, the best blend of corporate governance variables (see chapter 5) could be used as 
an indicator for corporate governance quality and also an indicator for asymmetric 
information degree. Managers of any company could use this best mix to measure the 
degree of asymmetric information. Also, the investors could use these variables to 
differentiate between companies to select their optimal portfolios. 
8.5 Limitations of the Research 
Although it is believed that this study has achieved its objectives and was able to 
answer the research questions, it is not without its limitations, which will be discussed 
in this section. The main limitations of this study are as follows: 
First, the research sample included only the non-financial listed UK companies on the 
London Stock Exchange. Financial firms were excluded from the population of listed 
firms because they do not have the characteristics (i. e. the Price-to-Book value) which 
make them comparable with non-financial firms. We excluded financial firms (banks, 
financial services, insurance, closed end funds and investment companies). Also, we 
excluded firms which listed after 2003, and also excluded any firm which did not 
publish its annual report, or which is unquoted at the date of the analysis. 
Second, we use the most recent and annual data for corporate governance and 
asymmetric information for only one year for each company. So, the year of analysis 
for all variables depends on the availability of the most recent annual report for each 
company. Accordingly, the year of analysis differs from one company to another 
because the data about corporate governance is not available for all companies for all 
years. 
Third, the data had been collected form the annual report for each company, the 
Bloomberg Database and the DataStream Database. So, any measures for asymmetric 
information or corporate governance mechanisms that were not available from these 
three sources have not been used. For example, we did not use analysts' forecasts 
measures as a proxy measure for asymmetric information because the data were not 
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available. Also, some corporate governance indexes related to charter and bylaw 
provisions and laws of the state of incorporation were not available in the Bloomberg 
Database, so we did not use them. 
Fourth, this research examined only the effect of corporate governance on asymmetric 
information which happens between managers and shareholders. The problem of 
asymmetric information which happens between managers and other stakeholders (like 
local community organizations, environmentalists, consumer advocates, governments, 
special interest groups, and even competitors and the media as legitimate stakeholders) 
has not been discussed. 
8.6 Recommendations for Further Research 
This study is carried out to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
asymmetric information. Hence, the outcome of this study could be used as the basis 
for future research as follows: 
First, as mentioned in the limitations, this research has focused on the non-financial 
listed UK companies on the London Stock Exchange. Future work could extend the 
research by using the financial listed UK companies on the London Stock Exchange or 
non-financial companies in other countries than the UK. 
Second, future research could examine if there are any other corporate governance 
variables that could be used to examine its effect on asymmetric information in the UK 
capital market. For example, the takeovers market is very active in the UK capital 
market, and so a study of its effect on asymmetric information is similarly warranted. 
Also, the regulatory and legal systems in the UK capital market could be used as a basis 
to study their effects on asymmetric information. 
Third, the robustness analysis in chapter five suggests that there are some differences in 
the effect of corporate governance variables on asymmetric information between large 
and small companies, and between industrial and non-industrial companies. 
Accordingly, future research could study the effect of company size on the degree of 
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asymmetric information, and study the main corporate governance variables which can 
make a difference. 
Fourth, future research needs to shed light on the importance of the interaction between 
corporate governance mechanisms and how corporate governance mechanisms affect 
each other. Also, what is the optimal or best mix of corporate governance mechanisms 
which may mitigate asymmetric information and reduce asymmetric information? 
Fifth, the idea of using the probit and ordered probit in predicting with corporate 
governance indexes' rates and asymmetric information degree is a new idea in the field. 
So, future research could look for other techniques to predict corporate governance 
rates and asymmetric information degree. The prediction with corporate governance 
and the degree of asymmetric information can benefit investors or decision makers in 
building their financial and investment strategies. 
Sixth, the roles of debt financing, committees' activities and compensation schemes 
(especially the role of stock options) in mitigating asymmetric information and 
reducing the agency problem, needs more attention in future research. 
8.7 Concluding Remarks 
The research results provide evidence of the strong effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms in mitigating asymmetric information. Future research may give more 
attention to examining the role of takeovers and the legal system (as external corporate 
governance mechanisms) in mitigating asymmetric information. Also, future research 
needs to examine the role of large creditors (especially banks) in mitigating asymmetric 
information and in solving the agency problem. 
Finally, we believe that the findings of this research provide useful evidence of the role 
of corporate governance variables in mitigating asymmetric information, a subject 
matter that has not been covered in the previous research in corporate governance. 
Hence, this adds a new dimension to the studies in the corporate governance area, and 
also provides a starting point for much future research. 
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Appendix 1 
Normal distribution curves 
Figure 1: Normal distribution curves for the dependent variables before and 
after data transformation using Van der Waerden's Formula 
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Figure 2: Normal distribution curves for the independent variables before and 
after data transformation using Van der Waerden's Formula 
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Appendix 2 
Residual Statistics, Histograms and Normal P-P Plots 
Table A. 1: Residual Statistics of Regression analysis between the normal 
scores of asymmetric information proxy measures and the normal scores of 
corporate governance variables (including the dummy variables) 
Panel A: Residuals Statistics of SP READRATIO 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.6165 1.6416 -. 0213 . 65994 284 
Residual -1.90294 2.74400 . 00000 . 66547 284 
Std. Predicted Value -2.417 2.520 . 000 1.000 284 
Std. Residual -2.788 4.020 . 000 . 
975 284 
Panel B: Residuals Statistics of VO LATILITY 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 9521 1.2054 -. 0370 . 34845 284 
Residual -3.01298 2.28269 . 00000 . 85832 284 
Std. Predicted Value -2.626 3.565 . 000 1.000 284 
Std. Residual -3.422 2.593 . 000 . 975 284 
Panel C: Residuals Statistics of VO LUME 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.7318 1.5679 . 0244 . 64837 281 
Residual 
-1.82344 1.89656 . 00000 . 66281 281 
Std. Predicted Value 
-2.709 2.381 . 000 1.000 281 
Std. Residual -2.681 2.789 . 000 . 975 281 
Panel D: Residuals Statistics of LEVERAGE 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.1791 . 8728 -. 
0313 
. 36954 291 
Residual -1.87452 2.52231 . 00000 . 84470 291 
Std. Predicted Value -3.106 2.446 . 000 1.000 291 
Std. Residual -2.169 2.918 . 000 . 977 291 
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Figure 3: Histogram and normal P-P Plot of Regression analysis between the normal 
scores of asymmetric information proxy measures and the normal scores of corporate 
governance variables (includinu the dummy variables) 
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Table A. 2: Residual Statistics of regression analysis between the normal 
scores of asymmetric information proxy measures and the normal scores of 
corporate governance variables (without dummy variables) 
Panel A: Residuals Statistics of SPREAD 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.6149 1.7665 -. 0253 . 65522 287 
Residual -1.95124 2.74862 . 00000 . 67664 287 
Std. Predicted Value -2.426 2.735 . 000 1.000 287 
Std. Residual -2.828 3.983 . 000 . 981 287 
Panel B: Residuals Statistics of VO LATILITY 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 9427 1.0348 -. 0371 . 33758 287 
Residual -3.02449 2.24862 . 00000 . 86545 287 
Std. Predicted Value -2,683 3.175 . 000 1.000 287 
Std. Residual -3.427 2.548 . 000 . 981 287 
Panel C: Residuals Statistics of VO LUME 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.8299 1.5637 . 0356 . 65104 284 
Residual -1.82140 1.99465 . 00000 . 66579 284 
Std. Predicted Value -2.865 2.347 . 000 1.000 284 
Std. Residual -2.682 2.937 . 000 . 980 284, 
Panel D: Residuals Statistics of LEVERAGE 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.1791 . 8728 -. 0313 . 36954 291 
Residual -1.87452 2.52231 . 
00000 
. 
84470 291 
Std. Predicted Value -3.106 2.446 . 000 1.000 291 
Std. Residual -2.169 2.918 . 000 . 977 291 
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Figure 4: Histogram and normal P-P Plot of regression standardized residuals of 
regression analysis between the normal scores of asymmetric information proxy measures 
and the normal scores of corporate governance variables (without the dummy variables) 
Histogram of residuals Normal P-P Plot of regression standardized 
residuals 
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Table A. 3: Residuals Statistics of the Regression analysis between the 
normal scores of asymmetric information proxy measures and the normal 
scores of corporate governance variables (reduced models) 
Panel A: residual statistics of SPREADRATIO 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.623750 1.668331 -. 005967 . 6438036 300 
Residual - 2.7168541 . 0000000 6869949 300 1.8147367 . 
Std. Predicted Value -2.513 2.601 . 000 1.000 300 
Std. Residual -2.615 3.915 . 
000 
. 990 300 
Panrai R! RAsiduals Statistics of VOLATILITY 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 734878 . 722756 -. 012171 . 
2652307 300 
Residual - 2.6020083 . 0000000 . 8989366 300 3.1110544 
Std. Predicted Value -2.725 2.771 . 000 1.000 300 
Std. Residual -3.426 2.865 . 000 . 990 300, 
Panel C: Residuals Sta tistics OF VOLUME 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.691017 1.604631 . 010771 . 6415147 297 
Residual - 8229053 1 . 0000000 . 6847049 297 1.9740980 . 
Std. Predicted Value -2.653 2.485 . 000 1.000 297 
Std. Residual -2.854 2.635 . 000 . 990 297 
Panel D- Rpsidualc Sta tistics of LEVERAGE 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -2.031186 2.025249 -. 000652 . 7875102 304 
Residual - 8233547 4 . 0000000 . 5365089 304 1.8002621 . 
Std. Predicted Value 
-2.578 2.573 . 000 1.000 304 
Std. Residual -3.322 8.901 . 000 . 990 304, 
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Figure 5: Histograms and P-P Plots of Residuals Statistics of the Regression 
analysis between the normal scores of asymmetric information proxy measures 
and the normal scores of corporate governance variables (reduced models) 
Histogram of residuals Normal P-P Plot of regression standardized 
residuals 
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Table A. 4: Residuals Statistics of Robust the results of multiple 
regression analysis between corporate governance variables and 
asymmetric information proxy measures 
Panel A : Residuals Statistics of 2005 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.6649 1.7035 -. 0531 . 68016 182 
Residual -1.93616 2.66831 . 00000 . 72162 182 
Std. Predicted Value -2.370 2.583 . 000 1.000 182 
Std. Residual -2.638 3.636 . 000 . 983 182 
Panel B : Residuals Statistics of 200 6 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.6127 1.4006 -. 0743 . 56469 92 
Residual -1.48535 1.48399 . 00000 . 57593 92 
Std. Predicted Value -2.724 2.612 . 000 1.000 92 
Std. Residual -2.493 2.490 . 
000 
. 966 
92 
PanPI Ce Residuals Statistics of large companies 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.542145 . 642813 -. 667527 . 4205145 
151 
Residual - 2 4349508 0000000 5772419 151 1.5658034 . . . 
Std. Predicted Value -2.080 3.116 . 000 1.000 151 
Std. Residual -2.658 4.133 . 
000 
. 
980 151 
Panel D: Residuals Statistics of small companies 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 
. 133588 
1.227199 . 
664472 . 2073408 149 
Residual - 1 8017747 . 0000000 . 
5760871 149 
1.2620715 . 
Std. Predicted Value -2.560 2.714 . 000 
1.000 149 
Std. Residual -2.146 3.064 . 000 . 
980 149 
Panel E: Residuals Statistics of industrial companies 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.0797 1.1673 . 1425 . 50976 
92 
Residual -1.22008 1.62699 . 00000 . 57273 92 
Std. Predicted Value -2.398 2.010 . 000 
1.000 92 
Std. Residual -2.059 2.746 . 000 . 966 92 
Panel F: Residuals Sta tistics of non-industrial companies 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.7327 1.6751 -. 0716 . 69626 208 
Residual -1.81655 2.62805 . 00000 . 72324 208 
Std. Predicted Value -2.386 2.509 . 000 
1.000 208 
Std. Residual -2.475 3.581 . 000 . 985 208 
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Figure 6: Histograms and P-P Plots of Residuals Statistics of Robust the results of 
multiple regression analysis between corporate governance variables and 
asymmetric information proxy measures 
Histogram of residuals Normal P-P Plot of regression 
standardized residuals 
MWp. "n NrIIW FI wally M WuYIIIrn. IY. IYI 
2005 
O. MIWMVrMW'. INFlWM 0. MMM VUMW: W. IWtl1 
2006 
r Wem.. 
0t. S dv. nrr.: r. wudl 
"ynw. ýw. ý. i. r llrW 
wl. w ra wr lyn. w W. r. a.. ll. w. l 
6rnw1 VwW: YMIA011 
I" s 
ý 
"" 
Large 
companies 
Hi. p. ln 
DdP- V. lIMI.: NWREAOR 
MrmM. a wr IY. n. Wn W wrraN wnW 
WPIWM V. IW.: MMM. M 
d" 
" 
Ibp... bn . onn. la. w bww 
' 
Small 
companies 
w. mar. M 
w... e. M v. rl. a.: Nsonuon 
a 
W, ".. I ra wr *fl .. ** w. t#dIl d l. wr 
d,... «. rw.: Nwww 
d` 
' 
N. al... lall 
wM. 
tNw 1U 
WINI ' 
Industrial 
companies 
"r-""" 
____ _- _ 
N.. Ir v rr r Mwl. ll wr. raw Iwrl 
oH. IWgvrNw: IMNl4ol1 
Non- 
industrial 
companies 
NiWMý 
.... M. M w,. N.: N..,.. oll 
- 
. Irýý., wr IIynMYll WIY. MIM Mr"W 
.... ý. M ýM. W II...... II 
270 
Table A. 5: Residuals Statistics of The main results of the multiple 
regression analysis using different proxy measures for asymmetric 
information as dependent variables and alternative proxy measures for 
corporate governance 
Panel A: Residuals Statistics of SPReAUKAI10 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.564036 1.805189 -. 001883 . 
6234016 299 
Residual - 2.5872672 . 0000000 . 
7026259 299 
1.8234494 
Std. Predicted Value -2.506 2.899 . 
000 1.000 299 
Std. Residual -2.569 3.645 . 000 . 990 
299 
Panel A: Residuals Statistics of VO LATILITY 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 681894 . 727567 -. 
013759 . 2615690 
299 
Residual - 2.8113611 . 0000000 . 
8940515 299 
3.3209057 
Std. Predicted Value -2.554 2.834 . 000 1.000 
299 
Std. Residual -3.677 3.113 . 000 . 990 
299 
Panel A: Residuals Statistics of VO LUME 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.770218 1.573172 . 009969 . 6114883 296 
Residual - 1.7268192 . 0000000 . 7050313 
296 
2.0354962 
Std. Predicted Value -2.911 2.556 . 000 
1.000 296 
Std. Residual -2.858 2.424 . 000 . 990 296 
Panel A: Residuals Statistics of LEVERAGE 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -2.099789 2.127542 -. 007628 . 
8243729 303 
Residual - 4 8919578 . 
0000000 . 4674056 
303 
1.8962604 . 
Std. Predicted Value -2.538 2.590 . 000 
1.000 303 
Std. Residual -4.016 10.362 . 000 . 
990 303 
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Figure 7: Histograms and P-P Plots of Residuals Statistics of The main results of the 
multiple regression analysis using different proxy measures for asymmetric information 
as dependent variables and alternative proxy measures for corporate governance 
Histogram of residuals Normal P-P Plot of regression standardized residuals 
Nlpap"m 
0. p. aMN V. n. bk: Not., S loot. of EPREACRATIO uWq Wir tlw 
WNrG. n'. Forma. 
Normr PP Pbt .l!...... on {IwWwd1. W R"raur 
0. p. rpml Vwltll.: NormM {co,. 01 {PREI1p1A110 0.1.9 V. Ew 
WNrtlm'. F. -W. 
i+ 
ao 
rl 
.7 
r +Nprpp. 
n awprdl. G 1.. 16115 
'" " 
o. °, u 
^^r 
tl"^Mp O. it*. Mwr, p {cs. r 1lRY. b. Vw, M WwMY 
Norms PJ Plr r R. Er.. ron ElwNwal. W R.. NI uw 
IrPw. a. nl vpl. w.: N>mr a. er. r vtt. rnrtv, rrr, F vm aw w. w e. n. 
s. 
w..... Fr«. r..... N, 
r 
"" u'OY"nM 
Gwi Pr+u" 
," 
Nlpeawn Norms Pi Plot of Rpr.. r. n EI. IJrSad 1.9160.1 
D"r VM. l1.: Norms Ecun of VOLUME urlp V. n Ew WNodn'. 
Formal. 
O"P"nbnt Vwl. bi. NormM feor. of VOL UNE ulna V.. a.. w"ýG. n". 
fermul. 
r ýRrEn.. 
l. n Mwp"rw. MIY"IýWr 
r 
W 
o" 
o 
"a .. ,° "'OOxrvM 
Cu,. Mao 
or 
Hlftepnm No PF Plot of R. Q.. NO. tt W. ASJ RntSW 
DFPOndot VMalN: Norma lop. of DERTTOANETS urny V{n Yw 
Ww0MR'. FonnWa 
OEPa1Mnt V. d. 01R: Mm" tem of DE$TTOA{6ETN 014.9 VE11 Mr 
W. Mbn'. FomWI. 
S °" 
w 
Ilý,. a a¢. u 
r o.. eE. 
., 
Rf.. bn EWW. rNSW R.. IW. 1 
rt oa osý. 
rvwl CUm PrOEa. 
ro 
272 
Table A. 6: Residuals Statistics The main results of the multiple regression 
analysis using spread ratio as a measure for asymmetric information and 
alternative proxy measure for corporate governance to robust the results 
between years, companies' sizes and companies' industries 
Panel A: Residuals Statistics of 200 5 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.6079 1.9115 -. 0556 . 66204 182 
Residual -1.90530 2.51476 . 00000 . 74141 182 
Std. Predicted Value -2.345 2.971 . 000 1.000 182 
Std. Residual -2.527 3.335 . 000 . 983 182 
Panel B: Residuals Statistics of 200 6 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.6101 1.5781 -. 0567 . 
55718 91 
Residual -1.66285 1.44981 . 00000 . 56236 91 
Std. Predicted Value -2.788 2.934 . 000 1.000 91 
Std. Residual -2.857 2.491 . 000 . 966 91 
Panel C: Residuals Statistics of la e companies 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.458892 . 
637874 -. 663424 . 
4003198 150 
Residual - 2.5120678 . 
0000000 . 5894878 150 1.5814073 
Std. Predicted Value -1.987 3.251 . 000 1.000 150 
Std. Residual -2.628 4.175 . 
000 
. 
980 150 
Panel D: Residuals Statistics of small companies 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 
. 176071 
1.373811 . 
664099 . 2142976 149 
Residual - 7594976 1 . 
0000000 . 5739015 149 1.2561127 . 
Std. Predicted Value -2.277 3.312 . 
000 1.000 149 
Std. Residual -2.144 3.003 . 000 . 
980 149, 
Panel E: Residuals Statistics of Industrial companies 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.1220 1.3826 . 1425 . 
47317 92 
Residual -1.11412 1.88315 . 
00000 . 60331 
92 
Std. Predicted Value -2.672 2.621 . 000 
1.000 92 
Std. Residual -1.785 3.017 . 000 . 
966 92 
Panel F: Residuals Sta tistics of non-industrial companies 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.7199 1.8057 -. 0661 . 68576 207 
Residual -1.82240 2.53152 . 00000 . 73004 207 
Std. Predicted Value -2.412 2.730 . 000 1.000 207 
Std. Residual -2.460 3.417 . 000 . 985 207 
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Figure 8: Histograms and P-P Plots of Residuals Statistics of The main results of the multiple 
regression analysis using spread ratio as a measure for asymmetric information and alternative proxy 
measure for corporate governance to robust the results between years, companies' sizes and companies' 
industries 
Histogram of residuals Normal P-P Plot of regression standardized 
residuals 
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Table A. 7: Residuals Statistics of The main results of the multiple 
regression analysis using different proxy measures for asymmetric 
information as dependent variables and corporate governance sub- 
indexes 
Panel A: Residuals Statistics of SPREADRATIO 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 798873 . 628565 -. 383393 . 3070190 161 
Residual - 1.8927835 . 0000000 7954427 161 1.9958255 . 
Std. Predicted Value -1.353 3.296 . 000 1.000 161 
Std. Residual -2.478 2.350 . 000 . 
987 161 
Panel B: Residuals Statistics of VO LATILITY 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 617297 . 868493 -. 022448 . 2263113 161 
Residual - 2.0741100 . 0000000 8608500 161 2.1777301 . 
Std. Predicted Value -2.628 3.937 . 000 1.000 161 
Std. Residual -2.498 2.379 . 000 . 987 161 
Panel C: Residuals Statistics of VO LUME 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 692306 . 874685 . 380339 . 3614327 161 
Residual - 1.9750712 . 0000000 . 7301577 161 2.2687552 
Std. Predicted Value -2.968 1.368 . 
000 1.000 161 
Std. Residual -3.068 2.671 . 000 . 987 161 
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Figure 9: Histograms and P-P Plots of Residuals Statistics of The main results of the 
multiple regression analysis using different proxy measures for asymmetric information 
as dependent variables and corporate governance sub-indexes 
Histogram of residuals Normal P-P Plot of regression standardized 
residuals 
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Table A. 8: Residuals Statistics of the main results of the simple regression 
analysis using corporate governance general index 
Panel A- Residuals Statistics of SPREADRATIO 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.125377 . 400453 -. 362869 . 2826727 255 
Residual - 2 1382053 0000000 7966245 255 2.3475060 . . . 
Std. Predicted Value -2.697 2.700 . 
000 1.000 255 
Std. Residual -2.941 2.679 . 000 . 998 255, 
P7fOI H" I PSIf1IIAIC : %T2TIgTICS OT VULA I IL-1 IT 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 521613 . 435176 -. 
044418 . 
1768558 254 
Residual - 2.1144898 . 
0000000 . 
8775187 254 
2.2067111 
Std. Predicted Value -2.698 2.712 . 
000 1.000 254 
Std. Residual -2.510 2.405 . 000 . 
998 254, 
Panel G: Residuals statistics OT VULUM 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 504866 1.155114 . 
326055 . 
3074938 255 
Residual - 22028894 . 
0000000 . 8107312 
255 
2.4087024 
Std. Predicted Value -2.702 2.696 . 000 1.000 255 
Std. Residual -2.965 2.712 . 000 . 998 255 
Panel D: Residuals Statistics of LEVERAGE 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 067498 . 358434 . 
145955 . 
0789198 254 
Residual - 2.3227739 . 0000000 . 8714985 
254 
1.8390766 
Std. Predicted Value -2.705 2.692 . 
000 1.000 254 
Std. Residual -2.106 2.660 . 000 . 998 254 
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Figure 10: Histograms and P-P Plots of Residuals Statistics of the main results of the 
simple regression analysis using corporate governance general index 
Histogram of residuals Normal P-P Plot of regression standardized 
residuals 
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Table A. 9: Residuals Statistics of The main results of the simple regression 
analysis using corporate governance industry index 
Panel A: Residuals Statistics of SPREADRATIO 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 889094 . 368820 -. 340476 . 2627740 240 
Residual - 
1.7889694 2.0072565 . 
0000000 
. 7879921 240 
Std. Predicted Value -2.088 2.699 . 000 1.000 240 
Std. Residual -2.266 2.542 . 000 . 998 240 
Panel B: Residuals Statistics of VO LATILITY 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 323337 . 
314807 -. 046120 . 
1330393 238 
Residual - 2.1841424 
. 
0000000 
. 8764705 238 2.1224129 
Std. Predicted Value -2.084 2.713 . 000 1.000 238 
Std. Residual -2.416 2.487 . 
000 
. 
998 238 
Panel C: Residuals Statistics of VO LUME 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 464368 . 937590 . 327102 . 2929801 239 
Residual - 2.0986061 . 
0000000 7906312 239 1.9711547 . 
Std. Predicted Value -2.701 2.084 . 000 1.000 239 
Std. Residual 
-2.488 2.649 . 
000 
. 998 239, 
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Figure 11: Histograms and P-P Plots of Residuals Statistics of the main results of the 
simple regression analysis using corporate governance industry index 
Histogram of residuals Normal P-P Plot of regression standardized 
residuals 
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Appendix 3 
Some multiple regression analysis results 
Table A. 10: Regression analysis between the normal scores of asymmetric information proxy measures and 
the normal scores of corporate governance variables (witnout aummy variances) 
SPREAD (+1 Sig. VOLATILITY(+) Sie. VOLUME(-) Sie. LEVERAGE(-) Sie. 
Number of observations 287 287 284 294 
R Square 0.48 0.13 0.49 0.16 
Adjusted R Square 0.46 0.10 0.47 0.13 
Std Frrnr of the F%timnte 0.69 0.88 0.68 0.86 
3.86*** 
Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity 
chit 1.92 0.17 1.19 0.28 3.43 0.06 3.13 0.08 
(Constant) - 0.01 0.95 
0.08 
0 50 - 
0.01 0.95 
0.12 0.32 
NNONEXESIZE - 0.24*** 0.00 0.00 1.00 
0.23*** 0.00 0.05 0.48 
NNCSIZE - 0.00 0.84 - 0.03 0.28 
0.01 0.64 0.03 0.36 
NBOARDMEETINGS 0.06 0.14 0.16*** 0.01 
0.03 0.47 0.02 0.70 
NRCMEETS - 0.07 0.16 0.01 0.85 
0.06 0.23 - 0.03 0.62 
NACMEETS - 0.04 0.47 
0.03 0.61 0.12** 0.02 
0.02 0.75 
NFEMALTOBOARD 0.05 0.55 
0.11 0.35 0.07 0.41 - 
0.13 0.23 
NCEOBENFITS - 0.14*** 0.00 
0.04 0.50 0.10** 0.04 
0.04 0.47 
NINSIDERSOWN 0.20**" 0.00 
0.17*** 0.01 - 0.25*** 0.00 - 
0.30*** 0.00 
NINSIDERSSIZE - 0.18*** 0.00 - 
0.08 0.21 0.17*** 0.00 
0.09 0.15 
NBLOCKOWN 0.12*** 0.01 
0.14*** 0.01 - 0.05 0.26 
0.05 0.41 
NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL - 0.16*** 0.00 - 0.04 0.52 0. )2*"* 0.01 ------- ----- 
*'", *', * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Table I presents the results of the regression between the normal scores of asymmetric information proxy measures and the normal scores of corporate 
governance variables (without dummy variables). We examined hetroskedasticity for all regression using Breusch-Pagan / Cook- Weisberg test. 
Statistics like RZ and adjusted R' were also reported to determine the goodness of fit of the model. Using NSPREADRATIO, NVOLATILITY, 
NVOLUME and NLEVERAGE as proxy measures for asymmetric information, the models are significant at 1% level of significance since the F-test 
significance <0.01. The R2 ofNSPREADRATIO, NVOLATILITY, NVOLUME and NLEVERAGE are 0.48,0.13,0.49 and 0.16 respectively. 
The full regression model using NSPRIi; 11)RA1 IO as a proxy measure ufasymmetrie info rm. uion is summarized by the following equation: 
YSPREADRATIO = -0.01 - 0.24 NNONEXESIZE -0.00 NNCSIZE + 0.06 N BOARDM EETINGS - 0.07 NRCNEETS -. 04 NACAIEETS +. 05 
NFEAMAL I'OBOARD - 0.14 NCEOBENFITS + 0.20 NINSIDERSOWN - 0.18 NINSIDERSSIZE + 0.12 NBLOCKOWN - 0.16 
NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL 
The results are identical with the full regression model (which includes the dummy variables) and indicated that NNONEXESIZE, NCEOBENFITS, 
NINSIDERSSIZE and NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL are negatively significantly related with asymmetric information and NINSIDERSOWN and 
NBLOCKOWN are positively significantly related with asymmetric information. All other variables in the regression are not significantly related with 
asymmetric information at l0% level of significance (including the dummy variables). These results mean that the higher the number of non-executive 
directors serving in the board, the ratio of CEO benefits, the number of insiders who have ownership in the company and the ratio of long term debt to 
capital, the lower the degree of asymmetric information. Also, the higher the fraction of outstanding shares held by insiders and the fraction of 
outstanding shares owned by block-holders the higher the degree of asymmetric information. 
The full regression model using NVOLATILITY as a proxy measure of asymmetric information is summarized by the following equation: 
Y VOLATILITY = 0.08 + 0.00 NNONEXESIZE - 0.03 NNCSIZE + 0.16 NBOARDMEETINGS - 0.01 NRCNIEETS + 0.03 NACMEETS - 0,11 NFENIALTOBOARD - 0.04 N(EOBENFII' + 0,17 NINSIDERSOWN - 0.08 NINSIDERSSIZE + 0.14 NILOCKOWN - . 04 
The results indicated that NBOARDMEETINGS, NINSIDERSOWN and NBLOCKOWN are significantly positively related to NVOLATILITY. All 
other variables in the regression are not significantly related with asymmetric information at 10% level of significance (including the dummy 
variables). These results mean that the higher the number of board meetings, the fraction of outstanding shares held by insiders and the fraction of 
outstanding shares owned by block-holders the higher the degree of asymmetric information. 
The full regression model using NVOLUME as a proxy measure of asymmetric information is summarized by the following equation 
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V VOLUME =-0.01 + 0.23 NNONEXESIZE + 0.01 NNCS1ZE + 0.03 NBOARDMEETINGS + 0.06 NRCMEETS + 0.12 NACMEETS - 0.07 
NFEIIALTOBO. ARD + 0.10 NCEOBENFITS - 0.25 NINSIDERSOWN + 0.17 NINSIDERSSIZE - 0.05 NBLOCKOWN + 0.12 
N LONG D EBTTOCAPITAL 
Using NVOLUME, the results indicated that NVOLUME are significantly positively related to NONEXESIZE, NACMEETS, NCEOBENFITS, 
NINSIDERSSIZE and NLONGDEBTTOCAPITAL and significantly negatively related to NINSIDERSOWN. All other variables in the regression are 
not significantly related with asymmetric information at 10% level of significance (including dummy variables). That means the higher the number of 
non-executive directors serving in the board, the number of Audit committee meetings, the ratio of CEO benefits, the number of insiders who have 
ownership in the company and the ratio of long term debt to capital, the lower the degree of asymmetric information. Also, the higher the fraction of 
outstanding shares held by insiders the higher the degree of asymmetric information. 
the full regression Windel using NLFV1: RA(ih as a pro'. } measureol asymmetric information is summarized by the following equation: 
I' LEVERAGE =-0.12 + 0.05 NNONEXESIZE + 0.03 NNCSIZE + 0.02 NBOARD51 EETINCS - 0.03 NRCMIEETS + 0.02 NACNIEETS - 0.13 
NFEMALTOBOARD + 0.04 NCEOBENFITS - 0.30 NINSIDERSOWN - 0.09 NINSIDERSSIZE + 0.05 NBLOCKOWN 
The NLEVERAGE model indicated that NINSIDERSOWN is significantly negatively related to NLEVERAGE. All other variables in the regression 
are not significantly related with asymmetric information at 10% level of significance (including dummy variables). This result means the higher the 
fraction of outstanding shares held by insiders the higher the degree of asymmetric information. 
282 
Table A. 11: the main results of the multiple regression analysis using different proxy measures 
for asymmetric information as dependent variables and alternative proxy measures for 
corporate governance 
Model summary 
Number of observations 299 299 296 303 
R Square 0.44 0.08 0.43 0.17 
Adjusted R Square 0.43 0.42 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.71 0.90 0.71 0.87 
F 38.31*** 0.00 3.70*** 0.00 36.23'*' . 00 
12.29*** 0.00 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook- 
Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity 
chi2(l) 
MAIN VARIABLES 
0.08 
Coef. 
0.78 
P>t 
Robust standard error 
Coef. P>t 
0.07 
Coef. 
0.78 
P>t 
Robust standard error 
Coef. P>t 
(Constant) -0.01 0.84 - 0.01 0.85 0.02 
0.71 -0.00 0.95 
NBSIZE -0.25*** 0.00 0.04 0.59 
0.21*** 0.00 0.15** 0.03 
NCEOSALARY 0.16*** 0.00 0.07 0.22 - 0.10'* 0.03 -0.04 0.52 
NINSIDERSOWN 0.25*** 0.00 0.15** 0.03 -0.33*** 0.00 -0.31**' 0.00 
NINSIDERSSIZE -0.21*** 0.00 -0.12* 0.09 0.24*** 0.00 0.08 0.21 
NLARGESTOWNER 0.08* 0.07 0.09 0.13 -0.05 0.30 0.04 0.45 
NDEBTTOCAPITAL -0.09** 0.05 - 0.07 0.35 0.08 
0.11 ------- ----- 
"ii, "", ' indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
The full regression m odd using NSI RIADRAT IO as a pioxy measure of asvuumctric inR rmauion is summarized hr the Rollos ink, cyuauun- 
YSI'READRATIO =-0.0I - 0.25 NBSIZE+ 0.16 NCEOSALARY+ 0.25 NINSIDERSOWN - 
0.21 NINSIDERSSIZE + 0.08 NI ARGESTOWNER 
- 0.09 NDEBTTOCAPITAL 
The results indicated that NBSIZE, INSIDERSSIZE and NDEBTTOCAPITAL are negatively and significantly related mth NSPREADRA110 and 
NCEOSALARY, NINSIDERSOWN and NLARGESTOWNER are positively significantly related with NSPREADRATIO. These results mean that the 
higher the size of the board, the number of insiders who have ownership in the company and the ratio debt to capital, the lower the degree of asymmetric 
information. Also, the higher the salary of CEO, the fraction of outstanding shares held by insiders and the fraction of outstanding shares owned by the 
largest owner, the higher the degree of asymmetric information. 
The full regression nu del using NV(ll. AA'1'It lI as a proxy measure of a.., ýmmetric information is summarized by the fullo%Ning equation 
YVOLATILfI'Y = -0.01 + 0.04 NBSIZE + 0.07 NCEOSALARY + 0.15 NINSIDERSOWN - 0.12 NINSIDEI4SSILE + 0.09 NLARCE: STOWNER 
. 0.07 NDEBTTOCAPITAL 
The results indicated that NINSIDERSOWN positively and significantly related with asymmetric information and NIINSIDERSSILG negatively and 
significantly related with asymmetric information. All other variables in the regression are not significantly related with asymmetric information at 10% 
level of significance (but the signs of the coefficients are identical with the signs of the coefficients using NSPREADRATIO). This result supports sonic 
of the last results using NSPREADRATIO. The higher the fraction of outstanding shares held by insiders the higher the degree of asymmetric 
information but the higher the number of insiders who have ownership in the company the lower the degree of asymmetric information. 
füll regression model using, N V( Mt as a proxy measure ofasymnrtric information is summarized by the fOllum in, equation 
OLUh1E =. 016 +. 214 NBSIZE -. 096 NCEOSALARI' - . 334 NINSIDERSOW'N + . 242 NINSIDERSSIZE -. 046 LARCESTOWNER +. 076 
f. II TOCAPITAL 
find results Kedialar to the results in the last equations (using NSPRI ADRATIO and NVOLATILITY). NVOLUMt are significantly positively 
Led to NBSIZE and NINSIDERSSIZE and significantly negatively related to NCEOSALARY and NINSIDERSOWN. All other variables in the 
ession are not significantly related with asymmetric information at 10% level of significance. These results mean that the higher the size of the board 
the number of insiders who have ownership in the company and the ratio of long term debt to capital, the lower the degree of asymmetric information. 
>, the higher the CEO salary and the fraction of outstanding shares held by insiders the higher the degree of asymmetric information. 
full regression model using LEVERAGE as a proxy measure of asynmetric intürmation is summarized by the 
find some Kedialar results. NLEVERAGE is significantly positively related to NBSIZE and significantly negatively related to NINSIDERSOWN and 
ISIDERSSIZE. All other variables in the regression are not significantly related with asymmetric information at 10% level of significance. That 
ns, the higher the number of directors serving in the board the lower the degree of asymmetric information. Also, the higher the fraction of 
tanding shares held by insiders the higher the degree of asymmetric information. 
last models have no multicollinearity problem and normally distributed independent variables and residuals. Also, we examined the assumption of 
sally distributed residuals using histogram and normal P-P Plot of regression standardized residual. 
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